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Foreword
The papers in this collection were given at Peking University (PKU) in 
Beijing at a conference held on 10–11 September 2015. The event, entitled 
‘Retrospect and prospect: the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta’ was, in 
fact, the third Anglo-Chinese historians’ conference organized between 
the Institute of Historical Research in London and the historians of PKU 
acting on behalf of historians of Britain in China in general. Our host, 
Professor Qian Chengdan, professor of history at PKU, had specifically 
requested that we hold a conference on Magna Carta and its influence, and 
the papers in the collection reflect the interest of Chinese scholars not only 
in the making of Magna Carta in 1215 but its enduring relevance in Britain, 
the west and now globally. 
A group of eight historians went from Britain to Beijing. At the conference 
they were partnered by nine Chinese scholars who also gave papers. The full 
proceedings of the conference, the schedule of which is included in this 
collection, will be published in Chinese in 2018. Here, we publish the papers 
given by the British contingent only. Written and presented to a Chinese 
audience, many of whom had interests in more modern British history, 
these papers are necessarily broad in compass and general in approach. We 
were conscious that we were writing for an audience interested above all in 
the major themes of 1215 and the enduring qualities of Magna Carta rather 
than the minutiae. But this may be one of the advantages of the collection: 
the papers here, written for an international audience, explain and preserve 
the essence of Magna Carta and its meaning. 
For their part, our Chinese counterparts were interested in Magna Carta’s 
reputation and influence in China; in the meaning of ‘liberty’ as enshrined 
in the document and as interpreted by subsequent generations; in parallel 
developments in Chinese history which might be compared with the events 
in England in the early thirteenth century; and in its specifically religious and 
episcopal contexts. The paper delivered by Professor Gao Dai of the history 
department at PKU was a wonderfully entertaining, whimsical and also 
serious contribution linking 1215 with the present, by way of environmental 
history. Noting that clause 33 of Magna Carta stipulated a prohibition on 
weirs in the rivers Thames and Medway in order to encourage salmon, Gao 
Dai showed that from the seventeenth to the mid nineteenth century the 
clause was ignored and the salmon, overfished and unable to navigate the 
rivers, consequently died out. But recent improvement to the ecology of 
the Thames has seen the welcome return of the salmon, a small but telling 
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connection of the present to Magna Carta’s origin. 
The conference was attended by faculty members from PKU, historians 
from many other Chinese universities, and postgraduate students. The 
quality of the questions and comments from the latter group assure us that 
the future of British historical studies in China will be very bright indeed. 
Discussion was always rich and engaging, but was especially lively whenever 
comparisons were made between social structures and legal forms in the 
Song, Jin and Liao eras in Chinese history and the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries in England and Europe more generally. Thus we fulfilled another 
of the aims of these Anglo-Chinese meetings, held every three years: that we 
should not only learn about each other’s history, but compare and contrast 
national developments.
Our Chinese hosts were wonderfully generous. The five-day visit included 
a day trip to the Great Wall as well as sightseeing in Beijing. We would like 
to thank Professor Qian Chengdan in particular for planning the academic 
programme and presiding at the conference, and Liang Yuetian of the 
history department at PKU for organizing our itinerary with such ease and 
good humour. We were assisted by many postgraduates while in Beijing 
and two in particular, both studying British history, deserve special thanks: 
Yongchun Xie of PKU and Zhang Yekai who is now at work on a Ph.D. in 
the history department at Brown University in the United States. 
The Institute of Historical Research is grateful also to Sir Robert (Bob) 
Worcester, chairman of the 800 Committee, which largely planned and 
executed the many commemorations of Magna Carta in 2015, for the 
personal interest he took in the academic conference from which this book 
has emerged and financial support provided by the 800 Committee to get 
the British delegates to Beijing and back. 
Lawrence Goldman, Institute of Historical Research, January 2018
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1. Historic anniversaries in British public life: 
Magna Carta 800/2015 in perspective
Lawrence Goldman
The 800th anniversary celebrations of Magna Carta offer an opportunity 
to judge not only the importance of the document and the influence of its 
ideas on Britons today, but to consider also the growing British fascination 
with historical anniversaries of all sorts. In recent years a distinctive feature 
of British public life has been the number of historic anniversaries we not 
only register but mark in some public way, whether through celebrations or 
ceremonies of a more sombre type. Many of these are connected with the 
two twentieth-century world wars which have defined British identity and 
shaped British history like nothing else has in the modern period. Whether 
the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landings in June 
2014, the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War two months 
later, or the Battles of Agincourt (1415) and Waterloo (1815) as well as the 
800th anniversary of the sealing of Magna Carta in 2015, the British have 
become addicted to historical anniversaries, many of them military in 
nature. Each new year begins with the publication of the lists of historic 
anniversaries to follow over the next twelve months.1 If we awaken early 
enough each morning, at 5.35am on BBC Radio 4 great and notable events 
which occurred on this day in history are listed and sometimes explained, 
as if to encourage us out of bed to do something notable in the day to come 
as our forebears did notable things before us.2 It is reminiscent of the St. 
Crispin’s Day speech in Henry V: 
And gentlemen in England now a-bed
Shall think themselves accurs’d they were not here3
 1 See, for example, the 2016 list on the Visit England website: <https://www.visitengland.
com/biz/advice-and-support/travel-trade/anniversaries-2016>. This includes reference not 
only to the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare’s death and the 300th anniversary of the birth 
of Capability Brown, but the centenary of Roald Dahl’s birth and the 950th anniversary of 
the battle of Hastings. 
 2 For a comprehensive list of anniversaries relevant internationally, see <https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_historical_anniversaries>.
 3 Shakespeare, Henry V, IV. iii. 
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There is even an ‘On This Day’ BBC website listing daily events in the 
period 1950–2005, effectively covering the television age before the advent 
of the internet age.4 
The British have always been a historically minded people who have used 
history for contemporary political and civic purposes. But the recent desire 
to acknowledge our past in so many ways and so many places is worthy 
of some consideration, especially in the light of the public activities and 
projects connected with Magna Carta across Britain in 2015. What does the 
remembrance of Magna Carta tell us about the status of anniversaries in 
British public life and national consciousness, and how should historians 
think about the growing propensity to remember British – and other – 
history in this manner? 
The 2015 celebrations for Magna Carta came to a climax at Runnymede, 
in the meadow where the document was sealed on 15 June 1215 800 years 
previously, in the presence of the Queen and Prince William, the archbishop 
of Canterbury and the prime minister, David Cameron.5 The audience had 
assembled there early on a damp and faintly misty June morning, though 
they were soon exceedingly hot with no shade under a strong sun. There 
were speeches; bands and orchestras played; choirs sang; people chatted 
amiably and the atmosphere was more village fête – though for an event for 
3,500 people – than political event or historical commemoration.6 Fittingly, 
the morning’s activities ended with a flypast by the Red Arrows, the RAF’s 
elite aerial acrobatics team, who grace many a British festival. Probably the 
largest cheer of the morning was given before the speech of the United 
States’ attorney general, Loretta Lynch, representing the U.S. government 
and people.7 But this was not in virtue of the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’, or the American veneration of Magna Carta, which is palpably 
greater than in Britain. Rather, it was for her role in the arrest and detention 
 4 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/default.stm>.
 5 ‘Magna Carta changes the world, David Cameron tells anniversary event’ <http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33126723>; ‘Magna Carta: leaders celebrate 800th anniversary of the 
Great Charter’, The Guardian, 15 June 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/
jun/15/magna-carta-leaders-celebrate-800th-anniversary-runnymede>; ‘Authors of Magna 
Carta would be “bemused” by celebration 800 years on’, The Daily Telegraph, 15 June 2015 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/11675736/Authors-of-Magna-Carta-would-be-
bemused-by-celebration-800-years-on.html>. 
 6 Magna Carta. Foundation of Liberty. Runnymede 800. 15 June 2015 (official programme, 
National Trust, 2015).
 7 ‘British picnic on the grass and raise a pint to Magna Carta’, Washington Post, 15 June 
2015 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/british-gather-to-commemorate-800th-
anniversary-of-magna-carta/2015/06/15/63e90a58-133d-11e5-89f3-61410da94eb1_story.
html?tid=ptv_rellink
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in the previous days of allegedly corrupt officials from the governing body 
of world football, FIFA. In a country not famed for its devotion to soccer, 
the American authorities had done what no government in Europe had 
dared to do despite all the evidence of misappropriation and malfeasance 
by FIFA officials. Magna Carta had secured the rights of the innocent and 
mandated due process under the law: many clapped and cheered Lynch for 
ensuring that the rule of law would extend to the administration of ‘the 
beautiful game’ across the world.8
Participants at Runnymede that morning were also able to admire 
the new sculpture in the meadow by Hew Locke.9 Called ‘The Jurors’, it 
celebrates the famous 39th clause of Magna Carta mandating for all men 
‘the lawful judgment of his equals’. Locke’s bronze installation takes the 
 8 ‘FIFA President Sepp Blatter’s real foe was US Attorney General not ethics inquiry’, The 
Guardian, 21 Dec. 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/21/fifa-president-
sepp-blatter-nemesis-loretta-lynch-football-new-york>.
 9 ‘Sculpture at Runnymede celebrates Magna Carta’s blow against injustice’, The 
Guardian, 15 June 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/culture/2015/jun/15/hew-locke-
sculpture-jurors-runnymede-magna-carta-against-injustice>; <http://artatrunnymede.com>; 
<https://photosynth.net/preview/view/71e2a982-5079-41de-ac9e-75c1d422e9d8>.
Figure 1.1. ‘The Jurors’ by Huw Lock at Runnymede, Surrey, commissioned 
by Surrey County Council and the National Trust to commemorate the 
800th anniversary of Magna Carta in 2015. The twelve chairs represent 
the historical and ongoing struggle for justice and equal rights.  
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Figure 1.2. The  American Bar Association Memorial to 
Magna Carta at Runnymede, erected in 1957.
Historical anniversaries in British public life
5
form of twelve chairs for twelve jury members and pays tribute not only 
to Magna Carta’s English origins and influence in Britain but, in chairs 
devoted to the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of the serfs and the 
struggle for the freedom of Nelson Mandela, among other themes, to its 
influence around the world. Mandela, of course, cited the rights granted 
by Magna Carta in his great speech at the Rivonia trial in South Africa 
in 1964.10 ‘The Jurors’ is a less dramatic memorial than the column that 
nineteenth-century satirist Richard Brinsley Sheridan proposed to erect in 
the meadow for the centenary of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 on ‘a 
spot sacred to the liberties of the people’.11 But this was never built. The 
celebrations planned for 1715 were never held in a tense year in British 
history when the new Hanoverian regime of George I was threatened with 
Jacobite rebellion. Nor did the planned commemorations of 1815 and 1915 
take place in years in which Britain was engaged in two great wars in France 
and the Low Countries. 
This climax to the events of 2015 was, in fact, a very British style of 
anticlimax, understated and casual rather than scripted and formal. This 
was in keeping with the planning and organization of the Magna Carta 
anniversary from the first which had fallen to the ‘800 Committee’ under 
the aegis of the Magna Carta Trust which had been formed in 1956.12 The 
800 Committee included public figures, politicians, jurists, academics and 
representatives of those institutions which hold copies of Magna Carta, 
among them cathedrals and great libraries.13 But until the grant of £1 million 
by the chancellor of the exchequer, George Osborne, in his 2014 Budget 
speech – and this can hardly be considered magnificent public largesse – 
the 800 Committee and the preparation of the Magna Carta memorials 
entrusted to it had been largely supported by an individual, Sir Robert 
(Bob) Worcester, an American domiciled in England and famous for his 
long career in British political polling, who chaired the 800 Committee. 
Until 2012 most of the available public funds for cultural activity went to 
support the London Olympics; only latterly did the state recognize the 
significance of 2015, and, interestingly, having made a grant to the Magna 
Carta commemorations, central funds were then found, on the same model, 
 10 <http://artatrunnymede.com/magna-carta-nelson-mandela/>; <http://www.bl.uk/magna- 
carta/articles/magna-carta-in-the-modern-age>. 
 11 Annual Register, 1788, pp. 220, 249–51, cited in R. Quinault, ‘The cult of the centenary, 
c.1784–1914’, . Research, lxxi (1998), 303–23, at p. 305.
 12 <http://magnacarta800th.com>.
 13 <http://magnacarta800th.com/magna-carta-today/membership-of-the-magna-carta-
800th-committee/>.
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for the commemorations of Agincourt and Waterloo in 2015 as well.14 The 
British and Commonwealth campaign at Gallipoli in 1915, one of the many 
disastrous campaigns of the First World War, was not forgotten, either. 
On 25 April 2015, ANZAC Day, there were ceremonies at the Australian 
and New Zealand War Memorials in Hyde Park and at the Cenotaph in 
Whitehall, London. On the previous day, there had been a commemorative 
service at the Cape Hellas memorial at Gallipoli itself. Each of these was 
attended by members of the British royal family.15 
None of these military anniversaries evoked the crescendo of interest that 
attached to Magna Carta in 2015. The interest was all the more effective as 
a tool of public education because it was largely generated from below by 
academic, church, community and local groups given small sums for their 
projects, exhibitions and celebrations.16 In a very British fashion, the energy 
and interest was self-generated rather than imposed or choreographed 
from above. There were notable exhibitions, such as that in Westminster 
Hall which brought the four surviving original Magna Cartas to a single 
place, and the British Library exhibition ‘Law, Liberty and Legacy’ which 
ran for much of the year, designed by Dr Claire Breay, lead curator of 
medieval and early manuscripts at the British Library.17 Among several 
academic conferences, that held in June at King’s College London and the 
British Library was the most notable in bringing together all the leading 
historians.18 Magna Carta featured on several major websites including 
those of The National Archives,19 the Historical Association,20 Salisbury 
Cathedral21 and many smaller and less well-known ones. There were church 
services and thanksgivings; commemorative coins and postage stamps; local 
exhibitions and lectures; books and learned articles; school lessons aplenty; 
and several major television and radio programmes, such as the series 
devoted to Magna Carta’s history and legacy in BBC Radio 4’s ‘In Our 
Time’ strand.22 The celebrations and commemorations were not without a 
 14 <http://www.agincourt600.com>; <http://waterloo200.org/about/>. 
 15 Royal British Legion: Gallipoli Centenary: <http://www.britishlegion.org.uk/
remembrance/what-we-remember/gallipolicentenary/?gclid=Cj0KEQiA6IC2BRDcjPrjm_
istoUBEiQASrLz1k1rR_uonafbX7WJ0rDnky62eVomBYD9V5NEvesURwUaAj_
t8P8HAQ>. 
 16 <http://magnacarta800th.com/projects/>
 17 <http://www.bl.uk/events/magna-carta--law-liberty-legacy>; Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, 
Legacy, ed. C. Breay and J. Harrison (2015).
 18 <http://magnacarta.cmp.uea.ac.uk/read/conference>.
 19 <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/medieval/magna-carta/>.
 20 <https://www.history.org.uk/news/news_2510.html>.
 21 <http://www.salisburycathedral.org.uk/magna-carta>.
 22 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00k4fg7>.
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scholarly purpose and outcome as well. Thanks to a large grant in 2012 from 
the Arts and Humanities Research Council to Professor Nicholas Vincent 
at the University of East Anglia for a three-year project to track down lost 
originals of Magna Carta and create an online database about the document 
and its textual and manuscript history, two new copies were found.23 
Both were Magna Cartas dating from 1300 and both were originally from 
Kent. One was from Faversham and the other, found in the Kent County 
Archives along with the town’s Charter of the Forest, had originally been in 
the possession of the town of Sandwich.24 
Inevitably among such a range of commemorations, the import of Magna 
Carta became blurred, distorted and anachronistic. It was celebrated too 
often as a cornerstone of modern ‘democracy’ in some generalized way, 
rather than the rule of law, the rights of the subject, and due legal process.25 
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that all this activity had its effect: 
the sheer number of local projects and commemorations is testimony to 
the interest people took in the anniversary and its penetration into the 
collective ‘national mind’, if only for a few weeks in mid 2015. The Magna 
Carta anniversary celebrations may be the best evidence of British historical 
consciousness today, but they are hardly the only example of the marking 
and observance of anniversaries in our public life. Indeed, their prominence 
and success in 2015 owed a great deal to a public culture which has been 
highly interested and engaged in historical remembrance since at least the 
1980s. 
For academic historians the significance of modern public anniversaries 
can be best approached via the emergence of two relatively recent sub-
disciplines: the history of memory and the history of traditions. Eric 
Hobsbawm related the ‘invention of traditions’ to the development of 
modern nations and states in the nineteenth century and their requirement 
for a shared history and ceremonies by which to create national cohesion. 
Previous forms of solidarity had been based on religion, duty to a sovereign, 
regional or even tribal association. The new nation states in Europe and 
the Americas had to replace these with a national narrative which could be 
 23 <https://www.uea.ac.uk/about/media-room/press-release-archive/-/asset_publisher/
a2jEGMiFHPhv/content/university-of-east-anglia-unveils-magna-carta-research-project>; 
<http://magnacartaresearch.org>. 
 24 ‘Magna Carta edition found in Sandwich archive scrapbook’, BBC News, 8 Feb. 
2015 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-31242433>; ‘Faversham: Magna Carta 
rediscovered’ <http://magnacarta800th.com/projects/round-1-grants/faversham-magna-
carta-rediscovered/>.
 25 ‘In this field of dreams, democracy was born’, Daily Telegraph, 16 June 2015. 
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dramatized through anniversary.26 Hence the first celebrations of Bastille 
Day, 14 July, waited until 1880 and came at a time when the French Third 
Republic was struggling to legitimize republicanism, unify a nation, and 
turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’.27 Roland Quinault’s work on the history of 
public anniversaries, specifically centenaries, adds detail and texture to this 
broad thesis. Their observance emerged later than might be expected in the 
last third of the nineteenth century. Unlike twentieth-century observance, 
centenaries then tended to celebrate writers and cultural figures rather 
than military heroes and military events. The British state was not greatly 
involved: they were the work of enthusiasts and followers. The development 
of mass transportation and the growth of leisure assisted public participation. 
If they encouraged national solidarity, centenaries and anniversaries were 
made possible by the emergence of a mature historical consciousness in the 
final decades of the nineteenth century.28 The rise in historical interest and 
publication in these years, the development of major public institutions 
like the National Portrait Gallery which gave popular access to Britain’s 
past, the introduction of history as a degree course in universities and its 
institutionalization in the school curriculum, and the systematic gathering 
and cataloguing of historical documents in major collections, raised public 
awareness of the past and made the public anniversary possible. 
Some of the most notable anniversaries still celebrated in Britain were 
spontaneous acts of memorialization, emerging from the natural desire 
of populations to remember events and bear witness to the changes to 
their lives. Armistice Day, 11 November, emerged in this manner directly 
after the First World War, part spontaneous, part planned, and rapidly 
won pride of place in the British public’s annual ceremonial traditions.29 
Indeed, it supplanted the annual celebration of the Battle of Trafalgar of 21 
October 1805, which throughout the nineteenth century had been a major 
anniversary both in Britain and across the empire.30 After the First World 
War it was felt to be inappropriate to mark military victory in this manner 
and public mourning and remembrance took the place of celebration. 
Guy Fawkes Day, 5 November, also emerged rapidly after the events of 
1605 in which Roman Catholic plotters were caught before they were able 
 26 E. Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 1870–1914’ in The Invention of 
Tradition, ed. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (Cambridge, 1983; rev. edn. 1992), pp. 263–307. 
 27 Hobsbawm, ‘Mass-producing traditions’, p. 271. See E. Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: 
the Modernization of Rural France 1870–1914 (Stanford, Calif., 1976). 
 28 Quinault, ‘The cult of the centenary’, pp. 320–3. 
 29 A. Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919–1946 (Providence, R.I., 1994). 
 30 W. Shephard Walsh, Curiosities of Popular Customs and Rites, Ceremonies, Observances 
and Miscellaneous Antiquities (1898), p. 940. 
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to blow up parliament: almost immediately ‘national deliverance’ was 
celebrated widely across England and remembrance was institutionalized 
by the passage of the Observance of 5th November Act, widely known as 
the ‘Thanksgiving Act’, in January 1606, which mandated celebration and 
prayer on 5 November each year in thanks for the salvation of the king and 
legislators. The anniversary became a ritualized means for the denunciation 
and persecution of Roman Catholics; later, in the 1630s and 1640s, it was 
used by puritans as an occasion to denounce their political and religious 
enemies, royalists and all alleged crypto-Catholics.31 
The Magna Carta commemorations in 2015 led to nothing like this. 
The events of 1215 are too far in the past to create conflict as opposed to 
curiosity. The principles that Magna Carta embodied and has represented 
ever since are too central and precious to British and western political 
values and judicial systems to evoke dissent. There has been academic 
debate, as there should be: for example, the argument of the senior judge 
of the Supreme Court, Jonathan Sumption, who is also a leading medieval 
historian, that Magna Carta’s importance has been exaggerated, was 
controversial.32 There was criticism of David Cameron for using his speech 
at the ceremony at Runnymede on 15 June to exalt a putative British Bill 
of Rights of the future above the Human Rights Act of the present, passed 
by the Labour government in 1998 and disliked by many Conservatives 
because of its perceived bias in favour of individual petitioners.33 Cameron 
told the gathering that ‘here in Britain, ironically the place where those 
ideas were first set out, the good name of human rights has sometimes 
become distorted and devalued’. The mixing of party politics with national 
commemoration was not well received. In Beijing, an exhibition of the 
Hereford Cathedral Magna Carta at Renmin University was cancelled and 
relocated to the British embassy when the necessary ministerial approvals 
were not forthcoming.34 But these were relatively insignificant controversies 
and conflicts when set against the wider history of anniversaries and their 
celebration in British history. 
The very success of the Magna Carta celebrations and the interest in 
 31 J. A. Sharpe, Remember, Remember: a Cultural History of Guy Fawkes Day (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2005); D. Cressy, ‘The fifth of November remembered’, in Myths of the English, ed. 
R. Porter (1992). 
 32 J. Sumption, ‘Magna Carta then and now’, address to the Friends of the British Library, 
9 March 2015 <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-150309.pdf>. 
 33 ‘David Cameron: I’ll fix human rights mess’, BBC News, 15 June 2015 <http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/uk-politics-33134338>.
 34 ‘Magna Carta not welcome at Beijing University’ <http://magnacarta800th.com/
articles/magna-carta-not-welcome-at-beijing-university/>.
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anniversaries raise questions about a society so much given to retrospection: 
it may reinforce the view that Britain is a society with a better past than 
future and is fixated on lost glory.35 On the other hand, it may also be 
evidence of the remarkable success of history as a discipline in Britain today. 
On television and radio, in newspapers and magazines, on bookshelves 
and in libraries, history is popular and finds a ready audience – and this 
audience can appreciate the celebration of the past and participate fully 
in it. Certainly the commemoration of national anniversaries provides us 
with a type of national cohesion, though this may in itself simply be a 
replacement for other types of solidarity. Most religious ritual, ceremony 
and festivity is an act of remembrance – be it the birth and death of Jesus 
at Christmas and Easter; or the deliverance of the children of Israel from 
Egyptian slavery at Passover.
Some anniversaries are untroubled and untroubling, notably those 
commemorating events from the distant past or those that remember 
sacrifice in a self-evidently virtuous struggle such as the defeat of Nazism 
in the Second World War. But remembering the First World War is more 
difficult because the cause Britain fought for does not seem so just and noble 
now, and because the First World War is seen to have been badly managed 
by politicians and generals who, in the popular view of the war, needlessly 
sacrificed hundreds of thousands of British lives. The remembrance of 
national heroes is also easily accomplished. Winston Churchill’s reputation 
has only grown since his death in 1965, ensuring that the fiftieth anniversary 
in January 2015 was quite without criticism. In the 1960s and 1970s his 
mistakes were more prominent in public discussion, and it was common 
to hear and read reference to Tonypandy in 1911 (where as home secretary 
Churchill used troops to shut down a strike of Welsh coal miners); Gallipoli 
in 1915 (which was Churchill’s idea); going back onto the gold standard at 
the pre-war exchange rate in 1925 when he was chancellor of the exchequer; 
and his support for King Edward VIII in 1936 during the abdication crisis. 
Sometimes, an anniversary can usefully encapsulate a movement or an idea. 
A recent conference at the Institute of Historical Research in London on 
the relationship between science and modernism in the period 1880–1920 
exactly coincided with the centenary of the first ever use of poison gas in 
warfare on 22 April 1915 in France on the Western Front.36 What better way 
to point to the ambiguities in the history of technology and of ‘progress’ 
itself than to remind the audience of this dark centenary? 
 35 P. Wright, On Living in an Old Country: the National Past in Contemporary Britain 
(1985)
 36 ‘Being modern: science and culture in the early twentieth century’, 22–4 Apr. 2015, 
IHR, London <http://www.history.ac.uk/events/browse/17866>.
Historical anniversaries in British public life
11
Few anniversaries are without their attendant moral and national 
difficulties. Remembering the Second World War will be different for other 
combatant societies – for Germany and Japan, of course, and also for Russia 
and China, where the scale of what occurred and what is to be remembered 
is so different from British historical experience. There have been various 
arguments and disagreements over Second World War anniversaries: 
arguments over who sacrificed more; over who liberated the French (almost 
always the Americans); over the presence of German representatives at 
ceremonial events; and of the omission of due acknowledgment at the D-Day 
commemorations in 2014 of the role of Canadian personnel on 6 June 1944. 
The bombing of Dresden in February 1945 reignites controversy in Britain 
each year. To some Britons, the fact that the nation defines itself through 
the remembrance of conflicts and warfare is no sort of recommendation, 
and they object to the ‘militarization of remembrance’. In early November 
each year, most Britons wear a poppy in the lapel of their jackets and coats. 
It is timed to coincide with the anniversary of 11 November 1918, the day 
the First World War ended. The poppy we wear is a plastic flower, red in 
colour, to remind us of the real red poppies which grew on the battlefields 
of Flanders between 1914 and 1918: it is a national symbol of remembrance, 
perhaps the most notable of all personal, British symbols. But some critics 
today wear white poppies instead, distributed by the Peace Pledge Union 
which was founded in 1934, because they object to symbols of conflict and 
violence and to the glorification of warfare as they see it.37
The same event can therefore be remembered and experienced in different 
ways. This was made clear to me on 9 May 1990 when leading a party of 
students to Moscow under the old Soviet Union. We encountered a group 
of men wearing British military decorations, members of the North Russia 
Club which united comrades who had served at the Royal Navy bases in 
Archangel and Murmansk in northern Russia during the Second World 
War. Membership was later extended to all those who had served on the 
Arctic convoys to Russia supplying the Soviet Union with war materiel – 
guns, ammunition, supplies – from 1941.38 Their role in the war had been 
largely forgotten in Britain, and commemorating our alliance with Stalin 
was difficult during the Cold War. But these men came every year to Soviet 
commemorations of the end of the war and they looked on the Russians as 
their comrades and friends. 
 37  <http://www.ppu.org.uk/whitepoppy/>.
 38 The North Russia Club was wound up in 2007. There is still an Arctic Convoy Club. See 
<https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=arctic+convoy+club&sa=X&biw=1280&bih=907& 
tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&ved=0ahUKEwiLyJSTkv_KAhUBVxQKHWiK 
CqUQsAQIVQ>
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There are many anniversaries in the British calendar that are intrinsically 
controversial. The annual Guy Fawkes celebrations were occasions for 
the stigmatization of Roman Catholics, as we have seen. In 2014 many 
British television programmes and articles conveyed a message that the 
First World War was purposeless, meaningless carnage. Yet to many of 
the men who marched away to fight, the war had a powerful rationale in 
stopping ‘Prussianism’ and the domination of great powers over smaller 
nations seeking to be free. To them it was a fight for international order 
and liberalism, though this commitment has largely been overlooked in 
subsequent literary, dramatic and musical explorations of the war. Hiroshima 
Day, 6 August, has been taken up not only by peace movements in general, 
but by those who would distort the history of the use of atomic weapons 
and present it as a crime, rather than present it in its own unique historical 
context. Controversy attends any historical commemoration where the 
issues remain unresolved – for example, the centenary of the American Civil 
War in the early 1960s at a time when the same issues of African-American 
civil rights were still being fought over in the United States.39 It was difficult 
to avoid controversy and many American organizations, whether official 
or private, gave up the attempt at remembrance, or did so in a carefully 
muted fashion. Only military remembrance was possible on the basis of the 
shared heroism and sacrifice of both sets of combatants who in the 1860s 
fought nobly although for different causes. But as soon as those causes came 
under scrutiny, remembrance was pitched into the present and became 
politicized rather than historicized. This was also the fate of the centenary 
of the Russian Revolution in 2017. It was impossible to note the anniversary 
of the Bolshevik coup without noting also the crimes of the Soviet Union, 
its disregard for human life and truth, its inauspicious collapse, but the 
continuation of its anti-democratic and anti-western culture nonetheless. 
The different commemorations of 1917 were influenced not only by ideology 
but also by the knowledge that the Revolution, whatever the hopes for it at 
the time, ended in persecutions, purges, the gulags and collapse. 
The annual commemoration of the Apprentice Boys of Derry/
Londonderry, Northern Ireland, is in a league of its own when it comes 
to controversy and communal tension, even though the events recalled 
occurred as long ago as December 1688 when thirteen Protestant apprentice 
boys in Derry shut the city gates against a force of 1,200 Catholic troops. 
 39 R. Cook, ‘Ordeal of the union: Allan Nevins, the Civil War centennial and the civil 
rights struggle of the 1960s’ in Reconfiguring the Union: Civil War Transformations, ed. 
I. Morgan and P.  Davies (2013), pp.  181–200; J. Sexton, ‘Projecting Lincoln, projecting 
America’ in The Global Lincoln, ed. R. Carwardine and J. Sexton (Oxford, 2011), pp. 288–
302. 
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There followed more than seven months of siege, much of it under the 
command of the deposed king, James II, during which it was reported that 
4,000 of the townspeople, about half the population, died of starvation. 
The siege was eventually lifted by the forces of the new Protestant British 
monarch, William III, and the besieging Catholic army retreated. These 
events are marked each year by the ceremonial closing of the gates in 
December and then the biggest and most antagonistic of Northern Ireland’s 
Orange Order parades on the second Saturday of August to remember the 
relief of Derry/Londonderry. Protestant parades are more than merely acts 
of remembrance; in tense, religiously divided communities they have been 
understood as acts of intimidation on the part of the majority Protestant 
community against the minority Catholic community in Ulster. The 
problem is all the more intense in Derry/Londonderry because here the 
nationalist community – Catholic – is actually larger than the loyalist – 
Protestant – population. The routes taken by the parades and marches, 
which are held across the cities and towns of the province, have led them 
by design into many Catholic districts in order to reinforce the sense of 
subordination felt by many Catholics. They were always controversial but 
became the cause of outright violence between the communities in the 
years of the Troubles after 1968. Policing them drew the civil and military 
authorities into the local conflicts as well. After particularly intense conflict 
over Orange Order parades in Portadown in the mid and late 1990s, an 
investigative commission was established to recommend ways of reducing 
communal friction, and under the terms of the 1998 Public Processions 
(Northern Ireland) Act, a permanent Parades Commission, a quasi-
judicial public body, now oversees arrangements which allow Protestants to 
march, but in less contentious places, and Catholics to live in peace.40 The 
parades – and the annual summer marching season in Northern Ireland in 
general – are an example of the commemoration of events which are still 
integral to contemporary politics. In Northern Ireland, the way history is 
remembered, recorded and celebrated has itself become part of the ongoing 
conflict between groups. 
Some anniversaries, meanwhile, remember or commemorate the wrong 
thing. Anyone with even a passing knowledge of the French Revolution 
will appreciate the inflated significance that 14 July gives to the fall of the 
Bastille. The Bastille was a hated symbol of the corruption of the French 
ancien regime, but when the crowd overwhelmed it there were only a handful 
of prisoners to be released. Because it was a building that could be taken, 
as in a battle, it had an immediate significance. Yet, to a historian, there 
 40 <http://www.paradescommission.org>
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are far more important events in that same season, such as the pledge of 17 
June 1789, taken by members of the Third Estate and the liberal nobility, to 
create an enduring popular assembly – or the famous debates and decisions 
of that assembly on 4 August 1789 to end all feudal dues and relationships, 
all the privileges and legal immunities of an aristocracy that had prospered 
at the expense of the people. The commemoration of 14 July each year 
may be said to hamper a true understanding of the French Revolution as a 
sequence of events and developments stretching across more than a decade 
from 1786 to the rise of Napoleon in the mid 1790s. 
There are also forgotten anniversaries, those overlooked or otherwise 
uncelebrated. The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography devoted lavish 
resource and time to an update in October 2008 designed to coincide 
with the ninetieth anniversary of the end of the First World War which 
added several dozen biographies of people connected with the war who 
were missing from the Dictionary. But the update coincided with the global 
financial crash of that month, when the world economic system seemed on 
the brink of collapse, and no one took any notice. 
We should also register the capacity of a public ceremonial or 
commemoration to transform and overshadow private remembrance such 
that personal responses are overwhelmed by wider, societal reactions. It is 
to the credit of British society that Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January 
each year – the day that Auschwitz was liberated in 1945 – has been officially 
observed since 2001.41 The anniversary has grown in stature and significance 
in recent years, so that on 27 January 2015 the prime minister, the deputy 
prime minister and the leader of the opposition, among others, were all 
engaged in a televised public act of remembrance.42 No one could be against 
the efforts made thereby to ensure that this particular horror is not forgotten 
and that as a society, we educate the next generation about the degree of 
man’s inhumanity to man. But grief is largely private and is not always 
easily shared. Public ceremonial may educate others, those who perhaps 
need to be educated, but can feel like an invasion to those who themselves 
suffered or lost family members, or have been deprived of family members 
never born. When we mark anniversaries of such grave events in this public 
manner we should be aware also of the private reactions of those affected 
for whom public ceremonial may feel like an invasion of the privacy and 
solitude that personal remembrance sometimes requires. For this reason 
the most potent anniversaries in the calendar are not national anniversaries 
 41 <http://hmd.org.uk/page/about-hmdt>.
 42 <http://hmd.org.uk/news/holocaust-memorial-day-2015-uk-ceremony-honours-
survivor-memory>.
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of the sort investigated by historians, but personal ones, a set of individual 
memories that we carry with us and which pattern our lives. We recall – 
just about – when and where we first met our partner, when and where we 
learnt we were to become a mother or father, when and where we learnt of 
a death – and it could be the death of John F. Kennedy on 23 November 
1963, which so many people then alive, all over the world, seemed to recall 
in the years that followed.43 
Anniversaries structure our lives. They remind us who we are, which 
tribe we belong to, what we believe in and how we should understand the 
past. They bind us together, whether in a nation, sect or group. They can 
also divide us from others. But what made the 800th anniversary of Magna 
Carta notable was its universality based on the central ideas contained 
within the document itself.44 There was much understandable public 
interest in the history of the early thirteenth century which brought the 
parties – king, bishops and nobles – to Runnymede in June 1215. There was 
legitimate pride in Magna Carta as a product of English history and values. 
But the anniversary celebrations were notable for the focus on the ideas of 
due process, fair and open procedures, the rule of law and the submission 
of all – even monarchs – to that law. This made it possible to widen the 
participants in, and audience for, the 800th anniversary because these 
ideas have an international – indeed a universal – impact far beyond the 
confines of England, Britain and the Commonwealth. Most anniversaries 
are confined by the history of the events and the biography of the individual 
being celebrated. Exceptionally, in 2015, the Magna Carta anniversary 
exceeded the boundaries of time and place and was marked and celebrated 
around the world, in Beijing as well as in Runnymede. 
 43 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/22/newsid_2451000/ 
2451143.stm>.
 44 N. Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and Legacy (Oxford, 2015), p. 150. 
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2. Magna Carta 1215: its social and political context
David Carpenter
The year 2015 was the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta. It was on 15 June 
1215 that King John, in the meadow of Runnymede beside the Thames 
between Windsor and Staines, authorized the writing out and sealing of 
the document which was to become known as Magna Carta. Runnymede 
remains an atmospheric place and it is not difficult to imagine the scene 
during those tense days in June 1215 when the Charter was being negotiated; 
the great pavilion of the king, like some circus top, towering over the 
smaller tents of barons and knights stretching out across the meadow.1 
Today the great jets taking off from London Heathrow airport come 
up over Runnymede and then turn to fly down its whole length before 
vanishing into the distance. It is as though they are taking Magna Carta 
round the world, and the Charter has indeed become one of the most 
famous documents in world constitutional history. 
 Magna Carta is 3,550 words long written in Latin, the English translation 
of the Latin Magna Carta being Great Charter. Much of the Charter, even 
in a modern translation, can seem remote and archaic. It abounds in terms 
like wainage, amercement, socage and distraint.2 Some of its chapters seem 
of minor importance. One calls for the removal of fish weirs from the rivers 
Thames and Medway. Yet there are other chapters which still have a very 
clear contemporary relevance. Under chapter 12, the king is not to levy 
taxation without the common consent of the kingdom. Under chapter 39, 
he cannot arrest people or seize their property without judgement of their 
peers or by the law of the land. Under chapter 40, he is not to deny, delay 
or sell justice.3 In these ways, the Charter asserted a fundamental principle: 
 1 The best contemporary description of the scene is in Radulphi de Coggeshal Chronicon 
Anglicanum, ed. J. Stevenson (Rolls Ser., 1875), p.  172. The chronicler Matthew Paris 
explained that ‘Runnymede’, an English word, meant ‘the meadow of counsel’. It was ‘a 
place where from ancient times meetings had taken place about the peace of the kingdom’ 
(Matthaei Parisiensis Historia Anglorum, ed. F. Madden (3 vols., Rolls Ser., 1866–9), ii. 153). 
 2 D. Carpenter, Magna Carta (Harmondsworth, 2015), pp.  461–70 has a glossary 
explaining the meaning of these and other contemporary terms. The classic work on the 
Charter remains J.C. Holt, Magna Carta (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1992). 
 3 Detailed commentaries on the chapters in the 1215 Magna Carta by Henry Summerson 
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that of the rule of law. The king was beneath the law, the law the Charter 
itself was making. He could no longer treat his subjects in an arbitrary 
fashion. Chapters of Magna Carta are still on the statute book of the United 
Kingdom today.4 It still features in current political debate. The heading 
may be found on the website of the Magna Carta project <http://www.magnacartaresearch.
org> [accessed 22 March 2018]. 
 4 For the surviving chapters and the repeal of others, see ‘Magna Carta repeals’: <http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw1cc1929/25/9/contents> [accessed 22 March 2018].
Figure 2.1. The last part of the copy of Magna Carta 1225 in the Cerne Abbey 
cartulary (Cambridge University Library Ll.1.10). 1225 was the first time 
Magna Carta was given a full witness list and the scribe at Cerne clearly 
recognised its importance in testifying to the way that Charter was now 
accepted by the good and great of the land. Photograph: David Carpenter.
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of a leader in The Guardian newspaper opposing the ninety-day detention 
period for suspected terrorists was ‘Protecting Magna Carta’.5 In 2015 
chapter 40, promising that justice should not be sold, was cited by those 
opposing the government’s changes to legal aid. 
In 1215 there was nothing new in the ideas behind the Charter. They 
were centuries old and part of general European heritage.6 Strengthened 
in the twelfth century by the study of Roman and canon law, they can be 
found in legislation and constitutions promulgated in Spain, Hungary and 
the south of France.7 It was in England, however, that they led to the most 
radical and detailed restrictions on the ruler. That was because in England 
the ruler was uniquely demanding and intrusive, thanks to the pressures 
of maintaining a continental empire which stretched from Normandy to 
the Pyrenees. By the time of John’s accession in 1199, there was already 
outcry at the level of the king’s financial demands. They were to become far 
worse. After John had lost Normandy and Anjou to the king of France in 
1204, he spent ten years in England amassing the cash needed to recover his 
empire, in the process tripling his revenues.8 In 1214 the eventual campaign 
of recovery ended in total failure. John returned to England, his money 
spent, his prestige in tatters. The next year his baronial enemies rebelled and 
forced him to concede Magna Carta. They had other grievances. Although 
paying lip service to the principles of custom and consent, John’s rule had 
been lawless. He took hostages at will, deprived barons of lands and castles 
without legal process, and demanded large sums of money to assuage his 
rancour and recover his good will. In a chivalrous age, which expected 
noble captives to be treated with courtesy, he was cruel. He murdered both 
his nephew Arthur and the most famous noble woman of the age, Matilda 
de Briouze. She and her eldest son were starved to death in the dungeons 
 5 The Guardian, 5 No. 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/nov/05/
terrorism.terrorism> [accessed 22 March 2018]. The later history of the Charter and its 
influence especially in America is splendidly illustrated in N. Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins 
and Legacy (Oxford, 2015). 
 6 For very similar ideas being expressed in the Carolingian period, see J. L. Nelson, ‘Bad 
kingship in the earlier middle ages’, Haskins Soc. Jo., viii (1999), 1–26.
 7 See, e.g., R. Altamira, ‘Magna Carta and Spanish medieval jurisprudence’, in Magna 
Carta Commemoration Essays, ed. H. E. Malden (1917), pp.  227–43; T. N. Bisson, ‘An 
“Unknown Charter” for Catalonia (A.D. 1205)’, in his Medieval France and her Neighbours 
(1989), pp.  199–212; N. Vincent, ‘English liberties, Magna Carta (1215) and the Spanish 
connection’, in 1212–1214: El trienio que hizo a Europa, Acta de la XXXVII Semana de 
Estidios Medievales de Estella 19 al 23 de julio de 2010 (Pamplona, 2011), pp. 243–61.
 8 Key works on John’s financial demands are J. C. Holt, The Northerners: a Study in the 
Reign of King John (Oxford, 1961), ch. 9, ‘The loss of Normandy and its consequences’; N. 
Barratt, ‘The revenue of King John’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxi (1996), 835–55; and compare N. 
Barratt, ‘The English revenue of Richard I’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxvi (2001), 635–56.
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of Corfe castle. As a contemporary writer put it, John was ‘brimful of evil 
qualities’.9 
In 1215, John was, therefore, placed beneath the law, but the Magna 
Carta of 1215 was very far from giving equal treatment to all the king’s 
subjects. Socially it was a divided and divisive document, often reflecting 
the interests of a baronial elite a few hundred strong in a population of 
several million.10 Indeed the Charter did not merely reflect social divisions: 
in places it was designed to reinforce them. Having asserted that taxation 
required the common consent of the kingdom, the assembly giving that 
consent was to be attended primarily by earls, barons, bishops and abbots. 
There was no place for London and other towns, although the Londoners 
thought that there should be. There was no place for knights elected by and 
representing the counties. In other words, there was no equivalent of the 
house of commons.
At least, in the chapter on taxation, the good and great of the realm 
could be seen as protecting the rest of the king’s subjects from arbitrary 
exactions. But the king’s subjects were far from sharing equally in the 
Charter’s benefits. Indeed, the unfree villeins, who made up perhaps half 
the population, did not formally share in those benefits at all.11 The liberties 
in the Charter were granted not to ‘all the men’ of the kingdom, but to ‘all 
the free men’. The most famous chapter of Magna Carta, one of those still 
on the Statute Book, reads 
No free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or 
exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go against him, nor will we send 
against him, save by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.
It is, therefore, only ‘freemen’ who are preserved from arbitrary arrest and 
dispossession. As far as Magna Carta was concerned, both king and lords 
remained perfectly free to dispossess their unfree tenants at will. The threat 
of doing so was a vital weapon for control of the peasant workforce. 
The next chapter, likewise still on the Statute Book, seemed more 
universal.
‘To no one will we deny, delay or sell right or justice’.
 9 Carpenter, Magna Carta, pp. 79–80. There are three fine biographies of King John: 
W.L. Warren, King John (new edn., New Haven and London, 1997); S. Church, King 
John: England, Magna Carta and the Making of a Tyrant (2015) and M. Morris, King John: 
Treachery, Tyranny and the Road to Magna Carta (2015). 
 10 For this theme, see chapters 4 and 5 of Carpenter, Magna Carta.
 11 For the law relating to villeins in this period, see P. R. Hyams, King, Lords and Peasants 
in Medieval England: the Common Law of Villeinage in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries 
(Oxford, 1980), an absolutely groundbreaking book.
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But this was less helpful to the unfree than it seemed. It was the law 
itself which laid down that villeins had no access to the king’s courts in 
any matter concerning their land and services. These were entirely for the 
lord to determine. As one law book put it, a villein when he wakes up in 
the morning does not know what services he must perform for his lord 
by night.12 The one chapter in the Charter which specifically protected 
the unfree was less than it seemed. Under chapter 20 fines imposed on 
villeins were to match the offence and be assessed by local men. During the 
negotiations at Runnymede, this chapter was redrafted to make it clear that 
the fines in question were those imposed by the king. In other words, they 
did not apply to fines imposed by lords. Lords were protecting their villeins 
from the king so they could take all the more themselves.
Magna Carta’s attitude to women was more nuanced. An important 
chapter protected widows from being forced into remarriage. Chapter 39 
referred to the ‘free man’ but ‘man’ could be understood to mean ‘human 
being’.13 Indeed, the chapter probably owed something to the way John 
had ‘destroyed’ Matilda de Briouze. The Charter, however, also reflected 
the inequalities between men and women. It gives the names of thirty-
four men, while three women are mentioned: John’s queen, and the sisters 
of King Alexander II of Scotland. Not one was named. This was but part 
and parcel of the limited role women played in public life. If a free woman 
secured judgement of peers under the terms of chapter 39, those peers 
would have been entirely male, for women did not sit on juries. Chapter 39 
also forgot about women altogether when it spoke of outlawry, for rather 
than being outlawed women were ‘waived’, which meant left as a ‘waif ’. 
This had the same effect. A waived woman could be killed on sight just like 
an outlawed man. But the distinction showed how subject women were to 
men. Women took no oath of allegiance to the king because in theory they 
were always under the protection of a man – father, husband or lord. They 
were, therefore, never ‘in law’ and so could not be ‘outlawed’, hence they 
were ‘waived’ instead. The only chapter (54) of the Charter where the word 
‘woman’ (‘femina’) appears was designed to put women on a lower plane 
than men when making accusations of homicide. The implication was that 
women could not be trusted. 
It is easy, therefore, to dismiss Magna Carta as a ‘feudal’ document, in 
which selfish baronial men looked after their own interests at the expense 
of the great bulk of the population. Such a view has been powerfully 
 12 Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England, ed. G. E. Woodbine, translated with 
revisions and notes by S. E. Thorne (4 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1968–77), ii. 89. 
 13 See The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England commonly called Glanvill, ed. 
G. D. G. Hall (1965), p. 106, a reference I owe to John Gillingham.
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argued during the Charter’s 800th anniversary commemorations, yet it is 
misleading. Magna Carta had a much broader appeal. Chapter 1 protected 
the freedom of the church. Chapters 12 and 13 protected the liberties of 
London and other towns. Chapters 18 and 48 gave an important role to 
knights, elected in the county courts, in administering justice and reforming 
local government. The chapters facilitating litigation under the procedures 
of the common law benefited all free men (around half the population). 
Indeed these chapters actually cut across the interests of great barons since 
they undermined the jurisdictions of their own courts. The numerous 
chapters repressing the malpractices of the king’s local agents – his sheriffs, 
castellans and bailiffs – had considerable benefits even for the unfree. Magna 
Carta thus responded to the grievances of wide sections of society. Had it 
not done so it would never have survived. 
In 1215 itself any survival appeared problematic. Within a few months of 
its promulgation the Charter seemed a failure without a future. John had got 
the pope to quash it. The barons had likewise abandoned it. They deposed 
John and elected another king in his place, none other than Prince Louis, 
the eldest son of the king of France. Louis had no brief for the Charter, 
and on his arrival in England in May 1216, said nothing about it. Magna 
Carta only survived because of John’s death in October 1216. The minority 
government of his son, the nine-year-old Henry III, in a desperate situation 
with Louis controlling over half the country, decided on a complete change 
of course. They accepted what John had rejected and Louis was ignoring. 
In November 1216, they issued, in the young king’s name, a new version 
of Magna Carta.14 Having won the war, in part because of this concession, 
they issued a second version of the Charter in November 1217 as part of 
the peace settlement. Then, in 1225, in order to secure a great tax, Henry 
III issued what became the final and definitive Magna Carta. It is chapters 
of Henry III’s Charter of 1225, not John’s of 1215, which remain on the 
Statute Book today. Indeed in the thirteenth century it was Henry’s Charter 
of 1225 which was called ‘Magna Carta’. John’s Charter of 1215 was more 
often called just ‘the Charter of Runnymede’. The name ‘Magna Carta’ 
itself had only appeared in 1218 to distinguish the ‘Great Charter’ from 
the physically smaller Charter dealing with the royal forest which Henry 
III issued alongside it. It was not until the seventeenth century that John’s 
Charter recovered its place centre stage and became called Magna Carta. 
It is sometimes said that in its first century Magna Carta was little more 
than ‘guff’. It asserted high principles but had little practical effect. Recent 
 14 For a catalogue of the new versions of the Charter with illustrations of the surviving 
originals, see Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and Legacy, pp. 204–71.
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research shows this view to be wrong. In the first place the Charter was 
far more than just a vague symbol of good government. Its detail was 
immensely well known. This had started in 1215 itself. It used to be thought 
that in 1215 originals of Magna Carta were sent to the sheriffs in charge of 
the counties, so there was one for every county. In fact, evidence is building 
up to show that the Charters were sent not to the sheriffs but to the 
bishops and their cathedrals. Two of the four surviving originals have been 
at cathedrals – Lincoln and Salisbury – throughout their life. An exciting 
discovery has shown that another of the originals (one of the two now in 
the British Library) was once at Canterbury Cathedral where it almost 
certainly went in 1215.15 In the great British Library Magna Carta exhibition 
it was described as the ‘Canterbury Magna Carta’. For John’s opponents the 
bishops and their cathedrals were far safer depositories of the Charter than 
the sheriffs and their castles; after all the sheriffs were the very people under 
attack in the Charter. Had Magna Carta been sent to them it would soon 
have disappeared into their castle furnaces. The bishops, on the other hand, 
with the first chapter of the Charter protecting the liberties of the church, 
had every reason to preserve and proclaim it.
The originals at the cathedrals were not the only source of knowledge 
of the 1215 Charter. New research has also shown that numerous unofficial 
copies were circulated round the country.16 Many of these were not of the 
final authorized text and derived instead from drafts produced during the 
negotiations at Runnymede. This spreading knowledge on the Charter 
helps explain its survival. From the start it was digging deep roots into the 
hearts and minds of the political community. That was why the minority 
government of Henry III took the crucial decision to revive it. Copies of 
the 1215 Charter continued to be made throughout the thirteenth century. 
Equally copied were the Charters of 1217 and 1225. Such copies are found in 
chronicles, cartularies and legal collections made by lawyers. The chapters 
were often numbered, described and analysed, with the differences between 
the different versions being pointed out.
By the end of the century, Magna Carta in its various forms was known in 
all strata of society. In 1300 it was proclaimed in English, the language of the 
general run of the population. Around the same time it was appealed to by 
 15 Carpenter, Magna Carta, pp.  477–80. The hypothesis that the originals of the 1215 
Charter were sent to cathedrals was first developed by I. W. Rowlands, ‘The text and 
distribution of the writ for the publication of Magna Carta, 1215’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxxiv 
(2009), 1422–31.
 16 See the section ‘Copies of Magna Carta’ on the website of the Magna Carta project 
<http://www.magnacartaresearch.org> [accessed 22 March 2018].
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the peasants of Bocking in Essex, later a centre of the peasants’ revolt.17 The 
Charter had also effected a profound change in the workings of monarchy. 
Stopping up many arbitrary sources of revenue, and insisting that general 
taxation required common consent, it had helped create the tax-based 
parliamentary state. It was a real watershed between lawless and lawful rule. 
It had established the base from which it would later go round the world.
 17 Carpenter, Magna Carta, pp. 435, 457–8.
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influence, ed. L. Goldman (2018), pp. 25–40.
3. Magna Carta: from King John to western liberty*
Nicholas Vincent
On 15 June 2015, the 800th anniversary of the sealing of Magna Carta, 
leaders of the British establishment gathered in the field of Runnymede, 
on the banks of the river Thames, twenty or so miles west of London. 
The queen and the duke of Edinburgh were there. So was the duke of 
Cambridge (future heir to the British throne), the archbishop of Canterbury 
(Justin Welby), the prime minister (David Cameron) and a large number 
of government, military and civic dignitaries. The attorney general of the 
United States of America (Loretta Lynch) attended as a representative of 
President Obama. Together she and the Princess Royal, Princess Anne, 
re-inaugurated the American Bar Association memorial on the field of 
Runnymede: a classical rotunda, built in 1957, decorated with American 
stars and housing a pedestal that declares its dedication to ‘Magna Carta, 
symbol of freedom under law’.
A neutral observer might be forgiven for considering this a most peculiar 
occasion. Why, for example, were so many members of the British royal 
family involved in the commemoration of a document that so severely 
limited the exercise of royal power? Why were there as many American as 
there were British spectators? What did it say about the conservatism of 
the British ‘establishment’ that the archbishop of Canterbury travelled to 
Runnymede from his London residence at Lambeth, just as his predecessor, 
Stephen Langton, had done in June 1215, and that the queen arrived from 
her castle at Windsor, just as King John had done in 1215, albeit transported 
by helicopter rather than on horseback? As for the celebrations themselves, 
they were described to me as ‘a magnificent blend of fascist flag rally and 
boy scout jamboree’. Certainly, they seemed to have little to do with the 
real history of the document, King John’s Magna Carta, whose anniversary 
was celebrated.
Magna Carta has passed through many centennials. Yet it is surely 
significant for our understanding of British history that the anniversary of 
* One version of this paper has been published in Chinese. Others were published in 
Armenian, by the University of Yerevan, and in French under the auspices of the Université 
de Paris and the Université de Lille.
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2015 should have been the first to have been so elaborately stage-managed. 
On the 500th anniversary, in 1715, the British paid little attention to Magna 
Carta, being too involved in Jacobite Rebellion. In 1815, Napoleon stole 
the show, obliging the British army to return to Flanders, on the eve of its 
great test at Waterloo (18 June). In 1915, the British army was once again 
in Flanders and celebrations of Magna Carta, in preparation since 1913, 
were cancelled in the face of German aerial bombardment of London, the 
second battle of Ypres, the sinking of the Lusitania and the Allied landings 
at Gallipoli. As this should demonstrate, and for all its 800-year history, 
whatever else it may have done, Magna Carta has brought the British no 
relief from foreign wars, nor from political turmoil that as recently as 1715, 
and again after 1815 and 1915 (not least in Ireland), threatened to develop 
into revolutionary chaos. 
Referring to Magna Carta on 4 July 1918, with the end of the First World 
War in sight, Winston Churchill declared that the American Declaration of 
Independence ‘follows on the Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights (1689) 
as the third great title-deed on which the liberties of the English-speaking 
people are founded’.1 His words were intended to celebrate the wartime 
alliance between Britain and America, cemented by a new ‘English-Speaking 
Union’. Yet were they anything more than empty rhetoric? Certainly, they 
have since been repeated by countless politicians around the world. Why 
such praise for a document that even today, in its 800th anniversary year, 
very few people have read and even fewer can claim properly to understand?
Magna Carta is celebrated today as one of the foundation stones of 
constitutionalism throughout the English-speaking world: an 800-year-old 
guarantee of the rule of law. In origin, however, it had no such universal 
meaning. At is most basic, it is an 800-year-old peace treaty made between 
the king and his leading subjects, the ‘barons’ of England. Four copies 
issued officially from the chancery of King John still survive. Two of these 
‘originals’ of the 1215 Magna Carta are preserved in the British Library in 
London, the two others in the cathedral archives of Salisbury and Lincoln.2 
The treaty records an attempt by barons and king, in the summer of 1215, 
to put an end to a civil war itself the product of the king’s incompetence 
and tyranny. King John (1199–1215) came to the throne as the youngest 
son of the great Henry II (1154–89). Founder of the Angevin ‘empire’ in 
 1 P. Clark, Mr Churchill’s Profession: Statesman, Orator, Writer (2012), p. xv and cf. pp. 81, 
106, 110–11.
 2 Studies here include J. C. Holt, Magna Carta (Cambridge, 1st edn. 1965; 2nd edn. 1992; 
3rd edn. 2015); D. Carpenter, Magna Carta (2015); N. Vincent, Magna Carta: a Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford, 2012), and (with illustrations of each one of the surviving 24 original 
Magna Cartas) N. Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and Legacy (Oxford, 2016).
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France, Henry II had been a ruler on a truly imperial scale. Ruling more 
French territory than any king since the collapse of the Carolingian dynasty, 
300 years before, he had not only extended his dominion by conquests 
in Ireland and Brittany, but ensured its commemoration in literary and 
architectural memorials worthy to stand alongside those of the court of 
Charlemagne as a self-consciously magnificent celebration of the rise of 
empire. John’s greatest failing was his inability to live up to the reputation 
either of his empire-building father, Henry II, or of his heroic elder brother, 
the crusader king, Richard ‘Lionheart’ (1189–99).3 
Kings in the middle ages were expected to discharge two chief functions: 
they were to maintain and if possible extend the frontiers of their dominion, 
and guard their subjects against foreign attack. In the process, they were 
also to ensure that justice was done and that the rights and property of their 
inferiors were protected. It is precisely these functions that were proclaimed 
on the great seals of King John and his ancestors: the means by which 
the king himself authenticated his own letters and laws. On one side, the 
great seal showed the king on horseback riding into battle. On the other, 
it portrayed him enthroned in majesty, with the orb of dominion and the 
sword of justice, ruling his people as God’s chosen instrument on earth.4 
In both of these functions, military and judicial, John proved a miserable 
failure. In 1202, he faced rebellion from his young nephew, the fifteen-
year-old Arthur of Brittany. Such rebellion was nothing new. Indeed it had 
become a more or less regular feature of the family politics of John and 
his ancestors, the Plantagenet kings. Through a lightning raid and with 
considerable aplomb, John took Arthur prisoner. So far so good. This was 
the fate of many previous royal rebels, locked away, blinded or castrated as 
a means of invalidating their claims to power. But in Arthur’s case, things 
went seriously wrong. 
In circumstances that still remain mysterious, Arthur simply disappeared. 
He was last heard of at Falaise, or possibly Rouen, within a few days of his 
capture. Some alleged that he thereafter died attempting escape. Others 
that he was murdered by the king in a fit of drunken rage. Most likely, 
he was killed or starved to death at the king’s command. To imprison a 
kinsman was one thing; to kill him quite another. The act branded King 
John for ever afterwards as a tyrant, slayer of his own flesh and blood, the 
killer moreover of a boy barely out of puberty, fit candidate to be celebrated 
as an innocent martyr. The barons of northern France, tired of endless 
 3 For John, there are good biographies by S. Painter, The Reign of King John (Baltimore, 
Md., 1949); W. L. Warren, King John (New Haven, Conn., 1961), and S. Church, King John: 
England, Magna Carta and the Making of a Tyrant (2015).
 4 Image in Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and Legacy, p. 200.
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wars between the kings of England and their rivals in Paris, threw in their 
lot with King Philip of France. Philip invaded Normandy. John fled to 
England. Within the space of only two years, the entire Plantagenet empire 
north of the river Loire was lost to Philip and the French.5
John was determined to reconquer these lost lands. To that end, he raised 
a vast war chest through taxation and the exploitation of his feudal rights. 
Previously to a large extent an absentee from England, he now resided for 
the most part in London and the southern counties, a constant threat to his 
English barons, eyeing up not only their financial resources but their wives 
and daughters. The king was a notorious lecher. He was also notoriously 
cruel. After 1210, he is said to have starved to death the wife and eldest son 
of one of his leading barons, William de Briouze: a man who had previously 
stood among John’s closest friends, but whom he abandoned, disgraced and 
hounded into exile. As with Arthur, the persecution of the Briouzes supplied 
the king’s enemies with what must have seemed a God-given opportunity 
to blacken John’s name.6 Nor was it only the barons from whom a backlash 
came. 
The king sprang from a family whose relations with the Church had 
never been smooth. In 1170, John’s father, Henry II, had notoriously 
spoken out against the then archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, 
provoking Becket’s murder in Canterbury Cathedral. Ever afterwards, 
however blameless they might claim to be for the martyrdom of ‘St. 
Thomas’, the Plantagenet dynasty was branded in the eyes of the pope 
and the Church as a dynasty of murderers, the sons of Belial, the Devil’s 
Brood (from the verdict upon Henry II pronounced by St. Bernard, c.1152, 
‘From the Devil he came, and to the Devil he will surely return’).7 As a 
result, after 1205, when King John attempted to have one of his henchmen 
promoted as archbishop of Canterbury, the pope refused. Instead, John 
was commanded to accept as archbishop a man, Stephen Langton, who 
although born in England had spent the past thirty years in Paris. There 
Langton had lectured on the Bible, drawing comparisons between the 
good and bad kings of the present day, the Plantagenets included, and 
 5 For the ‘empire’, building upon the work of J. C. Holt, ‘The end of the Anglo-Norman 
realm’, Proc. Brit. Acad., lxi (1975), 223–65, see J. Gillingham, The Angevin Empire (2nd 
edn., 2001); D. Power, The Norman Frontier in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries 
(Cambridge, 2004).
 6 D. Crouch, ‘Baronial paranoia in King John’s reign’, and ‘The complaint of King John 
against William de Briouze’, in Magna Carta and the England of King John, ed. J.S. Loengard 
(Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 45–62, 168–79.
 7 References in N. Vincent, ‘The seals of King Henry II and his court’, in Seals and their 
Context in the Middle Ages, ed. P. R. Schofield (Oxford, 2015), pp. 15, 28 fn.78.
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the tyrants and heroes whose exploits were described in the Christian Old 
Testament.8
John refused to accept Langton. The pope refused to abandon him. The 
outcome, from 1208 to 1213, was a stand-off between Church and state. 
Throughout this period of ‘Interdict’, the mass and other sacraments were 
not publicly celebrated; the dead were not buried in consecrated ground; 
the king’s court was excommunicated, and the king himself was threatened 
not just with excommunication but the possibility that the pope might now 
back an invasion of England by the French king Philip Augustus, deposing 
John and placing his greatest rival upon the English throne. To avoid such 
an eventuality, in 1213, John backed down. The pope was promised titular 
lordship over both England and Ireland together with an annual ‘census’ or 
rent (a token sum of £666, 1,000 ‘marks’). In return, the pope now treated 
John as a favoured son.9 
Using the vast treasure that he had by now extracted, both from his barons 
and from the confiscated property of the Church, John embarked on a 
campaign of reconquest in France. This ended in catastrophe at the battle of 
Bouvines, fought outside Lille, on 27 July 1214. Here John’s northern allies, 
including the Holy Roman Emperor, Otto IV, were decisively defeated by 
Philip of France. John himself, who was south of the Loire at the time, was 
obliged to slink back to England for the second time in his reign, defeated 
in war and with his treasury exhausted.
The outcome was rebellion and civil war. In the hope of cementing the 
friendship of the pope, John himself took vows as a crusader. This in theory 
placed him under the direct protection of the Church. In the meantime, a 
large number of English barons, particularly those of East Anglia and the 
North, rose up against the king.10 They enjoyed the tacit support of Langton 
and other English bishops, many of whom had financial or personal 
grievances of their own against John, arising from the problems of the 
Interdict since 1208. From among this opposition party – a truly political 
coalition between barons and clerics, one of the first such in English history 
– voices began to be raised demanding that John reissue the promises made 
by earlier kings to rule well and in accordance with custom and law. In 
 8 The classic biography of Langton remains that by F. M. Powicke, Stephen Langton 
(Oxford, 1928), although see more recently P. Buc, L’Ambiguité du livre: prince, pouvoir, et 
peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible au Moyen Age (Paris, 1994), and various of the essays, 
especially those by Baldwin and Vincent, collected in Etienne Langton: prédicateur, bibliste, 
théologien, ed. L.-J. Bataillon, N. Beriou, G. Dahan and R. Quinto (Turnhout, 2010).
 9 C. R. Cheney, Pope Innocent III and England (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 303–56.
 10 For the roots of the rebellion, the classic study remains J. C. Holt, The Northerners: a 
Study in the Reign of King John (Oxford, 1961; 2nd edn. 1992).
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particular, attention was drawn, perhaps by Langton, perhaps by others, 
to the so-called ‘Coronation Charter’ that John’s great-grandfather, King 
Henry I, had issued in 1100. Here, at a desperate moment in his own career, 
Henry I had been persuaded to limit the extent of royal exploitation of 
feudal rights over widows, orphans and the Church.11 Let King John, the 
barons now demanded, reissue this charter, suitably updated so as to answer 
the circumstances of 1215.
In May 1215, the city of London, itself tired of the king’s financial 
exploitation and disgruntled with French wars that placed an embargo on 
foreign trade, threw in its lot with the rebels. The king was now forced to 
negotiate. At Runnymede, on and around 15 June 1215, at a location halfway 
between the royal castle at Windsor and the rebel stronghold in London, 
John met with the rebel barons and agreed a settlement, based in part upon 
Henry I’s coronation charter, in part upon more recent developments. 
Runnymede was chosen as a liminal spot, on the banks of the Thames, 
neither entirely land nor water, at a place where the boundaries of four 
English counties met, and perhaps more significantly the boundaries of 
four English dioceses (the bishoprics of Lincoln, London, Winchester and 
Salisbury).12
The document thrashed out at Runnymede, known to us as Magna Carta, 
was first and foremost a peace treaty. Its intention was to place limitations 
upon the king’s power both to tax and to trouble his subjects, in order that 
peace might be re-established between king and realm. Thus, among its 
sixty or more provisions, it included clauses on the liberties of the Church, 
of the city of London, and above all protecting the customary rights of 
the barons, their heirs and dependents. It included much else besides.13 
For example, it sought to promote peace between England, Scotland and 
Wales (clauses 56–9). It decreed standard measures for wine, corn and 
cloth (clause 35, significantly calculated according to the measures already 
adopted by the city of London). It sought to prevent any resurgence in 
royal authority, first by calling for the expulsion of a list of the king’s named 
foreign constables (clauses 50–1), and thereafter by imposing a supervisory 
 11 For the text of Henry I’s coronation charter as received by barons and king in 1215, see 
Holt, Magna Carta (1965), pp. 296–303; Carpenter, Magna Carta, pp. 310–15.
 12 For the site, see T. Tatton-Brown, ‘Magna Carta at 800: uncovering its landscape 
archaeology’, Current Archaeology, ccciv (July 2015), 34–7, also of importance for 
demonstrating that the medieval ‘Runnymede’ is almost certainly not included within the 
land currently managed by the National Trust, representing what in the middle ages was 
known as ‘Long Meadow’. 
 13 For the text, see Holt, Magna Carta (1965), pp. 316–37; Vincent, Magna Carta: a Very 
Short Introduction, pp. 111–24; Carpenter, Magna Carta, pp. 36–69.
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committee of twenty-five barons above and over the king (clause 61, the so-
called ‘security clause’). These men were in effect empowered to make war 
against John should the king in any way infringe the terms of the Charter. 
The choice of the number twenty-five here suggests the influence of the 
archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langton, since it was in theology and 
biblical exegesis that the number twenty-five was widely advertized as a 
number appropriate to the law (being five times five, or the square of the 
number of books of law in the Old Testament, the so-called Pentateuch).14 
Other clauses of the Charter, far from being pure ‘English’ law, were so 
close to expedients attempted elsewhere in France or northern Spain as 
to suggest a degree of conscious imitation of continental precedents. In 
particular, several clauses of Magna Carta, on the liberties of the Church, 
on free access to justice, on inheritance, the rights of widows and orphans 
and so forth, were anticipated in the so-called ‘Statute of Pamiers’ issued in 
1212 by the French baron, Simon de Montfort, for his subjects in those parts 
of Toulouse and southern France recently conquered in the Albigensian 
Crusade. Magna Carta did not simply copy Pamiers. Both settlements 
nonetheless reflected tensions between rulers and the ruled, shared across 
wide areas of Europe in the decades either side of 1215.15
Rather surprisingly for a settlement that is supposed to have been 
‘radical’ and to have introduced nothing but good, the 1215 Magna Carta 
also contains clauses that today seem deeply reactionary or contrary to 
modern ideas of justice and right. Thus it is firm in its condemnation 
of the usury charged by Jews against the debts of underage heirs (clauses 
10–11); in its limitation of the access to justice allowed to women (clause 
54); and in its demand for the expulsion of foreigners (clauses 50–1, here 
described as ‘aliens’, borrowing a word used in the Old Testament book of 
Maccabees to describe outsiders in occupation of the Holy Land). In only 
a few places does the Charter enunciate what might be described as general 
or legal principles. In clause 60, for instance, it demands that the customs 
and liberties hereby guaranteed by the king to his barons be extended by 
the barons to all lesser men: an essential widening of the settlement, that 
transformed it from being a narrowly ‘feudal’ document, of benefit to the 
few, into a much more generous concession, available to the many.
 14 N. Vincent, ‘The twenty-five barons of Magna Carta: an Augustinian echo?’, in 
Rulership and Rebellion in the Anglo-Norman World, c.1066–c.1216: Essays in Honour of 
Professor Edmund King, ed. P. Dalton and D. Luscombe (Farnham, 2015), pp. 231–51.
 15 N. Vincent, ‘English liberties, Magna Carta (1215) and the Spanish connection’, in 
1212–1214: El trienio que hizo a Europa, Acta de la XXXVII Semana de Estidios Medievales 
de Estella 19 al 23 de julio de 2010 (Pamplona, 2011), pp. 243–61.
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Most famously, clauses 39 and 40 of the Charter enunciate a general 
principle that in England we would describe as the rule of law, or in America 
as the right to ‘due process’:
No free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or 
exiled, or in any other way ruined, nor will we go against him or send against 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
We will not sell, or deny, or delay right or justice to anyone
Together with clauses 1 and 13 on the freedom of the Church and the 
liberties of the city of London, these two clauses are the only fragments 
of Magna Carta that still remain law in England today. They have been 
widely imitated, so that echoes of them are to be found in the American 
Bill of Rights, in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) and 
in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet 
we should notice, from the start, how vague they become whenever we 
attempt to pin them down to specific points of law. Who, for example, is a 
free man? Did this category include both women and men (answer: for the 
most part yes), and did it exclude the vast majority of the population who, 
in 1215, would have been considered servile peasants living without the right 
of appeal to the king’s courts (answer: probably no)? We are to be judged by 
our ‘peers’, that is to say by our equals (the term pares in Latin here being 
borrowed from the French word pair, as in the modern ‘pair of aces’ in a 
game of cards). But who are our equals? Are the rich to be judged by the 
poor, or those of aristocratic birth by mere commoners? Moreover, what is 
the ‘law of the land’ by which ‘lawful judgement’ is to be obtained? In 1215, 
indeed until as late as the 19th century, there was no single book to which 
one could refer in England in which the ‘law of the land’ was clearly and 
concisely set out. Rather, law was a matter not just of statute but of custom, 
process and to some extent of expediency. Moreover, who was to determine 
whether any particular judgement was or was not ‘lawful’? 
Here, bizarrely, we return to the sovereign power of the king as the only 
authority capable of determining what was or was not to be considered 
‘lawful judgement’. Magna Carta as a whole, framed as an act of grace, 
granted by the king to his barons, bishops and other subjects, enshrines 
the principle that it is the king who delivers justice, grants privileges, and 
ultimately has the power both to extend and to limit the authority of the 
law. Far from placing the king under the law, Magna Carta can in this 
reading appear a document that promotes the king as lawgiver. No wonder, 
perhaps, that so many members of the British royal family queued up in 
2015 to celebrate the Charter’s anniversary.
Magna Carta: from King John to western liberty
33
Furthermore, as granted in 1215, it was clear from the very start that 
the charter agreed at Runnymede would provoke outrage and repudiation. 
The king was a feudal subject of the pope. Yet the Charter deliberately 
ignored the pope’s rights as overlord, specifically forbidding the king from 
seeking adjudication from any higher authority. The king in theory derived 
his powers from God, yet the Charter attempted to insert a committee 
of twenty-five barons as judges over the king. No such settlement could 
be accepted either by pope or by king. In medieval conceptualization, 
the king was head of the body politic. How could any authority, papal 
or royal, permit the head to be ruled by the body’s inferior members? It is 
worth noticing that, even when they invited the king of France to invade 
England and support them against King John, the barons made no attempt 
to persuade King Philip, or Louis, his son, that Magna Carta was something 
worth reissuing or defending. This was a document as repugnant to the 
kings of France as it was to the pope or King John. Within twelve weeks of 
its issue, the peace that it sought to establish had irrevocably collapsed. The 
barons refused to surrender the city of London. The king refused to expel 
his alien sheriffs and constables. In August, the pope declared the Charter 
annulled.16 In September, king and barons once again went to war against 
each other. After barely twelve weeks, Magna Carta expired: a failed treaty 
that brought war rather than peace.
For the next year, the king made war on his barons with barely 
a thought for what had been negotiated at Runnymede. To lead their 
cause, the barons encouraged Louis, eldest son of King Philip of France, 
to lead a French invasion of England. But in October 1216, King John 
died, struck down, we are told, by an attack of dysentery contracted 
from eating peaches and new cider. The throne now passed to his son, 
a nine-year-old boy, the future King Henry III. With Louis ruling in 
London, and threatening now to seek coronation in Westminster Abbey, 
the traditional site of such ceremonies, Henry III’s ministers not only had 
their boy king crowned at Gloucester, far away in the west, but a few days 
later, at Bristol, reissued Magna Carta. The charter was now offered as a 
manifesto of future good government, to persuade the realm that Henry 
would in future rule better than his father had done. In the process, about 
a third of its length and many of its more radical clauses were pruned 
away. Out went the clauses on consent for taxation. Out went those on 
aliens or the Jews. Above all, out went the so-called ‘security clause’ by 
which the king at Runnymede had bound himself to observe the advice 
and authority of a committee of twenty-five barons.
 16 Cheney, Pope Innocent III and England, pp. 382–6.
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What remained, including the guarantees of due process and of the 
liberties of the Church, of London, of the barons and the freemen of 
England, was first reissued by Henry III in November 1216, sealed not only 
by the king’s chief guardian, William Marshal earl of Pembroke, but by the 
pope’s local representative, the legate Guala Bicchieri, a native of Vercelli 
in northern Italy. By this means, the Charter was henceforth endorsed 
not just by the king’s ministers but, in effect, by the papacy, God’s highest 
representative on earth. Again sealed by the legate, the Charter was reissued 
once the civil war had been won by the king’s party in November 1217. It 
was issued again in 1225, when Henry III came of age, now in a definitive 
form whose text was to change only in minor details thereafter. It was the 
1225 version of the Charter that henceforth was treated as law. The peace 
treaty of 1215 was thus transformed into a statute. Reissued again in 1234, in 
1253, in 1265, after 1272, in 1297 and for a last time in 1300, the Charter of 
1225 achieved totemic status.17 By 1300, indeed as early as the 1250s, many of 
the terms of the Charter were anachronistic, divorced from the day-to-day 
concerns of political society. What mattered were not the individual clauses 
on inheritance, widows, wards or financial obligations, but the fact that 
the charter had come to be regarded as something approaching holy writ, 
widely believed to protect the king’s subjects, their liberties and their sense 
of communal right against the threat of royal tyranny.18 Although grounded 
in the absolute sovereignty of the crown, the Charter was perceived as 
in some senses a concession to popular right. Granted by ‘We the king’, 
rather than ‘We the people’, it nonetheless recognized a degree of mutual 
dependence in dealings between ruler and ruled. 
It had also increasingly come to be associated with an institution that 
had emerged since the 1230s from a more ancient tradition of councils and 
representative assemblies summoned by English kings. Now described as 
‘parliaments’ (‘speaking togethers’), the more solemn meetings of the king’s 
councillors were by the 1250s capable not only of convening in the king’s 
absence but of incorporating representatives of the localities, sent to such 
‘parliaments’ both to air local grievances and to discuss the granting of tax. 
Following a renewal of hostilities between king and barons between 1258 and 
1265, parliament was both institutionalized and transformed into a theatre 
of kingship. In the hands of Henry III’s son, Edward I, king of England from 
 17 For the various reissues, see F. Thompson, The First Century of Magna Carta: Why it 
Persisted as a Document (Minneapolis, Minn., 1925); Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and 
Legacy, pp. 206–56.
 18 J. R. Maddicott, ‘Magna Carta and the local community, 1215–1259’, Past & Present, cii 
(1984), 25–65.
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1272–1307, it was summoned to display royal magnanimity and justice.19 
Nonetheless, by this time the idea had been firmly planted that kingship 
was itself conditional upon royal respect and service to the community of 
the realm. In particular, the financial problems of the English crown, and 
the inability of kings to finance their own wars in France without taxation 
from their people, guaranteed parliament, at times of crisis, a political role 
quite unlike that enjoyed by the more supine representative assemblies 
of kingdoms such as France or the Holy Roman Empire.20 Elsewhere in 
Europe, kings never fully acknowledged the right of such assemblies to veto 
taxation or supply. In England, they had little choice but to accept such 
limits.21 This too might be seen as a consequence of Magna Carta which, 
by limiting the traditional extortions of royal government, rendered future 
reliance on parliamentary taxation more or less inevitable.
Once again, it is important to remember that England in the later middle 
ages was not in any material sense better ruled than other nations. Good 
and bad kings came and went. In contrast to other nations, the English 
gained notoriety for their willingness to depose and ultimately to kill their 
kings: Edward II in 1327, Richard II in 1399, Henry VI deposed from 1461 
to 1470, killed in 1471, Richard III, killed in battle in 1485. There is little to 
suggest that the warlords and churchmen who presided over such killings 
had any more fundamental belief in popular sovereignty or the rights of 
the people than the warlords and bishops of France or Germany. Much 
of the turmoil of late medieval English politics was circumstantial and 
emerged from a combination of the personal incompetence of royalty, the 
pressures of war and finance, and the structural weaknesses both of central 
and local government. There is nothing in this to suggest that Magna Carta, 
although continually reconfirmed in parliament and used for the training 
of lawyers, placed at the head of many thousands of laboriously copied 
books of statutes, was in any sense responsible for English exceptionalism. 
It did nonetheless enshrine the principal that limitations upon monarchy 
lay at the root of English law, embedding such concepts as ‘liberty’, ‘custom’ 
and ‘right’ deep within the English political consciousness.22
 19 J. R. Maddicott, ‘Edward I and the lessons of baronial reform: local government, 1258–
80’, in Thirteenth Century England I, ed. P. R. Coss and S. D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1986), 
pp. 1–30.
 20 J. C. Holt, ‘The prehistory of parliament’, in The English Parliament in the Middle 
Ages, ed R. G. Davies and J. H. Denton (Manchester, 1981), pp. 1–28; J. R. Maddicott, The 
Origins of the English Parliament 924–1327 (Oxford, 2010).
 21 G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 
1975).
 22 F. Thompson, Magna Carta: its Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300–1629 
(Minneapolis, Minn., 1948), pp. 9–136; J. H. Baker, The Reinvention of Magna Carta 1216–
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The subsequent reinventions of Magna Carta can be only briefly touched 
on here. With the fading away of serfdom, the idea of the ‘free man’ came to 
define not just the rich but the majority of England’s population, rich and 
poor, male and female. The rights guaranteed under Magna Carta clauses 
39 and 40 thus became available to all. As such, they were loudly trumpeted 
throughout the period of political crisis between king and nation in the 
seventeenth century, culminating in the execution of Charles I in 1649, 
and the expulsion of his son, James II, in 1688.23 By this time, Magna Carta 
was not so much read as mythologized. It had become a liberty document, 
believed in some vague way to uphold an age-old tradition of protection 
under the law for those opposing the arbitrary powers of the king.24 It 
was as such that it crossed the Atlantic in the seventeenth century, carried 
to America almost as a genetic birthright of the settlers established in 
the new colonies of Virginia, Maryland, Jamaica and elsewhere. Hence, 
from the 1760s onwards, the way in which Magna Carta was employed 
by the colonists to argue their right to representation, to freedom from 
arbitrary burdens or arrest, and to possession of those liberties claimed 
for all freeborn subjects of the British crown, in this instance no longer as 
an anti-royal instrument so much as a check upon the powers of an over-
mighty parliament.25 To this phase of Magna Carta’s history there was as 
much make-believe and misunderstanding as there was sound history. A 
true understanding of the Charter’s purpose became overlaid by a desire to 
view it as a universal panacea.26 
It is from such readings that many of the present misconceptions of the 
document emerge. It is today widely supposed that Magna Carta underpins 
a whole series of liberties peculiarly associated with English law. Democracy, 
parliament, ‘habeas corpus’, presumption of innocence in criminal trials, 
1616 (Cambridge, 2017), and for European comparisons, J. Watts, The Making of Polities: 
Europe, 1300–1500 (Cambridge, 2009).
 23 In general, for English exceptionalism, see A. Macfarlane, The Origins of English 
Individualism (Oxford, 1978). For Magna Carta after 1500, see Thompson, Magna Carta: its 
Role, pp. 139–374.
 24 J. Champion, ‘From Liber Homo to “free-born Englishman”: how Magna Carta became 
a “liberty document”, 1508–1760s’, in Magna Carta: the Foundation of Freedom, 1215–2015, 
ed. N. Vincent (2014), pp. 103–18.
 25 A. E. Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in 
America (Charlottesville, Va., 1968); J. L. Malcolm, ‘Magna Carta in America: entrenched’, 
in Vincent, Magna Carta: the Foundation of Freedom, pp. 121–35.
 26 For the later history, see A. Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty (Oxford, 1971); 
P. Linebaugh, The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All (Berkeley, Calif., 
2008); M. Taylor and N. Vincent, in Vincent, Magna Carta: the Foundations of Freedom, 
pp. 137–69; Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and Legacy, pp. 85–150.
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all of these things and more have in some way come to be attributed to a 
document that, in reality, deals with none of them. Even so, Magna Carta 
retains a surprise or two. 
Take, for example, clause 33 of the 1215 charter, forbidding the construction 
of fish weirs on the rivers Thames and Medway. Originally included as a sop 
to the men of London, this clause was not in fact removed from the English 
statute book until 1970. Even now it continues to surface in English and 
Irish courts as perhaps the most frequently litigated clause in the entire 
document. The reason here is that clause 33 enunciates not just an archaic 
prejudice against fish weirs (a sort of trap made by driving wooden stakes 
into the bed of a river) but a principle, that navigation should be free and 
that certain types of property, in this case the navigable part of a river, should 
be considered public rather than private, as ‘res publica’ or, in terms that 
modern lawyers would understand, as rights according to ‘natural law’.27 
Clauses 41 and 42 of the 1215 charter (in the case of clause 41 retained in 
the 1225 charter as clause 30) guaranteeing freedom of movement to foreign 
merchants, and freedom to the king’s subjects to enter and leave the realm, 
might likewise seem merely banal. However, in countries around the world 
today, where such rights are by no means guaranteed, and where passports 
can be obtained only by those in political favour, these are clauses that have 
a very real and contemporary resonance.
Above all, in a contemporary context, Magna Carta should remind us 
both of the element of compromise involved in negotiations between the 
sovereign and the political community, and of the distinction to be drawn 
between autocracy and a society such as that of England, even as early as 
1215, boasting a relatively mature plurality of powers. In various parts of 
the world, even today, to establish a stamp club or a village choir, let alone 
any more controversial organization, can itself be regarded as a political 
act subject to control and disapproval by the ruling authorities. Magna 
Carta, by contrast, emerges from a society in which special interests were 
already recognized to possess their own liberties, rights and customs. Many 
of these special interests were, even by 1215, specifically commercial rather 
than feudal, associated with the international trade of the city of London. 
Clauses 13 and 35 of the 1215 Magna Carta, for example, not only guarantee 
the liberties of London and all other cities and ports, but define London 
weights and measures as the standard to be adopted universally throughout 
the realm. Clauses 41–2 guarantee the freedom of movement of both native 
 27 R. H. Helmholz, ‘Magna Carta and the law of nations’, in Magna Carta, Religion and 
the Rule of Law, ed. R. Griffith-Jones and M. Hill (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 76–7, and for the 
repeal of clause 33 (clause 23 of the 1225 charter), see Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of 
Liberty, pp. 100–1.
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and foreign merchants, save in time of open warfare. Even clause 33, on fish 
weirs, has a commercial aspect, given its intention to protect the navigation 
of the river Thames, and hence the river-born trade of London and much 
of southern England.
Those of us who consider ourselves fortunate to inhabit countries 
governed by the Anglophone tradition of law should avoid any temptation 
to complacency or self-congratulation. In 2015, it was all very well for 
English and American politicians to hold up their 800-year-old system of 
law for admiration in other parts of the world where due process is promised 
but seldom delivered, and where liberty and the rule of law are concepts 
manipulated more for the glorification of the powerful than for the benefit 
of the people at large. It should not be forgotten, even so, that for all its 
championing of liberty, Magna Carta did not oblige the English to rule well 
in Ireland or India or large parts of Africa. In Jamaica, it helped persuade 
British settlers that they enjoyed an equality more equal than that of others, 
with Magna Carta itself employed as a justification for dividing free from 
un-free, colonist from slave.28 In modern America, it is not at all clear that 
the impulse to export democratic values has entirely been divorced from the 
imposition of American values, by force where necessary.29 
Nonetheless, even the myth-making that surrounds Magna Carta has 
its own significance. The myths that people tell about themselves help to 
determine their future behaviour in the world. Nations founded upon a 
concept of God-given right, manifest destiny or a sacred mission to subdue 
and suppress all other nations through might and triumphant will tend to 
behave in ways different, both militarily and commercially, from nations 
founded upon a sense of age-old liberty triumphing over tyranny, right 
over might. Nations that believe themselves to possess an 800-year-old 
tradition of the rule of law, a sovereign authority or monarchy placed under 
restraint, and a dispersed plurality of powers, will behave rather differently 
from those where such concepts are either unknown or despised. To that 
extent, the celebrations of 2015, however bizarre, did indeed serve a more 
general purpose. A mature democracy requires compromise between ruler 
and ruled. It also implies respect for laws that both ruler and ruled obey. 
Tradition here, and an appeal to the past, can prove powerful incentives to 
good government past, present and future.
 28 Vincent, Magna Carta: Origins and Legacy, pp. 109–10, citing J. P. Greene, ‘Liberty and 
slavery: the transfer of British liberty to the West Indies, 1627–1865’, in Exclusionary Empire: 
English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900, ed. J. P. Greene (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 56–7, 65–6.
 29 For freedom as something potentially enforced upon others, see P. Buc, Holy War, 
Martyrdom, and Terror: Christianity, Violence, and the West, ca.70 C.E. to the Iraq War 
(Philadelphia, Pa., 2015), esp. ch. 6, pp. 213–41.
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I wrote various of the preceding remarks in January 2016, six months 
after the anniversary at Runnymede, and at a time when it was widely 
supposed that the referendum then pending on British membership of the 
European Union would be decided in defiance of calls for a retreat into 
past bigotry and isolationism. I write now, two years after Runnymede, 
at the end of 2017, with the referendum result declared, and with the very 
real prospect not just of a divorce between Britain and Europe but within 
the United Kingdom, between England and Scotland, and the majority 
of the population of Northern Ireland. As I hope to have shown here, the 
precedents for English withdrawal from Europe are not encouraging. The 
debacle of 1204, as a result of which King John was expelled from most of 
his French ‘empire’, led directly to 250 years of Anglo-French warfare, as 
kings of England struggled to recover their lost continental domain. It also 
provoked a crisis in public finances, both in England and, less well known, 
in Normandy whose barons and churches had previously depended heavily 
upon English revenues.30 More dangerously still, the events of 1204 drove 
a wedge between, on the one hand, a small part of the elite determined to 
recover their lost lands and glory in France, and an increasingly xenophobic 
English nation that had never cared for the French and that possessed no 
French interests to recover. From this fundamental disparity sprang many 
of the tensions between king and realm in the two centuries after 1204. The 
Hundred Years War, from the 1340s onwards, was not so much a campaign 
for ‘recovery’ as for conquest, as Englishmen of all sorts combined under the 
crown in the congenial business of slaughtering Frenchmen and plundering 
French property.
Magna Carta, another direct product of the events of 1204, played its 
own, not entirely innocent, role in the debacle of 2016. Certainly, it was 
widely cited by the advocates of ‘Brexit’ as a totem of the English ‘common 
law’ supposedly set at odds with the Roman law traditions of continental 
Europe. The peddlers of this interpretation either deliberately ignored (or 
more likely remained profoundly ignorant of ) the fact that Magna Carta 
emerged from a far wider European tradition of law. From its classical, 
civilian defence of ‘res publica’ and condemnation of judicial corruption, via 
its Augustinian committee of twenty-five barons, through to the materials 
it shares in common with the Statute of Pamiers and the reforming decrees 
of northern Spain, Magna Carta was not just an English but a thoroughly 
European response to political crisis. Roman jurisprudence, the Judaic 
Old Testament, Germanic tribal assemblies, French feudalism and papal 
 30 For the effects upon Normandy, see A. J. Davis, The Holy Bureaucrat: Eudes Rigaud and 
Religious Reform in Thirteenth-Century Normandy (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006), pp. 94–6.
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canon law all played a part in its making. Eight hundred years after it was 
first issued, Magna Carta remains both a highly charged and a potentially 
deceptive document. 
In so far as the rebellion of 1215 and the making of Magna Carta have 
lessons to teach us, they suggest that the personal failings of a particular ruler 
(King John) or his entourage (the French-born constables and mercenaries 
of Magna Carta clauses 50–1) can undermine even the most ruthless of 
governmental systems. Without compromise and the careful management 
of the body politic, clashes between the ambitions of individual rulers and 
the will of an elite oligarchy (the barons) can lead to crisis and civil war. Yet 
from such clashes can emerge not only political turmoil, but in the case of 
Magna Carta, an insistence upon the rule of law, and (from this, albeit only 
after many further crises) a system of constitutional balance that fosters 
stability rather than chaos. Certainly, in 2017, as in 1215, 1715, 1815 or 1915, 
Great Britain seems to have lost none of its flair for constitutional crisis. 
In 2017, as in 1215, it is to be hoped, such crisis will foster constitutional 
innovation and the reinvention of the body politic. In 2017, as in 1215, the 
new, as ever, remains firmly rooted in the old.
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4. The Church and Magna Carta 
in the thirteenth century
S. T. Ambler
The period of fifty years between the first issue of Magna Carta in 1215 and 
the confirmation of its authoritative version (1225) at Simon de Montfort’s 
celebrated parliament of 1265 is heralded in Britain today as a critical stage 
in the emergence of the parliamentary state, when the limitation of royal 
power and the constriction of the king’s ability to raise money through 
his feudal rights encouraged the strengthening of representative assemblies. 
Churchmen played leading parts in this story, though this is something that 
has generally gone unrecognized, perhaps for two reasons. First, academic 
research has for the most part focused on the role of laymen – whether 
barons, knights or even peasants – in the politics of this era. Second, the 
public perception of the age’s central episodes, from the meeting on the 
meadow of Runnymede in 1215 to the Westminster parliament of 1265 oft-
hailed as the ‘first house of commons’, views them as steps towards the 
modern system of democracy so cherished in the West, a polity seen today 
as antithetical to theocratic systems of government.1 Yet research over the 
past four decades, and discoveries made in the last couple of years, suggest 
that this image of thirteenth-century English politics needs to be recast. 
That churchmen, especially England’s bishops, deserve a prominent 
place in the telling of this period’s history was suggested in 1970, when 
John Baldwin published Masters, Princes and Merchants. This pathfinding 
study demonstrated how theologians of the Paris schools in the late twelfth 
century were deeply interested in what we might call moral philosophy and 
political ethics.2 Using events described in the Bible, as well as scenarios 
from the world around them, the Paris scholars discussed the rights and 
wrongs of various difficult situations, in order to determine the morally 
justifiable course of action. Many of the matters discussed related to the 
highest echelons of society, considering how bishops, barons and knights 
 1 For the 1265 parliament, see S. T. Ambler, ‘Magna Carta: its confirmation at Simon de 
Montfort’s parliament of 1265’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxxx (2015), 801–30.
 2 Masters, Princes and Merchants: the Social Views of Peter the Chanter and his Circle (2 
vols., Princeton, N.J., 1970). 
Magna Carta: history, context and influence
42
should interact with their kings. For instance: if the king has ordered 
his executioner to execute a subject, but the executioner knows that the 
man is innocent, should he proceed to carry out the sentence? If a king 
has ordered a knight to go to war, but the knight knows that the war is 
not justified, should he obey the order? One of the important scholars 
of Paris, the Englishman Stephen Langton, insisted that a king’s decision 
to go against a subject or to prosecute a war must be approved by the 
judgement of a court.3 The word ‘court’ in this context had two overlapping 
meanings: those prelates and magnates around the king and who offered 
him counsel, and the panel comprising the same group empowered to 
pronounce judgement upon one of its members accused of a fault. Both 
counselling the king and pronouncing a tenant-in-chief guilty or innocent 
meant providing ‘judgement’ for a royal decision. A king was expected 
not to act without first securing such judgement, or at least not without 
good reason or habitually, and indeed this was a profound expectation of 
medieval lordship more broadly. From this perspective Langton’s assertion 
was not controversial, though it is important to note that he was coming at 
the problem from a theological perspective. 
Baldwin’s work was extended by the research of Philippe Buc, who 
published L’ambiguïté du Livre in 1994.4 Here, Buc showed (among other 
things) that the Paris scholars held a deeply distrustful view of kingship as 
an institution. This was based upon the biblical origins of royal government, 
as identified by the Paris scholars: Cain’s building of the first city (Genesis 
IV: 17), the construction of the tower by Nimrod (Genesis X–XI) and the 
Israelites’ rejection of the rule of judges and demand for a king (I Kings 
VIII).5 The last of these was particularly significant. The Israelites, having 
rejected God’s direct rule, had demanded that God appoint a king to rule 
them. And so God sent his prophet, Samuel, with a warning about what the 
Israelites could expect from such a ruler: 
This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your 
sons, and put them in his chariots, and will make them his horsemen, and 
his running footmen to run before his chariots, And he will appoint of them 
to be his tribunes, and centurions, and to plough his fields, and to reap his 
corn, and to make him arms and chariots. Your daughters also he will take 
to make him ointments, and to be his cooks, and bakers. And he will take 
your fields, and your vineyards, and your best oliveyards, and give them to his 
 3 J. Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton, future archbishop of Canterbury: the Paris 
schools and Magna Carta’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxxiii (2008), 811–46, at pp. 815–20.
 4 P. Buc, L’ambiguïté du Livre: prince, pouvoir, et peuple dans les commentaires de la Bible 
au Moyen Âge (Paris, 1994).
 5 Buc, L’ambiguïté du Livre, pp. 237, 246–8.
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servants. Moreover he will take the tenth of your corn, and of the revenues 
of your vineyards, to give his eunuchs and servants. Your servants also and 
handmaids, and your goodliest young men, and your asses he will take away, 
and put them to his work. Your flocks also he will tithe, and you shall be his 
servants. And you shall cry out in that day from the face of the king, whom you 
have chosen to yourselves. And the Lord will not hear you in that day, because 
you desired unto yourselves a king.6 
This account invited two conclusions. First, God had never decreed 
kingship to be his chosen system of government. Kingship was conceived 
by humankind, in the course of rebellion against God. The Paris scholars 
connected this conclusion to the words of St. Paul, which foretold the end 
of days, when God would abolish the office of kingship: ‘Afterwards the end, 
when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father, when 
he shall have brought to nought all principality, and power’.7 The second 
conclusion centred upon the ius regis, the ‘right of the king’ proclaimed 
by Samuel in his warning to the Israelites. Samuel was not setting out the 
rights to which a king was naturally entitled but, rather, describing kingship 
essentially as a series of crimes, an array of abuses that resulted from a weak 
and sinful mortal being placed in a position of authority over his fellows.8 
The findings of Baldwin and Buc serve as important correctives to the 
entrenched conception of medieval political history, which held that politics 
was an essentially secular business. This view was epitomized by Sir James 
Holt, the pre-eminent Magna Carta scholar of his generation. In a chapter 
of his magnum opus Magna Carta (first published in 1965), ‘The quality of 
the Great Charter’, Holt argued strongly that Stephen Langton (appointed 
archbishop of Canterbury 1207, and present at the Runnymede negotiations in 
1215) played no real part in the Charter’s creation, except as a mere negotiator. 
Holt’s argument was founded upon the assertion that Langton did not think 
it was the business of churchmen to intervene in ‘secular’ affairs. Although 
when Holt came to revise his Magna Carta for its second edition in 1992 it was 
now clear, as a result of Baldwin’s research, that Stephen Langton nourished 
a deep interest in politics, based on his theological view of the world and his 
responsibilities within it, Holt did not change his views.9 The prodigious 
influence that Holt’s work enjoyed in the field of Magna Carta scholarship 
for decades perhaps explains why the topic of political theology was not 
incorporated into mainstream Magna Carta scholarship for some time. 
 6 I Samuel VIII: 11–18.
 7 1 Corinthians XV: 24; Buc, L’ambiguïté du Livre, pp. 123–70. 
 8 Buc, L’ambiguïté du Livre, p. 248.
 9 J. C. Holt, Magna Carta (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1992), pp. 281, 284–9. 
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In recent years, there has been a resurgence in the debate about 
Langton’s role in the creation of the first issue of the Charter in 1215.10 
Clearly, it was Langton who in 1215 brokered peace, bringing king and 
barons together at Runnymede. The chronicler Ralph of Coggeshall 
describes how, while King John and his men remained in their pavilions 
and the barons in their tents, the archbishop and his colleagues shuttled 
back and forth between them to negotiate a settlement.11 To describe their 
role here with such a meagre term as ‘go-between’ would be a failure to 
grasp its nature. Bringing together two sides so divided by ideals and 
by enmity, and keeping them together long enough to hammer out a 
peace treaty, required true grit. It also required a profound authority, 
drawn from the charisma of the episcopal office and from the trust of 
both king and barons. As to the question of whether Langton authored 
particular clauses of the Charter, this is, in most cases, contentious. In 
an article of 2008, John Baldwin argued that Langton’s commitment to 
the ‘judgement by court’ principle propelled him into rebellion between 
1213 and 1215.12 The implication was that Langton’s agency was behind the 
Charter’s headline chapter (thirty-nine of the 1215 issue): ‘No free person 
is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or in 
any other way destroyed, nor will we go against him or send against him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.’ This 
view has been rejected by David Carpenter (in an article of 2011), though 
Carpenter argued persuasively, based on a careful comparison of the 1215 
Charter and the Articles of the Barons (a draft from which discussions 
at Runnymede proceeded), that Langton was responsible for inserting 
chapter one of the Charter, guaranteeing the freedom of the Church.13 As 
far as most chapters are concerned, however, attempting to find a single 
‘author’ would be a futile task: the Charter was a product of committee 
discussions and negotiations. 
 10 For the part attributed to Langton in the making of Magna Carta during the 
‘rediscovery’ of the archbishop from the 17th to the 19th centuries, see N. Vincent, ‘Stephen 
Langton, archbishop of Canterbury’, in Etienne Langton, prédicateur, bibliste, théologien, ed. 
L.-J. Bataillon, N. Bériou, G. Dahan, R. Quinto (Turnhout, 2010), pp. 51–123, at pp. 51–5, 
and a summary of more recent debate at pp. 92–3, with Vincent’s contribution at pp. 93–7; 
for a bibliographic summary of recent debate, see D. A. Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton 
and Magna Carta: his contribution, his doubts and his hypocrisy’, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxxvi 
(2011), 1041–65, at p. 1041 n.1, with Carpenter’s contribution at pp. 1042–52.
 11 Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. J. Stevenson (Rolls Ser., 1875), p. 172. 
 12 Baldwin, ‘Master Stephen Langton’, pp.  827–30. Baldwin’s Masters, Princes and 
Merchants portrays a more conservative thinker, but the Langton of Baldwin’s 2008 article is 
something of a radical. 
 13 Carpenter, ‘Archbishop Langton and Magna Carta’, in extenso.
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It is now possible, however, to say much more about the role of Langton 
and his suffragans in securing the Charter’s issue in 1215, thanks to research 
conducted in the build-up to Magna Carta’s anniversary celebrations in 
2015 by the Magna Carta Project.14 Extensive analysis of the documents 
issued by King John’s chancery, and of the charters issued by the households 
of the bishops, was conducted by David Carpenter, Nicholas Vincent and 
Teresa Webber. The scribal hands from hundreds of charters were compared 
to the hands that produced the four surviving engrossments of the 1215 
Charter. It now seems clear that at least two of the four, those kept at the 
cathedrals of Salisbury and Lincoln, were not written by royal scribes (as 
one would expect royal charters to be). Instead, they were written by scribes 
of the bishops’ households. This research reveals, therefore, that the bishops 
provided their own scribes to help draw up engrossments of the Charter, in 
order to ensure that the contents of Magna Carta would be published above 
the wishes of a reluctant King John. Furthermore, the bishops were also the 
principal guardians of Magna Carta 1215, taking exemplars back to their 
cathedrals for safekeeping, from where they could be read or publicized.15 
Thus, in a phrase recently coined, the Church was central to the production, 
preservation and proclamation of the first issue of Magna Carta.
As time wore on, the interest of the English bishops in Magna Carta only 
increased. This was first revealed in 1998, when David d’Avray published a 
seminal article on Langton’s political theology that engaged directly with the 
work of historians of English politics. D’Avray pointed to the central place 
of the bishops in the enforcement of Magna Carta in the thirteenth century. 
When a new version of the Charter was issued by Henry III’s minority 
government in 1216, the controversial ‘security for peace’, which empowered 
twenty-five barons to ‘distrain and afflict’ the king in order to compel him 
to keep the Charter’s terms, was removed, leaving Magna Carta with no 
means of enforcement.16 This changed in 1225 when Stephen Langton, 
archbishop of Canterbury, and his suffragans stepped in to pronounce a 
general sentence of excommunication against all who would violate Magna 
Carta or the Charter of the Forest. The archbishop’s actions were informed 
by his own biblical scholarship (found in his exegesis of Deuteronomy), 
 14 The Project’s website can be found at <http://magnacartaresearch.org>. 
 15 N. Vincent and D. A. Carpenter, ‘Feature of the month: June 2015 – Who did (and did 
not) write Magna Carta’,  The Magna Carta Project <http://magnacartaresearch.org/read/
feature_of_the_month/Jun_2015_3> [accessed 11 Jan. 2016]; D. A. Carpenter, Magna Carta 
(2015), pp. 373–79.
 16 For the ‘security of peace’, see ‘The 1215 Magna Carta: suffix A’,  The Magna Carta 
Project, trans. H. Summerson et al. <http://magnacartaresearch.org/read/magna_carta_1215/
Suffix_A> [accessed 11 Jan. 2016].
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which set out the need for kings to keep and abide by a written volume 
of the law and placed upon the shoulders of the clergy the responsibility 
for ensuring that this condition was met. Crucially, then, Langton had the 
opportunity as archbishop of Canterbury to put his thinking into practice. 
In acting thus, Langton set a precedent for his successors, encouraging a 
culture in which bishops were duty-bound to oversee royal government 
and to keep the king’s rule within the law.17 The confirmations of the 1225 
Charter made throughout the course of Henry III’s reign, and during 
the reign of his son Edward I, were likewise buttressed by a sentence of 
excommunication pronounced by England’s bishops. 
Descriptions of this sentence of excommunication (provided by the 
chronicler Matthew Paris) reveal the centrality of the bishops in the political 
culture of the Magna Carta era. In the course of a great assembly in 1237, 
the ritual was enacted in St. Katherine’s chapel of Westminster Abbey. There 
the king stood, surrounded by his barons and bishops, with the bishops 
holding lighted candles. The king held his right hand on the Gospels and 
clutched a candle in his left, and delivered his oath to the archbishop of 
Canterbury, binding himself to uphold the Charters. All then uttered ‘let 
it be done’ to consummate the sentence, and the bishops turned over their 
candles onto the floor to extinguish them. This filled the room with smoke 
and the stench of the smoking wicks, which irritated the eyes and nostrils of 
those present. Now the archbishop proclaimed: ‘thus may the condemned 
souls of those who violate the Charter be extinguished, and thus may 
they smoke and stink.’18 This was a vivid and dramatic ritual, intended to 
imprint the sentence upon the memory by awakening the senses of sight, 
hearing, and smell. It summoned its participants to fulfil the communal 
responsibility of upholding the Charters and warned them of the spiritual 
danger of breaking their terms. 
The duty to enforce Magna Carta was one that the bishops took 
seriously. In 1234, when Henry III had for a time cast off the principles of 
Magna Carta, Stephen Langton’s pupil and successor as primate, Edmund 
of Abingdon, and his suffragans confronted the king in parliament with a 
catalogue of royal misdeeds and threatened to excommunicate him unless 
he mended his ways. It was a threat that the king took to heart, for he 
repented of his unjust actions and bent to Edmund’s counsel (discussed 
 17 D. L. d’Avray, ‘“Magna Carta”: its background in Stephen Langton’s academic biblical 
exegesis and its episcopal reception’, Studi Medievali, 3rd ser., xxxvii (1998), 423–38.
 18 According to Matthew Paris, Henry held a candle for the ceremony of 1237 but refused 
to do so in 1253, on the grounds that he was not a priest (Matthaei Parisiensis, Monachi Sancti 
Albani, Chronica Majora, ed. H. R. Luard (7 vols., Rolls Ser., 1872–83) [hereafter CM], iii. 
382, and v. 360–61 (for events of 1237); v. 377 (for 1253)). 
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below). On another occasion, three years later, the king and a number of 
his barons sought absolution from the archbishop, in case they had fallen 
under the sentence.19 
As the thirteenth century continued, the bishops made increasing efforts to 
publicize the sentence of excommunication to the wider kingdom. As recent 
work by Felicity Hill has argued, they were driven by their responsibility to 
ensure good government but also by their pastoral obligations: if anybody 
violated Magna Carta, their soul would be placed in jeopardy, meaning that 
the bishops were duty-bound to warn their flocks of the Charter’s terms, 
lest anybody fall under the sentence in ignorance.20 The consequence was 
that Magna Carta was brought to a broad public, to parish churches as well 
as shire courts, and thus to the unfree as to the free, to women as well as 
men. The bishops, then, were instrumental in the expansion of the political 
community in the thirteenth century. 
English bishops were able to act in this way because they were peculiarly 
powerful in respect to their king, and uniquely qualified to confront 
illegal royal actions. When the king acted illegally, refusing to follow due 
process or to consult his magnates and prelates, and provoked his barons 
to rebellion, the bishops could intervene. They possessed the ritual power 
to chastise him, purge him of his faults, and recreate him anew as king.21 
This can be seen in 1213: before Winchester Cathedral, the sin-ridden King 
John threw himself tearfully at the bishops’ feet, begging their forgiveness 
for the faults he had committed against Church and kingdom. The bishops 
lifted him from the ground and led him into the cathedral, where John 
swore to defend the Church and her clergy, to maintain the good laws of 
his kingdom and to provide justice: effectively a renewal of his coronation 
oath.22 The bishops’ authority can be seen again in 1234. Between 1232 
and 1233, under the malign influence of certain royal ministers, Henry III 
gave orders per voluntatem regis (acting according to his will and without 
judgement). This was a violation of the tenets of his office, as laid out by 
custom and guaranteed by Magna Carta, and provoked certain of his barons 
to rebellion. In response, Edmund of Abingdon, Stephen Langton’s pupil 
and now archbishop of Canterbury, intervened. Edmund and his suffragans 
 19 The Letters of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, trans. F. A. C. Mantello and J. Goering 
(Toronto, 2010), pp. 252–4.
 20 F. Hill, ‘Magna Carta, canon law and pastoral care: excommunication and the Church’s 
publication of the charter’, Hist. Research, lxxxix (2016), 636–50. 
 21 S. T. Ambler, Bishops in the Political Community of England, 1213–1272 (Oxford, 2017), 
pp. 61–81.
 22 Roger of Wendover, Chronica, sive Flores Historiarum, ed. H. O. Coxe (4 vols., 1842), 
iii. 260–61.
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stood before the king and reproved Henry for the unjust treatment of his 
subjects, and warned him to desist or face the penalty of ecclesiastical 
censure. The king’s response was humble and penitent, and he went on to 
rectify the wrongs he had committed.23
The role of the bishops here was ultimately founded upon the example 
of the Old Testament prophets, who were held to be the forerunners of 
the Christian clergy. First, the bishops drew authority from their role as 
anointers of kings. The place of the bishops in royal inauguration rites was 
founded upon Old Testament descriptions of the anointing of the kings of 
Israel by prophets,24 and had been established since at least the mid tenth 
century in much of western Europe.25 In England, bishops had long been 
central to the coronation ritual: they administered the coronation oath, 
anointed the candidate, and delivered a sermon on his duties as ruler.26 In 
England, this crowning and anointing by prelates became essential to the 
monarch’s authority.27 This was not the case in many other European polities 
in the central middle ages, where kings were not generally anointed. The 
fact of the royal anointing was important to episcopal authority because, 
like baptism, it renewed the candidate and implied that those conferring 
the anointing had the right to correct him.28
Second, the bishops drew authority from the example of their Old 
Testament antecessors by looking to instances when God had sent his 
prophets to reprimand the wayward monarchs who oppressed the Israelites. 
The duty to reprimand erring kings in this manner had long been borne 
by English prelates: Björn Weiler has traced it through the centuries, from 
 23 Wendover, iv. 294–7.
 24 I Samuel X: 1; I Samuel XVI: 13; I Kings I: 39; I Kings XIX: 15–16; II Kings IX: 6; J. L. 
Nelson, ‘The lord’s anointed and the people’s choice: Carolingian royal ritual’, in her The 
Frankish World, 750–900 (1996), pp. 99–132, at p. 108. 
 25 J. L. Nelson, ‘Inauguration rituals’, in her Politics and Ritual in Early Medieval Europe 
(1986), pp. 283–307, at 287. 
 26 P. Stafford, ‘The laws of Cnut and the history of Anglo-Saxon royal promises’, Anglo-
Saxon England, x (1982), 173–90, at pp. 185–6.
 27 English rulers since the Conquest were not considered king until crowned and anointed 
in Westminster Abbey. This custom continued until 1272, when necessity dictated that 
custom be broken (M. Morris, A Great and Terrible King: Edward I and the Forging of Britain 
(2008), pp. 103–4). 
 28 J. L. Nelson, ‘National synods, kingship as office, and royal anointing: an early medieval 
syndrome’, in Studies in Church History, vii, ed. G. J. Cuming and D. Baker (Cambridge, 
1971), 41–59, at pp. 52–3; Nelson, ‘National synods’, pp. 54–5. For the longer background 
of admonitio, see M. Suchan, ‘Monition and advice as elements of politics’, in Patterns 
of Episcopal Power: Bishops in 10th and 11th Century Western Europe, ed. L. Körntgen and 
D. Waßenhoven (2011), pp.  39–50; Stafford, ‘Anglo-Saxon royal promises’, Anglo-Saxon 
England, p. 188.
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the Anglo-Saxon period up to the archiepiscopate of Stephen Langton 
(1207–26).29 The most famous example, of course, was Thomas Becket, 
whose conflict with Henry II led to Becket’s martyrdom at the hands of 
Henry’s men in 1170. English bishops of the thirteenth century could thus 
draw on the authority not only of the Old Testament prophets but also of 
their predecessors when they reprimanded kings, and especially from the 
sanctified example of Becket (he was canonized in 1173), whose memory 
became talismanic.30 Something changed in the thirteenth century, 
however: the manner of issue contested by the bishops. Where earlier 
prelates had chastised kings for their moral failings or defended the liberty 
of the Church, Langton and his successors chastised the king for offences 
against his people and defended the kingdom as a whole, in the interests 
of the broader community.31 It was Langton, with his scholarly interest in 
political ethics, who was responsible for extending this duty. 
These pools of authority combined to qualify the English bishops for 
the oversight of royal power, a duty and a right amplified by Stephen 
Langton’s biblical scholarship, which argued that it was the responsibility 
of the priesthood to provide the king with written law. The strength of the 
episcopate in acting thus was enlivened by a forceful sense of corporate 
solidarity, developed through the thirteenth century as senior churchmen met 
frequently both in synods and regnal assemblies, where the king’s frequent 
demands for taxation encouraged the prelates to engage with royal policy 
and to act collectively in resisting it.32 This power of the English bishops to 
reform royal rule was unusual, in comparison with their colleagues in other 
European polities. For instance, the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula can 
be viewed as parallels to England, in that representative institutions similar 
to the English parliament emerged during the thirteenth century, wherein 
a penurious king was forced to bargain with his subjects. Yet, in the Iberian 
Peninsula, bishops had no power to oversee royal rule or correct the abuses 
of their kings, because they had no liturgical role in king-making, because 
they did not enjoy (or rather were not permitted to develop) the same sense 
of corporate solidarity, and because they were kept under the royal heel.33 
What was peculiar about the English experience, then, was the prominent 
place of religious leaders in the development of the parliamentary institution.
 29 B. K. Weiler, ‘Bishops and kings in England, c.1066–1215’, in Religion and Politics in the 
Middle Ages: Germany and England by Comparison, ed. L. Körntgen and D. Waßenhoven 
(Berlin, 2013), pp. 157–203.
 30 Ambler, Bishops in the Political Community, pp. 20–1, 64, 67–8, 96, 97–8, 117–18, 132–3.
 31 Ambler, Bishops in the Political Community, pp. 63–4.
 32 Ambler, Bishops in the Political Community, pp. 82–104. 
33 Ambler, Bishops in the Political Community, pp. 54, 99–103, 206.
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The creation of Magna Carta and its entrenchment in political society 
were, therefore, intertwined with the strengthening of England’s episcopate. 
Research over the past few decades has shown that regnal politics in this 
period was inherently religious, and that it became more and not less so 
even as the bureaucracy of the English State (so often seen as antithetical 
to charismatic politics) expanded, and as the parliamentary State emerged. 
Indeed, central to the political culture that produced the parliamentary 
State was the wielding of spiritual power by certain of its agents, and the 
understanding that spiritual and charismatic authority was as important in 
constraining the operation of kingship as the ability of barons and knights 
to refuse grants of taxation. The two, indeed, went hand in hand, since 
grants of taxation (made by assemblies of prelates, magnates and knights) 
were made only on condition that the king uphold the Charters, requiring 
the political community to participate in sentences of excommunication 
and subjecting them to its spiritual penalties. Contrary to the myths that 
have come to surround Magna Carta over the centuries, this world was not 
democratic, but theocratic.
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5. Sir Edward Coke’s resurrection of Magna Carta
George Garnett
On 28 April 1628 Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, M.P. for Downton, Wiltshire, told 
the house of commons:
I shall be very glad to see that good, old decrepit Law of Magna Charta which 
hath been so long kept in, and lain bed-rid, as it were, I shall be glad I say to see 
it walk abroad again, with new Vigour and Lustre, attended by the Six Statutes; 
For questionless, it will be a general heartening to all the people.1
Rudyerd was contributing to the parliamentary debates provoked by King 
Charles I’s arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of several individuals who had 
refused to subscribe to the forced loan which the king had attempted to 
exact, without parliamentary sanction, from certain of his subjects in 1627. 
To be precise, Rudyerd was urging the king’s opponents in the house of 
commons to accept a compromise. The king had offered to confirm Magna 
Carta along with the six supplementary statutes passed by parliaments 
during the reign of Edward III, between 1328 and 1368. These statutes had 
both amplified and readjusted Magna Carta to the changed circumstances 
of the fourteenth century.2 But the king would confirm these ancient bits of 
legislation only if his opponents sought no further, new restrictions on his 
exercise of his prerogative. 
How had it come about that King Charles in 1628 sought to placate 
parliamentary opposition by offering a confirmation of Magna Carta, a royal 
document of the early thirteenth century, and its various fourteenth-century 
statutory elaborations and redefinitions? No English king had proposed 
defusing opposition in this way since Henry V in 1422, over two centuries 
before. And why were Magna Carta and the subsequent statutes suddenly 
being resurrected, Lazarus-like, from the sickbed to which Sir Benjamin 
 1 Commons Debates 1628, ed. R. C. Johnson et al. (4 vols., 1977–97), iii. 128.
 2 F. Thompson, Magna Carta: its Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300–1629 
(Minneapolis, Minn., 1948), pp. 9–32; J. C. Holt, ‘The ancient constitution in medieval 
England’, in The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American 
Tradition of the Rule of Law, ed. E. Sandoz (1993), pp. 22–56.
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Rudyerd thought the Charter had been confined for several centuries?3 The 
answers to these questions are neither simple nor obvious, but they are best 
approached through the works of Sir Edward Coke, sometime chief justice 
of the king’s bench and by 1628 incontrovertibly the principal legal mind in 
the parliamentary opposition to Charles. 
Rudyerd’s account of Magna Carta’s antecedent moribundity was 
exaggerated. Sir John Baker has just published an enormous edition of 
readings on selected chapters of Magna Carta dating from the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, the very period during which, according to Rudyerd, it 
had been bed-ridden.4 Readings were the educational lectures on statutory 
texts delivered in the Inns of Court to law students. These particular readings 
reveal that Magna Carta – Henry III’s reissue of Magna Carta of 1225, that is, 
which had ever since the thirteenth century been treated as the authoritative 
text – continued throughout those centuries to be a subject of considerable 
jurisprudential interest, despite its increasing obsolescence in practical terms. 
That interest is hardly surprising, given that the Magna Carta of 1225 
was the first item in the English statute book. Magna Carta was the 
foundational statute, as it were. It would therefore have been well known 
to all law students, even the most elementary or indolent. It is difficult to 
generalize, but the readings from this period suggest that Magna Carta was 
used by law lecturers in the Inns of Court mainly as a very familiar hook 
on which to hang explorations of instructive legal problems. Sometimes 
these were framed in terms of real cases, excavated from the Year Books, 
the records of interlocutory proceedings in court. Sometimes the cases 
were hypothetical, manufactured by the lecturer in order to raise some 
interesting legal conundrum. The readings ostensibly based on Magna 
Carta therefore in practice strayed a very long way from the first document 
in the statute book as they explored those problems. A chapter of Magna 
Carta did no more than provide the starting point. Or as Coke put it of 
recent law readings in general, they were ‘long, obscure, and intricate, full 
of new conceits, liker rather to riddles than lectures, which when they are 
opened they vanish away like smoake, and the readers are like lapwings, 
who seem to be nearest their nests, when they are farthest from them’.5 
As this disparaging characterization suggests, Coke rejected such recent 
illusory and distracting elaborations, and presented himself as returning to 
the essentials of the text itself.
 3 G. Garnett, ‘Magna Carta through eight centuries’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography (2015) <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/107251> [accessed 22 March 2018].
 4 Selected Readings and Commentaries on Magna Carta 1400–1604, ed. J. H. Baker (Selden 
Society, cxxxii, 2015).
 5 Edward Coke, I Institutes, fo. 280a–b.
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By the time he published this criticism of the practices of modern law 
lecturers, in his First Institutes (1628), Coke had developed what was for 
centuries and in many respects still remains the most influential assessment 
of English legal history. For reasons explored elsewhere, he presented the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries – the period of the Year Books, and of 
Thomas Littleton, whose great work on land law was the subject of Coke’s 
First Institutes – as English law’s golden age. In that period, he erroneously 
asserted, readings had still been cited frequently in court proceedings, 
because, by inference, they were then still of use to legal practitioners. They 
had not yet degenerated into the deceptively irrelevant academic exercises 
of recent times, which were of no use at all to lawyers engaged in court 
proceedings, the context in which Coke considered English law was most 
effectively formulated. He presented himself, as mentioned earlier, as 
restoring or purifying the currently debased law. But his interpretation of 
English legal history had been fully formed long before he wrote, in 1628, 
this disparaging comment about modern readings. He had begun to sketch 
his interpretation in the readings that he himself wrote during Elizabeth I’s 
reign. He had greatly elaborated them in his artful prefatory essays to the 
volumes of his Reports, which he started to publish in 1600.6
The Reports printed what he presented as transcripts of jurisprudentially 
key court cases from the preceding forty years. They were intended as a 
definitive substitute for the now defunct sequence of Year Books, which had 
expired (for reasons Coke never addressed) by the mid sixteenth century. His 
first elaborate preface is that to the Third Reports, published in 1602, and the 
last to the Tenth Reports, published in 1614. These prefaces develop an account 
of English law as both immemorial and continuous. They were written in 
an engaging English prose, their style of reasoning is artfully whimsical, and 
they require little legal knowledge on the part of readers. They were, in other 
words, intended for a wide, lay as well as a legally learned, audience. Their 
account of the history of English law was intended to shore up that law, and 
therefore the liberties which were considered to be grounded in it, first against 
James I’s early threats of Union between his English and Scottish kingdoms, 
including a Union of the respective legal systems of those two kingdoms. The 
consequence of such a legal Union was widely accepted to be the abolition 
of English common law, and the liberties that English law was deemed to 
embody. Second, and more broadly, even as the threat of Union between 
England and Scotland receded, Coke was seeking to forestall the new king’s 
various devious attempts to sidestep parliament. 
 6 This is a summary of the argument of G. Garnett, ‘“The ould fields”: law and history in 
the Prefaces to Sir Edward Coke’s Reports’, Jour. Legal History, xxxiv (2013), 245–84.
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In the preface to Eighth Reports, published in 1611, Coke presented the 
Magna Carta of 1225 as the first surviving written summary of English 
law in statutory form. There was nothing novel or unconventional about 
this. It was in accord with English legal tradition reaching back to the 
late thirteenth century; but Coke here greatly elaborated it. He knew that 
Henry III’s Charter was a confirmation of John’s of 1215, the text of which 
he had not yet bothered to try to excavate, because that was not what was in 
the statute book; but he traced the tradition of the royal charter of liberties 
granted to the king’s subjects back through Henry II’s coronation charter in 
1154, Stephen’s coronation charter in 1135, and Henry I’s coronation charter 
in 1100, to William the Conqueror. William the Conqueror had not issued 
a coronation charter, but, according to some thirteenth- and fourteenth-
century chroniclers and a twelfth-century apocryphal law code which Coke 
accepted as authentic, the first Norman king had summoned an assembly of 
the English nobility which had summarized existing, indeed immemorial, 
English law, labelled as ‘the lawes of King Edward’. This label meant not that 
these laws were Edward the Confessor’s own legislation; rather they were 
the existing English laws which Edward the Confessor had endorsed, and 
which William the Conqueror, in the wake of his conquest of England, was 
in turn confirming. These laws, compiled by an assembly of the nobility 
under William I, had been made ‘into a Magna Carta (the ground-worke 
for all those that after followed)’.7 Henry III’s Charter of 1225 was simply the 
first extant statutory exemplification of that ancient, indeed immemorial 
English law, embodied after the Norman Conquest in successive Magnae 
Cartae, issued by successive kings. Coke first published this analysis in 1611, 
in the preface to Eighth Reports. But it was built on his much earlier, briefer 
sketches of English legal history, preserved in his extant readings written 
during Elizabeth I’s reign, and amplified above all in the preface to Third 
Reports (1602) and the substantial report of Caudrey’s Case which he had 
included in Fifth Reports (1605). Nevertheless, the central role in English 
legal history which he now attributed in print to Magna Carta was new to 
the preface of Eighth Reports of 1611.
This did not, however, constitute Coke’s first detailed written consideration 
of Magna Carta. Already in Michaelmas Term 1604, Coke had inserted 
into one of his manuscript notebooks – the sources for all his Reports on 
individual court cases – a memorandum on Magna Carta chapter 29, that 
chapter of 1225 Magna Carta which elided chapters 39 and 40 of John’s 
Charter of 1215.8 This unprinted memorandum does not place Magna Carta 
 7 Edward Coke, Eighth Reports, p. v.
 8 Baker, Selected Readings, pp. 394–402.
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in an historical context, as Coke would do in the preface to Eighth Reports. 
Perhaps it does not do so because he had not yet in 1604 realized how 
Magna Carta could be made central to his history of English law, or perhaps 
just because the memorandum was addressed to legal professionals, rather 
than also to the wider, unlearned audience to the prefaces of his Reports. In 
it Coke drew a connection between this chapter of Magna Carta and that 
early Tudor invention, the writ habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, an order to 
‘produce the body … to undergo [whatever our court should order]’.9
Originally, habeas corpus had been an expression of royal prerogative – an 
instruction in the name of the monarch to produce any prisoner, whoever 
currently held him in custody, in practice most often a royal councillor 
or one of the conciliar courts, themselves acting on the basis of the royal 
prerogative. Prerogative was thus used to trump prerogative, not in order 
to liberate a prisoner, but to bring him before the court issuing the writ 
– in the particular case of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the court of the 
king’s bench. Yet because the writ specified that it had to be returned with 
the date and cause of detention, it afforded that court an opportunity 
also to review the justification for imprisonment, and therefore at least 
potentially to release the prisoner, to set him at liberty. By connecting the 
writ with this chapter of Magna Carta in his memorandum, Coke was 
transforming this mechanism for transferring a prisoner from the custody 
of some other agent of the king into the custody of the court of the king’s 
bench. He was transforming it into a right of the king’s subject to contest 
arbitrary imprisonment at the king’s command. In Coke’s view this Tudor 
innovation could provide the remedy for infringement of chapter 29 and 
the supplementary statutes which neither Magna Carta itself nor the 
statutes had provided. In other words, it defined the ‘due process of law’ 
to which those statutes had referred, although they had never spelled out 
what the term meant. Magna Carta had occasionally been invoked in the 
sixteenth century by those contesting their imprisonment,10 but so far as I 
can establish Coke was the first lawyer to base habeas corpus on chapter 29 
of Magna Carta. The move was prophetic, in the sense that he wrote this 
memorandum twenty-three years prior to the Five Knights’ Case of 1627, 
in which habeas corpus would be treated by counsel for the imprisoned 
knights as the means for enforcing chapter 29 of Magna Carta, with the 
aim of assessing the legality of the king’s actions according to what this 
 9 P. D. Halliday, Habeas Corpus, from England to Empire (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 
pp. 16–18; J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn., Oxford 2002), 
pp. 146–7.
 10 J. H. Baker, ‘Personal liberty under the common law 1200–1600’, in his Collected Papers 
on English Legal History (3 vols., Cambridge, 2013), ii. 871–900, at pp. 893–9.
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very chapter of Magna Carta termed ‘the law of the land’.11 In 1604 Coke 
was King James’s attorney general, and his inventive use of habeas corpus in 
conjunction with Magna Carta and the fourteenth-century statutes on due 
process might be seen as a novel device to enable the common law judges, 
acting of course in the king’s name, to keep certain prerogative jurisdictions 
in check – an objective which continued to remain close to Coke’s heart.12 
But he had started publishing his Reports as attorney general under Queen 
Elizabeth. Her successor’s behaviour as king had exacerbated, not allayed, 
the concern which Coke had already felt prior to 1603. In Coke’s case, being 
a senior law officer did not necessarily make for deference to the royal will. 
Indeed, rather the contrary. In the memorandum he already in 1604 made 
grandiloquent claims which suggested that Magna Carta chapter 29 (and by 
implication the habeas corpus which he here connected with it) might have a 
much wider application: the chapter, he alleged, protected ‘everything that 
anyone has in this world, or that concerns the freedom and liberty of his 
body or his freehold, or the benefit of the law to which he is inheritable, 
or his native country in which he was born, or the preservation of his 
reputation or goods, or his life, blood, and posterity’.13 As such, moreover, 
it was ‘merely a declaration of the old law of the land’ – the law which had 
already been old at the time of Magna Carta, and which had been explicitly 
invoked in chapter 29. 
That brief characterization – not in itself innovatory – might be interpreted 
as prompting Coke’s later incorporation of Magna Carta into the scheme of 
English legal history which he had first outlined in any detail (but without 
any reference to Magna Carta) two years beforehand in the preface to Third 
Reports. In the terms of his later disparagement of recent readings in the 
Inns of Court, he was not a jurisprudential lapwing, farthest from his nest 
when he appeared closest to it; nor was he creating a smokescreen which 
obscured the real issue.14 On the contrary, he had identified the foundation 
for property, liberty, and even life itself in this very chapter of the earliest 
extant English statute. 
If Sir Benjamin Rudyerd had ever read Coke’s memorandum, which 
seems unlikely – if it circulated at all, it did so in manuscript – he might 
have identified it as the point at which Magna Carta had begun to stir in its 
centuries-old sickbed. It is, however, highly likely that Sir Benjamin would 
have read the preface to Eighth Reports, not least because of the role that 
 11 Thompson, Magna Carta, pp. 326–35; J. S. Hart Jr., The Rule of Law, 1603–1660: Crowns, 
Courts and Judges (Harlow, 2003), pp. 122–30.
 12 Baker, Selected Readings, pp. xc–xci.
 13 Baker, Selected Readings, p. 394.
 14 Above, p. 000.
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Magna Carta came to play in political debate in 1628. In that year Magna 
Carta was central to the Petition of Right, the device adopted, at Coke’s 
instigation, by the parliamentary opposition in order to circumscribe 
Charles I. In the Petition of Right Magna Carta was explicitly conjoined 
with habeas corpus, and the Five Knights’ Case of the previous year was 
explicitly invoked.15 To this Petition King Charles was eventually forced to 
give his grudging assent. It was the sort of measure he had sought to pre-
empt by offering to confirm Magna Carta and the supplementary statutes, 
on condition that there was no further elaboration. The Petition was just 
the sort of elaboration he had sought to fend off.
Coke was famously dismissed as chief justice of the king’s bench by James 
I in 1616. By that point he had published the last volume of Reports which 
he would see through the press. After his dismissal he was ordered to make 
many amendments to the published texts of the Reports – an order to which 
he responded as provocatively as one would expect of him.16 He was already, 
however, at work on his new and even more ambitious jurisprudential 
project, his Institutes. His aim in the Institutes was to produce the most 
comprehensive written survey of English law ever, a replacement for (and 
by implication an improvement on) the great thirteenth-century law book 
known as Bracton, which still remained at that point the most comprehensive 
and detailed statement of English law in existence. 
His choice of title for his new work was obviously an allusion to the 
sixth-century Roman emperor Justinian, whose Institutes, one of the four 
constituent parts of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, had also been presented as a 
legal text-book. Coke’s Institutes bore more than a passing resemblance to the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis in another sense, but to the Corpus in the form it assumed 
in the later middle ages onwards, not to the sixth-century original: it consisted 
both of the texts of authoritative sources of law, and Coke’s extensive glosses 
on them. However, in Coke’s opinion the nature of his gloss was yet another 
manifestation of the superiority of English jurisprudence over Roman: 
their glosses and commentaries are written by doctors, which be advocates, and 
in a manner private interpretations; and our expositions or commentaries upon 
Magna Charta, and other statutes, are resolutions of judges in courts of justice 
in judiciall courses of proceeding, either related and reported in our books, or 
extant in judiciall records, or in both, and therefore being collected together, 
shall … produce certainty.17 
 15 Thompson, Magna Carta, pp. 335–9.
 16 Garnett, ‘“The ould fields”’, pp. 282–3.
 17 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1642) (hereafter 
Second Institutes), ‘A Proeme’.
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Such certainty, based on law forensically defined by judges in public, was 
inconceivable in Roman jurisprudence, which by contrast with English was 
based on the private opinions of jurists and advocates. Coke proclaims it in 
the preface to Second Institutes, the volume which glossed at length certain 
statutes which Coke considered most significant, beginning, like the statute 
book, and as Coke underlined, with Magna Carta, and ending in the reign 
of James I.
The prefaces to all volumes of Institutes other than the Second are terse; 
the volume which follows the preface is allowed to speak for itself. Only 
that to Second Institutes is substantial and discursive, and in that sense 
comparable to the prefaces to the Reports. However, the only statute which 
this preface discusses explicitly is Magna Carta; the subsequent thirty-eight 
statutes included in the volume receive no explicit mention. Among the 
thirty-eight are included Edward I’s Confirmationes chartarum of 1297 and 
his Articuli super chartas of 1300. Coke’s gloss on Magna Carta, like his 
glosses throughout the first two parts of the Institutes, is designed for use by 
legal practitioners. Its focus is on the detailed interpretation of particular 
passages in the texts, by reference to records of forensic proceedings, 
primarily from the Year Books, and other sources which Coke regarded as 
authoritative. This format means that there is no opportunity to develop a 
sustained argument, even on the modest scale of the prefaces to the Reports. 
The focus is on particular textual detail. The preface to Second Institutes is 
therefore the most obvious occasion in the Institutes when Coke steps back 
from minute textual examination in order to draw wider lessons.
In it he repeated almost verbatim what he had said in that to Eighth 
Reports, which in turn echoes the memorandum of 1604: Magna Carta was 
‘for the most part declaratory of the principall grounds of the fundamentall 
laws of England, and for the residue it is additionall to supply some defects 
of the common law; and it was no new declaration’. He acknowledged, 
again, that King John had issued a Magna Carta in 1215, though Coke also 
admitted that John had attempted to wriggle out of it, by claiming that 
it had been issued under duress. That was not, however, true of Henry 
III’s Magna Carta of 1225. By virtue of the authorities Coke cited, and the 
earlier royal legislation he invoked, he sought to demonstrate that insofar 
as the 1225 Magna Carta did not simply endorse then current common 
law, it reinstated what had recently been disregarded or contravened, by 
King John and King Richard, whose reigns had been ‘troublesome and 
irregular times’ during which ‘divers oppressions, exactions, and injuries 
were incroached upon the subject in these kings names’. He established 
what ancient practice had been not by reference to court records – for there 
were none extant – but to late thirteenth and fourteenth-century books – 
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the Modus tenendi parliamentum and the Mirror of Justices – both of which 
affected to be pre-Conquest works, in the former case dating from the reign 
of Edward the Confessor, in the latter from that of King Arthur. Coke 
devotes most attention to chapter 29, the chapter which had been the main 
focus of his attention in the memorandum of 1604: ‘as the goldfiner will 
not out of the dust, threds, or shreds of gold, let passe the least crum, in 
respect of the excellency of the metal: so ought not the learned reader to let 
passe any syllable of this law, in respect of the excellency of the matter.’18 He 
attempts to establish a genealogy of cases in support of the connection he 
had drawn between the chapter and habeas corpus.
But the Second Institutes was not published during Coke’s lifetime. James 
I had ordered an investigation into Coke’s Reports, and Coke had thumbed 
his nose at the suggested revisions.19 In 1621 several of Coke’s books were 
confiscated – in 1628 he told the house of commons he would give £300 
to get the most precious manuscripts back.20 In that year he published 
his First Institutes, a massive gloss on Littleton’s Tenures, and in the brief 
preface gave notice that he already had in hand a similar treatment of 
Magna Carta. In view of the political events of that year, he was clearly 
needling his sovereign; and successfully so. Coke’s books and manuscripts 
were searched again in 1631, not long after Sir Robert Cotton had been 
barred from using his own library, because the material he was unearthing 
from his books was considered by the authorities to be too subversive. The 
king now ordered that every effort should be made to ensure that Coke’s 
promised commentary on Magna Carta did not ‘come forth’.21 In 1634, as 
the resurrector of Magna Carta himself lay on his death-bed, the king’s 
agents rifled through his books and papers in the study below. A trunk full 
of books and papers was dispatched to Charles in person, at Bagshot, ‘& 
there broken open by his Majesty’. Charles was evidently unwilling to trust 
anyone to do that job for him. Inside the box was a smaller trunk, which 
did indeed contain ‘an exposicion upon Magna Carta and other ancient 
statutes’22 – the draft of Second Institutes to which Coke had menacingly 
referred in the preface to First Institutes. In 1641 the house of commons 
voted that this, together with the drafts of Third and Fourth Institutes, 
should be released and published, and chose to do so on the very day of the 
earl of Strafford’s execution.23 That decision exemplified the shibbolethic 
 18 Second Institutes, fo. 57a.
 19 Garnett, ‘“The ould fields”’, p. 282.
 20 Commons Debates 1628, iii. 166.
 21 The National Archives of the U.K., SP 16/183, 18, fo. 29.
 22 London, Lambeth Palace Library, MS. 943, 371–2.
 23 Garnett, “The ould fields”’, p. 284.
Magna Carta: history, context and influence
60
status which Coke’s commentary had achieved, for both the king and his 
opponents; it had, as Sir Benjamin Rudyerd had prophesied to the house of 
commons in 1628, become ‘a general heartening to all the people’. 
But Coke would have been horrified by the use to which his work would 
be put by the end of the 1640s. In Behemoth, Thomas Hobbes characterized 
the preliminary conflicts of the 1620s and 1630s thus: ‘it were a Warre … 
yet there was no bloodshed; they shot at one another nothing but paper’.24 
Coke never envisaged the shift from printed legal argument to firearms and, 
ultimately, to the axe wielded by the executioner of the king at the behest of 
what purported to be an English law court sitting in, of all places, that legal 
Holy of Holies, Westminster Hall. Nevertheless his historical elaboration 
of the traditional doctrine of English legal continuity, at the heart of which 
he came to place Magna Carta, ended up playing a very important part in 
fashioning the weapon with which the veil of the temple was rent in twain. 
It also, both before and after, became foundational to the liberty of the 
subject, not only in England, but throughout the English-speaking world, 
and eventually beyond.
 24 Thomas Hobbes, Behemoth, ed. P. Seaward (Oxford, 2010), pp. 251–2.
61
R. Foxley, ‘“More precious in your esteem than it deserveth”? Magna Carta and seventeenth-century 
politics’, in Magna Carta: history, context and influence, ed. L. Goldman (2018),pp. 61–77.
6. ‘More precious in your esteem than it deserveth’? 
Magna Carta and seventeenth-century politics*
Rachel Foxley
Magna Carta was born in a time of conflict in the thirteenth century, 
when King John’s overbearing rule was challenged by his barons. In the 
seventeenth century Magna Carta was drawn into another conflict between 
a king and his subjects: the English Civil War or English Revolution of the 
1640s. King Charles I was not a tyrannical king in the way that King John 
was, but he was rather rigid in his approach to kingship, and he presided 
over three separate kingdoms (England, Scotland and Ireland) which were 
not easy to rule harmoniously, oversaw unpopular religious policies, and 
brought England into wars in the 1620s which placed a huge burden on the 
population. The resulting political tensions effectively brought about the 
breakdown of the English constitution. Under pressure from Scottish rebels, 
Charles called two English parliaments in 1640. His attempt to bolster his 
position in his largest kingdom backfired, as the Long Parliament which 
met in November 1640 exploited Charles’s weak position to prolong its 
own life and challenge the king’s unpopular counsellors and policies. In the 
autumn of 1641, rebellion broke out in Ireland as well. The king and the 
parliament both raised troops, but instead of sending them to suppress the 
Irish rising, they began a civil war in England. Parliament defeated the king 
in the English Civil Wars of 1642–6 and 1648. Charles was executed in 1649, 
and a failed experiment in republican government ensued before Charles II 
was able to reclaim his father’s throne in 1660.
But the civil wars were not just fought on the battlefield. The warring sides 
fought through print and propaganda too: ‘newsbooks’, the newspapers of 
the day, established themselves in English life permanently in the 1640s, 
and pamphlets also poured from the presses. In these media a battle of 
ideas was fought, and it was able to reach a broader audience than had 
ever had access to printed political news before. Both sides appealed to 
ordinary readers to support their cause in the civil war, and they needed 
 * I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak at Peking University at the Anglo-
Chinese Conference of Historians on Magna Carta in September 2015, and would like to 
thank all the organizers and hosts for their warm welcome, hospitality and discussion.
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justifications. Magna Carta was one of the authorities they called on in 
order to argue their case – both royalists and parliamentarians invoked its 
support for their preferred interpretations of the English constitution and 
the current conflict. These ways of appealing to a wide audience were put 
to a new use from 1646 when a group of radical parliamentarians – who 
later became known as the Levellers – started to propose a much more 
daring and innovative settlement for the kingdom than the parliamentarian 
leadership was prepared to countenance. The parliamentarians were a 
coalition – and a bitterly divided one. Most were still intent on restoring 
the king to the throne, albeit with conditions imposed on him. For them 
it was natural to invoke the ‘ancient constitution’, and the checks on royal 
power which measures such as Magna Carta embodied. The Levellers, by 
contrast, argued for a settlement based on a unicameral elected chamber 
exercizing the sovereignty of the people through its legislative power. This 
would be far from a return to the pre-civil-war status quo, and the Levellers’ 
arguments were often based on abstract ideas of natural rights rather than 
historical or legal precedent. However, even the Levellers looked backwards 
to Magna Carta. In the second part of this paper I will ask why that was, 
but first I will set out the background to the civil war use of Magna Carta 
by looking at the political conflicts of the 1620s and the contribution of the 
great common lawyer Sir Edward Coke.
Sir Edward Coke and Magna Carta before the civil war
Magna Carta had not held a prominent place in the political debate of 
the sixteenth century. One of the things Magna Carta did – in fact the 
first thing it did – was guarantee the liberties of the English Church. In 
the sixteenth century this was rather inconvenient to Henry VIII and his 
protestant successors who wrested the Church away from Rome and asserted 
their own royal authority over it. For this reason, among others, Magna 
Carta was not particularly prominent in political debate in the sixteenth 
century – it was not something that Protestants wanted to dwell on. But in 
the early seventeenth century Magna Carta came to be totemic in politics, 
something that almost everyone at the very least paid lip service to. 
After the death of Elizabeth I in 1603, she was succeeded by her cousin 
James VI of Scotland, who now became James I of England. There must 
have been a collective sigh of relief that the Virgin Queen’s succession 
problem had been solved peacefully, in spite of her stubborn refusal to 
solve it herself. But having a Scottish king ruling England brought its own 
problems. James brought with him well-developed theories of royal power, 
and an outsider’s perspective on the idiosyncratic English legal system, the 
common law, which was not used in Scotland. A highly educated man who 
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fancied himself as a political theorist, James had committed his views on 
monarchy to print in the Trew Law of Free Monarchies and Basilicon Doron, 
which were republished for the benefit of his new English subjects in 1603. 
He upheld an ideal of good kingship: because kings were divinely anointed, 
they were accountable directly to God for the virtue and benevolence of 
their rule. But they were accountable only to God, as their power came only 
and directly from him. It was unclear whether kings were subject to the law 
– but the implication seemed to be that they created it rather than obeyed it. 
As James told his subjects much later in his reign in a rather more informal 
work – a manuscript ‘libel’ which he wrote and circulated in response to an 
attack on royal policies in the same medium – ‘Kings doe make Lawes to 
bridle yow’.1 Subjects wanting protection against the king might well appeal 
to Magna Carta, which seemed to them to guarantee that their laws, or at 
least their legal system, had independent status and were not at the mercy of 
the king. The lessons which James I himself drew from the story of Magna 
Carta were rather different: 
The Charter which yow great doe call
Came first from Kings to stay your fall ...
James had been willing to admit in a 1610 speech to parliament that 
in ‘settled kingdoms’ subjects were protected by laws graciously granted 
by former kings. As his poem suggests, Magna Carta was one of these, 
but its ‘overbold’ promoters had been seeking their own greatness.2 As Paul 
Christianson suggests, James may have made considerable efforts to come 
to terms with the common law tradition which was part of the kingdom 
he inherited in 1603. However, some of his words could be read differently, 
even if they were now in the past; and James was still bold enough to suggest 
reform to the common law. In addition, James had hoped to unite England 
and Scotland into a single kingdom – which again might pose a threat to 
England’s legal system. A resurgence of interest in the distinctive character 
of England’s customary system of common law was a natural response to 
the early years of his reign.3 
 1 James I, ‘The wiper of the people’s tears’ (late 1622/1623), a libel in response to a libel 
called ‘The comons tears’, line 114 <http://www.earlystuartlibels.net/htdocs/spanish_match_
section/Nvi1.html> [accessed 12 Dec. 2016]
 2 James I, ‘The wiper of the people’s tears’, lines 118–125.
 3 For a more detailed account of these issues, and James’s changing positions, see 
P. Christianson, ‘Ancient constitutions in the age of Sir Edward Coke and John Selden’, in 
The Roots of Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of 
Rule of Law, ed. E. Sandoz (Columbia and London, 1993), pp. 89–146. 
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However, it was in the reign of Charles I that Magna Carta took on even 
greater importance. Charles inherited the throne in 1625 and responded to 
popular pressure in entering into the military conflicts on the continent, 
going to war against Spain and also France. Parliaments were frequent in 
the 1620s, and Charles hoped to work harmoniously with them – he had sat 
in the house of lords as prince of Wales. However, the disastrous progress 
and financial burden of the wars exacerbated existing tensions instead of 
uniting the country. Historians no longer see the early seventeenth century 
as a ‘high road to civil war’: the vast amount of scholarship produced by 
revisionist historians including Conrad Russell and Kevin Sharpe subjected 
the view that the civil war formed part of an inevitable social and political 
process to sharp scrutiny, and demonstrated that civil war in England was 
far from inevitable.4 However, post-revisionist historians challenged the 
revisionists’ picture of a culture of consensus in early Stuart politics. It is 
now clear that pre-civil-war England, particularly in the 1620s, experienced 
political conflict which was more ideological and less contingent than 
revisionist historians were prepared to admit.5 
War in Europe put huge pressures on the English state. The parliaments 
which were called in the 1620s, partly in order to vote money for English 
military efforts, were a forum for some of the political conflicts which 
resulted. In response to war and to criticism in parliament, the government 
took actions which seemed to its critics to overstep the boundaries of the royal 
prerogative. Could the king, for example, rightfully raise money without 
consent in parliament, as he attempted to do in the Forced Loan of 1626? 
This move was met by significant and increasingly orchestrated opposition, 
and the government responded punitively in some high-profile cases. The 
imprisonment of some non-payers without cause shown provoked the Five 
Knights’ Case, which again raised difficult questions about the limits of the 
 4 C. Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621–1629 (Oxford, 1979); C. Russell, The 
Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 1990); C. Russell, The Fall of the British Monarchies 
1637–1642 (Oxford, 1991); K. Sharpe, The Personal Rule of Charles I (New Haven, Conn., 
1992).
 5 For an influential set of post-revisionist essays emphasizing conflict in pre-civil-war 
politics, see Conflict in Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics 1603–1642, ed. 
R. Cust and A. Hughes (Harlow, 1989). Further studies emphasizing the conflicts involved 
in politics, particularly in the parliaments of the 1620s, are R. Cust, The Forced Loan and 
English Politics 1626–1628 (Oxford, 1987); T. Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English Politics 
and the Coming of War (Cambridge, 1989); L. J. Reeve, Charles I and the Road to Personal 
Rule (Cambridge, 1989). On conflicts of ideology as well as conflict in practical politics, 
see J.  P.  Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England 1603–1640 
(1999), but contrast the revisionist view provided by G. Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient 
Constitution: an Introduction to English Political Thought 1600–1642 (Basingstoke, 1992).
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king’s prerogative and gave those critical of the government cause to look 
back into English legal history for broader reassurances.
Magna Carta offered the members of parliament who were critical of 
these royal expedients one rhetorical tool that they could use as they tried 
to define, reinforce, or even tighten the limits of royal power. Magna Carta 
was useful for various reasons. It was a precedent for limits being placed 
on kings, had been confirmed by numerous monarchs, and had become 
the first statute included in collections of the laws of England – although 
the version which had become standard was that reissued in 1225 under 
Henry III, not the original 1215 version. The famous chapters on justice – 
in 1225 amalgamated into chapter 29 – offered protection against arbitrary 
imprisonment and other punishment without due process. In the context 
of the Five Knights’ Case such a venerable precedent was welcome. The 
requirement of the original 1215 Magna Carta that ‘No scutage or aid is to 
be imposed in our kingdom except by the common counsel of our kingdom’ 
did not survive into the 1225 version, but the parliamentarians of the 1620s 
could cite Edward I’s later statute ‘De tallagio non concedendo’ to the same 
effect. Taxes had to be approved in parliament, and these thirteenth-century 
laws confirmed it.
Sir Edward Coke was a leading figure in the political use of Magna Carta 
in the parliaments of the 1620s, and his interpretation of the charter was 
published after his death by the Long Parliament on the eve of the civil war. 
Coke exemplifies the way in which the English common law legal system 
(different from the Roman law system widely used in other parts of Europe 
and in Scotland) became central to politics in England. Coke was both 
an extremely eminent common lawyer, and an increasingly troublesome 
politician and member of parliament towards the end of his life in the 1620s.6 
His legal career was stellar: he had risen to be attorney general, chief justice 
of common pleas and then chief justice of king’s bench. His influence on 
legal thought went far beyond his own practice, however, as he made large 
amounts of case-law accessible through his volumes of Reports, which also 
offered interpretations of English law and history. Coke’s lengthy period of 
eminence was not untroubled: he was dismissed from the bench in 1616, 
and suspended from the privy council, but although he could be stubborn 
on points of principle, he was far from a consistent critic of the king. David 
Chan Smith has argued that in fact Coke saw the common law as working 
harmoniously with the royal prerogative, and believed that necessary legal 
 6 For narrative analyses of Coke’s career, see S. D. White, Sir Edward Coke and the 
Grievances of the Commonwealth (Manchester, 1979); A. D. Boyer, Sir Edward Coke and 
the Elizabethan Age (Stanford, Calif., 2003); D. Chan Smith, Sir Edward Coke and the 
Reformation of the Laws: Religion, Politics and Jurisprudence, 1578–1616 (Cambridge, 2014).
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reforms would serve to strengthen rather than weaken royal authority.7 It 
was towards the end of his long career that Coke became a key critic of 
royal policy. He did not return to the judiciary after 1616, and became more 
prominent as a political than a judicial figure, particularly as an M.P. in the 
parliaments of the 1620s. His actions led to imprisonment in 1621–2 and to 
attempts – unsuccessful in 1624, successful in 1626 – to prevent him sitting 
in parliament.8 However, he sat in most of the parliaments of the 1620s 
and his critique of royal policy – and use of Magna Carta in this cause – 
culminated in the creation of the Petition of Right in 1628.
Coke’s thought has been given great prominence by some historians, 
particularly those who see the common law as providing a ‘language’ which 
structured political thought and discourse in early Stuart England. Coke was 
the archetypal example of the early Stuart ‘common law mind’ identified 
by J. G. A. Pocock, and also figures largely in Alan Cromartie’s more recent 
argument for a ‘constitutionalist revolution’, based on common law, which 
led into the English Revolution of the mid century.9 These interpretations 
see the politics of the early seventeenth century as framed by and often 
argued through the language and resources of the common law tradition, 
and Coke as a key lawyer-politician takes on a prominent role in such 
arguments. Coke’s vision was of an ‘ancient constitution’ framed by the 
continuous practice of the common law, and ultimately bounded only 
by the reason inherent in that law. The common law, in Coke’s view, was 
competent to adjudicate on the powers of government and set limits to the 
king’s prerogative.10 For Coke the ancient constitution, the common law, 
and even parliament, stretched back before the Norman Conquest; and 
since the Conquest, kings had sworn to obey the laws. Kingship thus existed 
within the framework of common law, rather than pre-existing or presiding 
over it. This made the law a crucially important political tool, especially in 
the hands of an apparently authoritative interpreter, such as Coke in the 
 7 Chan Smith, Sir Edward Coke.
 8 Coke was imprisoned for asserting parliament’s right to debate all matters of concern 
to the commonwealth in the debate over freedom of speech, foreign policy, and Charles 
I’s marriage in the 1621 parliament. Plans to send him to Ireland to prevent him sitting in 
1624 failed; but in 1626 he was pricked as a sheriff, which prevented him from sitting in 
parliament. 
 9 J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: a Study of English 
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century. A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge, 1987); 
A. Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: an Essay on the History of England, 1450–1642 
(Cambridge, 2006).
 10 A. Cromartie, ‘The constitutionalist revolution: the transformation of political culture 
in early Stuart England’, Past & Present, clxiii (1999), 76–120, at pp. 87–8, 100; G. Burgess, 
Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven, Conn., 1996), pp. 166–71.
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1620s. Coke became more and more concerned to assert the law’s control 
over, or at least bounding of, royal prerogative,11 and Magna Carta was 
one exhibit in that argument: he famously declared that ‘Magna Carta is 
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign’.12 His parliamentary activities 
culminated in his role in the creation of the Petition of Right in 1628. 
The Petition invoked the Magna Carta of 1225 and other ancient statutes, 
including those confirming it, to assert the need for due legal process and 
protest against the recent use of imprisonment without cause shown.13 The 
Petition of Right may have taken aim at specific grievances of the war years 
of the 1620s, but by placing them within the framework of the common 
law, and asserting that these rights were pre-existent independently of the 
grace of the monarch, it became a broader assertion of the rule of the law 
and the ancient constitution. The Petition of Right itself thus duly took its 
place in the pantheon of constitutional protections alongside Magna Carta 
for many civil war parliamentarians. 
Scholars such as Christianson have rightly warned against seeing Coke 
as typical, and against seeing the common law as a field whose practitioners 
held uniform and uncritical views.14 But if not typical, Coke was nonetheless 
influential, not least on the Leveller authors of the civil war period. Coke’s 
distinctive shaping of the common law tradition, and his interpretation 
of Magna Carta’s place in it, meant that Magna Carta and the materials 
of the common law were still surprisingly fertile for civil war radicals. For 
Coke, the common law was remarkably malleable. It was interpreted by 
the artificial ‘reason’ of common lawyers – a professional expertise which 
Coke was keen to guard, but which more radical followers would later blur 
into a more generalized ‘reason’. Coke’s own interpretations of legal texts 
sometimes had a noticeable political spin, often achieved by expanding the 
application of terms within the texts. He might even coin new ‘maxims’ 
rather than relying on those traditionally used to interpret the law.15 The 
Institutes of the Laws of England, written in the turbulent 1620s, bequeathed 
these tendentious interpretations for use by the civil war parliamentarians, 
 11 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy, pp. 200–1; White, Sir Edward Coke, pp. 219ff; Cromartie, 
The Constitutionalist Revolution, pp. 213–6.
 12 A. D. Boyer, ‘Coke, Sir Edward (1552–1634)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford, 2004); online edn, Jan 2009 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/5826> [accessed 
12 Dec. 2016].
 13 White, Sir Edward Coke, pp. 238–42.
 14 P. Christianson, ‘Ancient constitutions’, pp. 108–15, 145.
 15 C. Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution Revisited (Oxford, 1997), pp. 224–5; 
White, Sir Edward Coke, p. 226; Pocock, The Ancient Constitution, p. 268; A. Cromartie, Sir 
Matthew Hale (Cambridge, 1995), p. 19; J. W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind (Baltimore , 
Md. and London, 2000), pp. 174–5.
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in spite of the seizure of Coke’s papers on Charles I’s orders before Coke’s 
death in 1634. It was the rebellious parliament which ensured that the 
remaining parts of Coke’s Institutes were finally recovered and published. 
The second part of the Institutes, in which Coke’s text and commentary on 
Magna Carta took pride of place at the very beginning of the book, was 
issued by the authority of parliament in 1642. Magna Carta, and Coke’s 
interpretation of it, was thus published in support of the parliamentarian 
cause. 
On one level, it is hard to see what Magna Carta had to offer to the 
parliamentarian thinkers of the English Civil War. Magna Carta is a 
compendious and various document, and many of its provisions, from 
fish weirs to wine measures, were very particular and specific to their time. 
Perhaps its most striking provision is the startling ‘security clause’ (clause 
61 in the standard numbering) which constituted a corporate body of 
twenty-five named barons ‘with the commune of all the land’ to police 
the keeping of Magna Carta through force. Out of the whole of Magna 
Carta, the security clause ought to have been the most relevant to the 
English Civil War parliamentarians and even the radical Levellers. The key 
themes of parliamentarian political thought were precisely these issues: the 
procedures by which the king could be resisted, and the authority which 
was necessary for any bodies to undertake this political resistance. The 
Levellers had taken parliamentarian thought a step further, arguing not 
only that parliament could resist the king, but also that the people could 
resist a misbehaving parliament. And yet the security clause, like the vast 
majority of the provisions of Magna Carta, was not a feature of civil war 
propaganda, and makes no appearance at all in the Levellers’ writings, for 
one very simple reason. Magna Carta, as published in Coke’s Institutes, was 
not the Magna Carta of 1215; it was Henry III’s reissued Great Charter of 
1225, which had become the standard version of the text by the end of the 
thirteenth century. So, although Magna Carta came with associations of 
resistance and holding a king to account, Coke’s widely cited text from 1225 
did not lay out a system for limiting the king and policing his actions as the 
1215 version had done.
Nevertheless, Coke still credited Magna Carta with immense power. 
He explained its title as the ‘Great Charter’ with a suitably hyperbolical 
comparison to Alexander the Great, who, he said, was called great ‘not in 
respect of the largenesse of his body, for he was a little man, but in respect of 
the greatnesse of his heroicall spirit’.16 Coke inflated Magna Carta’s ‘heroicall 
 16 Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England (1642) (hereafter 
‘Coke, Second Institutes’), ‘A Proeme’, unpaginated.
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spirit’ in an interpretation which laboured to derive broad principles from 
the Charter’s apparently quite specific and historically contingent provisions. 
The most resonant chapter of Magna Carta, in the seventeenth century as 
now, was chapter 29 – in the 1225 version – which dealt with fair judicial 
procedures against individuals. This famously promised that no free man 
would be disseized of his ‘liberties’. Coke elaborated enthusiastically on 
the several ‘significations’ of the term ‘liberties’, broadening the meaning of 
term far beyond particular legal entitlements. In one of those ‘significations’, 
‘liberties’ simply meant ‘the laws of the realme’.17 Thus the liberties of the 
free man were expanded to include both specific liberties never thought of 
by the framers of Magna Carta (such as freedom from monopolies18), and 
the laws of the land themselves. This is why Coke could argue that Magna 
Carta ‘made people free’ (‘liberos facit’) and could be described as the charter 
of the liberties of the realm or even just as ‘common freedom’ (‘communis 
libertas’).19 What was more, Magna Carta lay firmly within the resilient 
but flexible fabric of the customary common law of England: ‘for the most 
part’ it was ‘declaratory of the principall grounds of the Fundamental 
Laws of England’, and it was ‘no new declaration’ in 1225 as King John 
had previously declared the like. Magna Carta reached back beyond 1225 
and even (implicitly) beyond 1215, and when kings, like Edward I, later 
confirmed it they were not making new law but just confirming that it 
‘should be taken as the Common Law’. Kings who thought better of having 
granted Magna Carta and attempted to cancel it were thus committing a 
category error: no king could cancel ‘the ancient Common Law of England’. 
For Coke, that common law extended back before the Norman Conquest, 
and kings since the Conquest were still ‘bound and sworn’ to obey it.20 
Coke’s interpretation of Magna Carta had woven new potential into the 
living fabric of the common law.
The Levellers, Coke and Magna Carta
Parliament fought a civil war against Charles I, and by 1646 it had won. 
It was in this year that the Leveller leaders began to work together as a 
group to push for a political settlement which fulfilled radical aims, both 
in religion and in politics. The Levellers were committed and enthusiastic 
 17 Coke, Second Institutes, p. 47; P. Wende, ‘“Liberty” und “property” in der politischen 
Theorie der Levellers: ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der politischen Individualismus 
im England des 17. Jahrhunderts’, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung, i (1974), 147–73, at 
p. 159.
 18 Coke, Second Institutes, p. 47.
 19 Coke, Second Institutes, ‘Proeme’.
 20 Coke, Second Institutes, ‘Proeme’.
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parliamentarians, but they were at the radical end of a spectrum of views 
within the parliamentarian coalition. This coalition had already been 
fracturing during the fighting of the war, but in victory – with the task of 
trying to conclude a settlement with the defeated king – the divisions became 
even more evident. There were major differences among parliamentarians 
about whether to enforce membership of a reshaped national church, and 
about how extensive restrictions on the restored king’s power should be. In 
the end, the army blocked a moderate settlement by purging parliament, 
leaving the more radical M.P.s to vote for the trial of the king. Charles I was 
tried and executed in January 1649. 
The Levellers had certainly played a part in the radicalization of 
parliamentarian thought, denouncing regal tyranny and opening up the 
possibility of parliamentary rule without a king. They had taken parliament’s 
justifications for leading resistance against the king – the idea that parliament 
represented the people and that politics was based on the consent of the 
ruled – and extended them. They wanted a much wider section of the adult 
male population to be actively represented in parliament, and they wanted 
parliament to be accountable to its electors. Thus as well as opposing the 
tyranny of kings, the Levellers opposed the potential tyranny of parliament 
itself. They had, like much of the population, been increasingly disillusioned 
by the behaviour of the Long Parliament, which had had to use methods 
as unpopular as those of the king in order to fund its war effort and run 
the country in the aftermath of war. The Leveller leaders, in addition, had 
particular reason to fear parliamentary ‘tyranny’ as two of them, John 
Lilburne and Richard Overton, experienced imprisonment on political 
grounds under parliamentary rule, even before the watershed of the regicide 
left the Levellers as major critics of the ‘new chains’ imposed on the nation 
by the new republican regime. 
At first glance, it would seem that the Levellers’ attitude to law, 
history and Magna Carta would be completely different from Sir Edward 
Coke’s. The key leaders and pamphleteers of the Leveller movement were 
collaborating from 1645, and from 1647–9 the movement was at its peak. 
The fundamental basis of the Levellers’ thought was the political equality 
of (adult, male) Englishmen, and the fact that there were certain rights and 
liberties which these citizens could not be stripped of and could always 
exercise. All political power, ultimately, had to derive from these ‘free-born 
Englishmen’, and all political authorities had to recognize that and be 
accountable to the people. For that reason, the Levellers’ ideal constitution 
would look rather different from the institutions in place before the civil 
war: there would be a single-chamber elected ‘Representative’ instead of the 
two-chamber parliament of lords and commons; there might not even be a 
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king or a house of lords. Certainly neither king nor lords would have a veto 
on legislation; any king would have to be a mere executive officer. In their 
tract Regal Tyranny Discovered in January 1647 the (anonymous) Leveller 
authors railed not just against the monarchy of Charles I but against 
monarchy itself, and particularly all the kings since the Norman Conquest. 
On what grounds did the Levellers argue for such radical changes? 
Natural law theory offered one kind of justification. This emphasized 
people’s original liberty and equality in the ‘state of nature’ and the contracts 
which they had made. On this view, at some point in the distant past the 
people had handed over some of their rights, at least conditionally, in return 
for the security provided by government. The Levellers certainly made use 
Figure 6.1. John Lilburne reading from Coke's Institutes at his 
trial for treason (British Library shelfmark C.37.d.51.(5.)).
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of this type of theory, although they emphasized that aspects of people’s 
original liberty and equality persisted even in modern society, and that 
consent to government had not just happened in the distant past, but was 
also expressed through elections to the parliament or representative. The 
Levellers’ proposals for far-reaching constitutional reform, and the theory 
of natural law which they sometimes used to justify them, seem strikingly 
modern – a long way from Coke’s nostalgic appreciation of Magna Carta as 
part of an unbroken ‘ancient constitution’. We might expect the Levellers to 
see arguments for the ancient constitution, and a reliance on Magna Carta, 
as rather inadequate to the serious task of reform which they thought was 
necessary.
Moreover, William Walwyn, one of the three most important Leveller 
leaders and thinkers, expressed exactly the kind of views of Magna Carta 
which we might expect. Just at the moment when the Leveller leaders were 
beginning to encounter each other and work together, Walwyn argued with 
his new acquaintance John Lilburne over the significance of the charter. 
Lilburne, imprisoned, and making the most of his martyrdom as he always 
did, was in 1645 wholeheartedly appealing to Magna Carta, apparently 
declaring grandly in a speech to the Committee of Examinations: ‘Sir, the 
Privileges contained herein is my Birth-right and Inheritance’.21 Walwyn, 
a man of wider intellectual horizons than Lilburne, found Lilburne’s 
perspective problematic, and issued a famous rebuke to him, in a work of 
October 1645 called Englands Lamentable Slaverie. This was written as a 
letter to Lilburne and published in support of Lilburne’s case. In it, Walwyn 
said that Magna Carta was ‘but a part of the peoples rights and liberties’ and 
was so narrow in its provisions for freedom that it was only ‘deceitfully and 
improperlie Called Magna Charta, (indeed so called to blind the people)’. 
For Walwyn, Magna Carta was a small set of concessions ‘wrestled out of the 
pawes of ’ (Norman) conquerors; indeed it was ‘so little as lesse could not 
be granted with any pretence of freedom’. So much for it being the ‘Great’ 
Charter. For Walwyn at this time, Magna Carta was merely a concession 
on the part of kings. Not only had it been granted by kings, but both they 
and parliaments had subsequently done much to abbreviate the liberties 
contained in it: Walwyn clearly did not feel that Magna Carta in the present 
had much legal protection to offer. Even so, when danger appeared, these 
hypocritical parliaments could look no further than Magna Carta, ‘calling 
that messe of pottage their birthright, the great inheritance of the people, 
the great Charter of England’. And of course, Walwyn was not just accusing 
parliaments of treating Magna Carta with too much reverence: he then 
 21 John Lilburne, The Copy of a Letter ... to a Freind (1645).
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addressed Lilburne directly, saying ‘Magna Charta hath been more precious 
in your esteeme then it deserveth’. He even urged that instead of fetishizing 
Magna Carta, parliament should legislate afresh: he complained that 
parliament, ‘when they might have made a newer and better Charter, have 
falne to patching the old’.22 This startling proposal for a completely new 
Magna Carta seems like another proof of Walwyn’s willingness to abandon 
history for measures based purely on reason and current necessities. It was 
probably Walwyn who continued to criticize Magna Carta the following 
year, castigating it as ‘but a beggerly thing, containing many marks of 
intollerable bondage’ and arguing that the only guide for any government 
should be ‘equity and right reason’.23 
Lilburne initially seemed sensitive to Walwyn’s critique, offering a 
commentary on how he viewed Magna Carta and English history in his 
pamphlet The Iust Mans Justification the next summer. But even there, he 
did not completely concede Walwyn’s points – although he went some way 
towards it – and he continued to appeal to Magna Carta. In 1647 he even 
issued a substantial pamphlet which summarized Magna Carta and other 
key statutes ‘for the instruction, information and benefit of all true-hearted 
Englishmen’.24 He clearly still thought it had something to offer. Out of the 
three Leveller leaders, Lilburne was the most inclined to make use of legal 
language and arguments. However, the third major Leveller writer, Richard 
Overton, who was responsible for some of the Levellers’ most resounding 
statements of natural law theory, also rhapsodized about Magna Carta. 
Indeed, on one occasion in November 1646 he claims to have defended his 
copy of it physically, while being recommitted to prison in Newgate after an 
unsuccessful hearing before a committee of the house of commons. When 
his gaoler attempted to seize the book – which was of course the second 
volume of Coke’s Institutes – Overton 
replyed, that he should not, if to the utmost of my power I could preserve it 
from him, and I would do my utmost, where upon I clapped it in my Armes, 
and I laid myself on my belly, but by force, they violently turned me upon my 
back then Briscoe (just as if he had been staving off a Dog from the Beare) 
smote me with his fist, to make me let go my hold, whereupon as loud as I 
 22 William Walwyn, Englands Lamentable Slaverie (1645), in The Writings of William 
Walwyn, ed. J. R. McMichael and B. Taft (Athens, Ga., 1989), pp. 147–8.
 23 A Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens (1646), p.  15. This seminal Leveller 
pamphlet often used to be attributed to Richard Overton by scholars, but David Adams 
has demonstrated that Overton printed but probably did not write it. Walwyn thus seems 
the most likely candidate for authorship (D. R. Adams, ‘The secret printing and publishing 
career of Richard Overton the Leveller, 1644–46’, The Library, xi (2010), 3–88).
 24 John Lilburne, The Peoples Prerogative (1648), title page.
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could, I cryed out, murther, murther, murther. And thus by an assault they got 
the great Charter of Englands Liberties and Freedoms from me; which I laboured 
to the utmost power in me, to preserve and defend, and ever to the death 
shall maintain, and forthwith without any Warrant poore Magna Charta was 
clapt up close prisoner in Newgate, and my poore fellow prisoner de[p]rived of 
the comfortable visitation of friends: And thus [I was] stript of my armour of 
proofe, the Charter of my legall Rights, Freedomes and Liberties …25
That story of Overton’s gives us one of the reasons why the Levellers 
continued to appeal to Magna Carta: it was useful as a proof-text for 
the legally self-taught but rhetorically skilful Leveller leaders when they 
found themselves – as Lilburne especially often did – in prison. The fact 
that their prolonged imprisonments were initially on the order of the 
house of lords, and did not lead to trials at common law, meant that the 
provisions of Magna Carta could be a real help to their case. The Levellers 
were interested in very few of the specific provisions of the Great Charter. 
They focused overwhelmingly on chapter 29 of the 1225 charter (a chapter 
to which Coke had devoted a full twelve pages of his seventy-eight-page 
commentary). This chapter combined the famous provisions of chapters 
39–40 of the original 1215 charter, and thus gave protection to every ‘liber 
homo’, free person or free man, against punishment in person or property 
inflicted by the state ‘except by the lawful judgement of his peers or the law 
of the land’. These provisions – especially combined with Coke’s glosses 
on them – were directly useful to the imprisoned Levellers. Overton, for 
example, transcribed Coke’s commentary exactly when he insisted that 
any judgement leading to imprisonment must be made by a man’s peers 
or equals – ‘that is men of his own condition’. Similarly, ‘the law of the 
land’ was glossed so that it referred not just to the laws which subjects 
might be judged for transgressing, but to the whole legal mechanism of due 
process. Coke made this point emphatically, and again Overton transcribed 
it exactly: ‘by the law of the land (that is, to speak it once for all) by the 
due course, and processe of law’.26 For Lilburne – following Coke – Magna 
Carta guaranteed law, justice and right – ‘the best Birth-right the Subject 
hath’.27 Lilburne also frequently specifically cited chapter 29 of the 1225 
charter, and material from Coke both on the significance of that chapter 
and on the importance and meaning of judgement by one’s peers.28 Even 
in his pamphlet The Peoples Prerogative, which proclaimed prominently on 
 25 Richard Overton, The Commoners Complaint (1647), p. 14.
 26 Richard Overton, An Arrow Against All Tyrants and Tyranny (1646), pp.  6–7; Coke, 
Second Institutes, p. 46.
 27 John Lilburne, Innocency and Truth Justified (1646), p. 64; Coke, Second Institutes, p. 56.
 28 For example, John Lilburne, The Oppressed Mans Oppressions (1647), p. 24.
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its title page that it was ‘a collection of the Marrow and Soule of Magna 
Charta’ (Magna Carta was evidently a big ‘seller’ in the 1640s as now), 
he actually began the pamphlet not with Magna Carta itself but with the 
Petition of Right; and when he moved on to Magna Carta he introduced 
only four chapters: 14, 26, 28 and 29, which dealt again with Lilburne’s 
characteristic concerns of judgement by one’s peers, the need for witnesses, 
and due process of law. In fact, in a pamphlet which had ‘Magna Carta’ 
emblazoned very prominently on its title page, he spent less than a page on 
Magna Carta before moving on to the liberties guaranteed by more recent 
statutes.29
But beyond this practical use of Magna Carta, there were deeper reasons 
why the Levellers, even after Walwyn’s compelling and fundamentally 
historically accurate critique of the imposition of Norman law and 
custom, still returned to the language of law and to Magna Carta, that 
concession offered by Norman kings. Magna Carta, particularly as 
interpreted by Coke, came to represent ‘the liberties of England’, and in 
spite of the Levellers’ vitriol against the Norman kings, the implication 
that these liberties were still guaranteed by a continuing web of law and 
English rights was enormously useful. As Martin Dzelzainis has pointed 
out, the Levellers’ appeals to common law have to be seen in the light of 
the Long Parliament’s reputation and thought in the 1640s. As parliament 
lost its claim to be the defender of the law, and some of its propagandists 
moved towards accepting a kind of parliamentary absolutism, the Levellers 
moved in the opposite direction, invoking Magna Carta as a defence of the 
people’s rights against their parliament as well as against their king.30 And 
while we tend to separate out the ‘languages of political thought’ used in 
civil war argument, at the time they were cheerfully combined by many 
authors, and particularly by Lilburne. Lilburne did use the language of the 
law, but he used it very creatively. He talked about ‘liberties’, ‘franchises’, 
‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ – specific entitlements which people enjoyed 
because of specific grants made to them or because of the particular status 
or office which they held. But Lilburne used these terms in a way which 
changed their inherited legal meaning in a fundamental way. For him, all 
‘free-born Englishmen’ enjoyed the same collection of liberties and rights, 
simply through being born in England. (The non-free status of villeinage 
was no longer in existence, and when Lilburne and others talked of ‘free-
born Englishmen’ it was to emphasize the fact that all Englishmen were 
 29 Lilburne, The Peoples Prerogative, pp. 4–6.
 30 M. Dzelzainis, ‘History and ideology: Milton, the Levellers, and the Council of State in 
1649’, Huntington Library Quarterly, lxviii (2005), pp. 269–87.
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free.31) The Leveller belief in extensive political equality, which transcended 
many (though not all) kinds of social inequality, thus resulted in a vision 
of equal liberties and rights which Englishmen enjoyed. Lilburne had used 
the materials of the law to create a kind of citizenship. Thus Lilburne used 
the language of the law to construct an account of the (legal) liberties of the 
‘free-born Englishman’ which converged with the Leveller writers’ account 
of the liberties accorded to all men by natural law. Lilburne was capable of 
appealing to ‘national and natural, rational and legal’ laws in one breath. 
The radicalism of the Levellers clearly did not lie in a rejection of history and 
law. Rather, it lay in a fascinating synthesis of legal and historical thought 
with the abstract principles of natural law.32 
I want to conclude with a final speculation about the place of Magna 
Carta in the Levellers’ thought. The Levellers embodied many of their 
demands in petitions, but also adopted the idea of an ‘Agreement of 
the People’, a document outlining the powers of the parliament and the 
people which would be subscribed by the people of England to legitimize 
it as a settlement. This idea did not originate directly from the Leveller 
movement, and was not confined to it either: a series of proposals for an 
‘Agreement of the People’ was produced by army radicals, Levellers and 
army officers. Those conventionally called the first and third Agreements 
of the People (October/November 1647 and May 1649) were the work 
of radicals; the second Agreement (December/January 1648–9) was 
the contested product of negotiations between radicals and the army 
leadership in the period between the army’s purging of parliament and the 
trial of Charles I. The first ‘Agreement of the People’ in 1647 was produced 
for the Putney Debates by army radicals and displays a mixture of Leveller 
and army concerns.33 It was an audaciously simple document, which 
proposed that the nation was to be ruled by a succession of frequently re-
elected parliaments or ‘Representatives’, whose power was to be ‘inferior 
only to theirs who chose them’. These parliaments were to hold many 
of the marks of sovereignty previously seen as belonging to the king’s 
prerogative, but the people reserved certain powers to themselves. Thus 
the parliament could not make laws to bind people to particular forms of 
worship, or any law which was against the good of the people and no-one 
 31 K. Thomas, ‘The Levellers and the franchise’, in The Interregnum: the Quest for Settlement 
1646–1660, ed. G. E. Aylmer (1972), pp. 57–78, at pp. 73–5.
 32 For a more detailed discussion of the issues in this paragraph, see R. Foxley, ‘John 
Lilburne and the citizenship of “free-born Englishmen”’, Hist. Jour., xlvii (2004), 849–74.
 33 E. Vernon and P. Baker, ‘What was the first Agreement of the People?’, Hist. Jour., liii 
(2010), 39–60; The Agreements of the People, the Levellers and the Constitutional Crisis of the 
English Revolution, ed. P. Baker and E. Vernon (Basingstoke, 2012).
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was to be exempt from the law because of any particular status or privilege 
they enjoyed. 
The device of an Agreement subscribed by the people has seemed to 
place the Levellers and their radical allies in the army who produced the 
first Agreement firmly in the natural law tradition. Several historians have 
interpreted the Agreement of the People itself as a new ‘social contract’;34 
perhaps this was what Walwyn had meant when he argued in favour of 
making a ‘new Charter’ instead of continuing to patch up the inadequate 
Magna Carta. However, the first two Agreements of the People do not 
actually cut themselves off from history in quite such a simple way. As Alan 
Orr has argued, the Agreements can be read as vindications of existing right, 
in the tradition of medieval constitutionalism, rather than as documents 
creating new rights.35 The short conclusion to the first Agreement’s text 
clarified the position of the Agreement in English constitutional history: 
the authors were determined to vindicate their rights, inspired by the 
example of ‘our Ancestors, whose bloud was often spent in vain for the 
recovery of their Freedomes, suffering themselves, through fradulent [sic] 
accommodations, to be still deluded of the fruit of their Victories’. The 
same was not to happen this time round. The ancient cycle of assertion 
and suppression of these ‘native Rights’ was finally to come to an end with 
a definitive, unalterable codification.36 The Agreement was thus conceived 
of as momentous, but it placed itself within the nation’s history rather than 
cutting itself off from it. Like Magna Carta, the Agreement, once agreed 
by the population, could not be changed by parliament; it would be a 
fundamental law. That fundamental law, however, was designed to confirm 
and protect the existing ‘native rights’ of the English people. Some of those 
fundamental rights were still to be found in Magna Carta too. I suggest that 
the Agreement of the People was thus a tribute and a successor to Magna 
Carta, rather than simply a replacement. 
 34 J. Frank, The Levellers: a History of the Writings of Three Seventeenth-Century Social 
Democrats: John Lilburne, Richard Overton, William Walwyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), 
p. 142; H. N. Brailsford, The Levellers and the English Revolution (1961), p. 376; I. Hampsher-
Monk, ‘The political theory of the Levellers: Putney, property and Professor Macpherson’, 
Political Studies, xxiv (1976), 397–422, at p.  417. For a fuller discussion of the natural 
law aspects of Leveller thought and of the idea of the Agreements of the People as social 
contracts, see R. Foxley, The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution 
(Manchester, 2013), chs. 1 and 2.
 35 D. A. Orr, ‘Constitutionalism: ancient, modern and early modern in the Agreements of 
the People’, in Baker and Vernon, The Agreements of the People, pp. 76–96.
 36 An Agreement of the People for a Firme and Present Peace (1647), pp. 5–6.
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7. Magna Carta in the American Revolution
Harry T. Dickinson
In the 1760s the political disputes between Britain and its American 
colonies developed into a revolutionary crisis, which eventually led to war 
and the creation of an independent United States of America. In this crisis, 
which was primarily political and constitutional, the colonists challenged 
the authority of the British government and the power of the Westminster 
parliament by appealing to the notion of fundamental law, the principles 
of the English common law, the liberties granted to them in their colonial 
charters, and their understanding of England’s ancient constitution. In 
doing so, they frequently appealed to the rights and liberties granted by 
Magna Carta according to the interpretation of this charter of liberties that 
had been advanced over the centuries and more recently by Edward Coke 
and his allies who had strenuously defended the liberties of the subject and 
the rule of law against Stuart absolutism in the early seventeenth century. 
In the early thirteenth century Magna Carta had been supported by a 
baronial elite anxious to preserve its feudal privileges. It had not protected 
the rights and liberties of all the king’s subjects and it had not effectively 
limited the powers of the crown.1 Over the next four centuries, however, 
frequent confirmations of it by kings and parliaments,2 reinterpretations of 
it by teachers in the Inns of Court and by judges and lawyers appealing to 
it in numerous trials,3 and political exploitations of it by opponents of the 
crown’s prerogatives had seen its meaning and significance greatly expanded.4 
 1 E. Jenks, ‘The myth of Magna Carta’, Independent Rev., iv (1905), 260–73; S. Painter, 
‘Magna Carta’, American Hist. Rev., liii (1947), 42–9; C. H. McIlwain, ‘Due process of law 
in Magna Carta’, Columbia Law Rev., xiv (1914), 27–51; and W. S. McKechnie, Magna Carta: 
a Commentary on the Great Charter of King John (2nd edn., Glasgow, 1914).
 2 F. Thompson, The First Century of Magna Carta: Why it Persisted as a Document 
(Minneapolis, Minn., 1925); F. Thompson, ‘Parliamentary confirmations of the Great 
Charter’, American Hist. Rev., xxxviii (1933), 659–72; and F. Thompson, Magna Carta: its 
Role in the Making of the English Constitution 1300–1629 (Minneapolis, Minn., 1948).
 3 Thompson, Magna Carta: its Role in the Making of the English Constitution, pp. 167–
96 and 268–93; and Selected Readings and Commentaries on Magna Carta 1400–1604, ed. 
J. Baker (Selden Soc., cxxxii, 2015).
 4 Thompson, Magna Carta: its Role in the Making of the English Constitution, pp. 335–53; 
C. H. McIlwain, ‘Magna Carta and the common law’, in Magna Carta: Commemorative 
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By the later seventeenth century there was widespread support for Magna 
Carta, in both England and in the American colonies, but appeals were now 
made to the Magna Carta which had been interpreted and expanded over 
the centuries and mediated in particular by Edward Coke and his allies in 
the early seventeenth century, not to the Magna Carta of 1215 or even to 
that of 1225.5 It was now widely assumed that Magna Carta had guaranteed 
that justice would not be sold, delayed or denied to any subject, and that 
all accused persons must know the charge levelled against them, must be 
speedily brought to face their accusers and be free to offer their defence in 
an open trial conducted according to the law of the land and before a jury 
of their equals in the vicinity of where the offence had taken place. It was 
further widely believed that Magna Carta was a fundamental law designed 
to preserve England’s ancient constitution and immemorial common law 
by bringing all powers, even the royal prerogative, under the rule of law and 
denying parliament the right to pass statutes contrary to fundamental laws 
of this kind.
Throughout the American crisis of the later eighteenth century the 
colonists repeatedly insisted that their charters from the king had always 
granted them the same rights and liberties as their fellow subjects back 
home in England, including those granted by Magna Carta. They pointed 
to the Virginia charter of 1606, which had promised that the emigrants 
who settled in this colony, and their descendants, ‘shall have and enjoy 
all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities as if they had been abiding and 
born, within this our realm of England’.6 Similar rights were granted to 
many other colonies in America, from Massachusetts in 1629 to Georgia 
in 1732.7 The colonists themselves were generally very willing to adopt the 
English common law and English legal practices. When dissatisfied with 
Essays, ed. H. E. Malden (1917), pp. 122–79; J. R. Maddicott, ‘Magna Carta and the local 
community’, Past & Present, cii (1984), 25–65; D. Carpenter, ‘English peasants in politics, 
1258–1267’, Past & Present, cxxxvi (1992), 3–42; S. T. Ambler, ‘Magna Carta: its confirmation 
at Simon de Montfort’s parliament of 1265’, Eng. Hist Rev., cxxx (2015), 801–30; M. Ashley, 
Magna Carta in the Seventeenth Century (Charlottesville, Va., 1965); and J. G. A. Pocock, 
The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: a Study of English Historical Thought in the 
Seventeenth Century (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1987).
 5 King John had agreed to accept Magna Carta at a meeting with his rebellious barons 
at Runnymede in June 1215, but within ten weeks he had revoked it and Pope Innocent 
III had annulled it. This decision had led to civil war. In 1225 John’s son, Henry III, had 
voluntarily reissued a revised and shortened version of Magna Carta. This version was the 
one frequently reissued and confirmed thereafter.
 6 The Federal and State Constitutions, ed. F. N. Thorpe (7 vols., Washington D.C., 
1909), vii. 3788; and A. E. Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and 
Constitutionalism in America (Charlottesville, Va., 1968), pp. 15, 19.
 7 Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede, p. 25.
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the government of their colony, they frequently attempted to redress their 
grievances by appealing to the rights of Englishmen, including those they 
believed were enshrined in Magna Carta. The Maryland legislative assembly 
passed a law in 1638 which granted that the ‘Inhabitants of this province shall 
have all their rights and liberties according to the great charter of England’ 
and appeals were made to Magna Carta in a number of lawsuits contested in 
the Maryland courts.8 In Massachusetts a ‘Body of Liberties’ was drawn up 
in 1641 stressing the right of all the colony’s inhabitants to trial by jury, due 
legal process, and equal justice. All these liberties were drawn directly from 
chapter 29 of the 1225 version of Magna Carta. In 1646 the general court 
of Massachusetts claimed that the laws of the colony were in accord with 
Magna Carta. Two years later, the ‘Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts’ laid 
down several legal provisions, which were again drawn directly from chapter 
29 of Magna Carta.9 William Penn, the first proprietor of the colony of 
Pennsylvania, successfully appealed to Magna Carta, when he demanded to 
know what specific law he had broken, when he was charged in London with 
disturbing the peace. He did not abandon his principles when he settled in 
America. In 1681, he drafted a charter for Pennsylvania and Delaware that 
guaranteed the inhabitants of these colonies a fair trial and freedom from 
unjust imprisonment. In 1687 he arranged for the first printing in America 
of the 1225 version of Magna Carta and also the 1297 confirmation of it, in 
his tract, The Excellent Priviledge of Liberty and Property: Being the Birth-
Right of the Free-Born Subjects of England.10 Throughout the later eighteenth 
century, in their constitutional disputes with Britain, the American colonies 
continually reiterated that they possessed the same rights and liberties as the 
British people because of the grants made to them in their royal charters. 
In 1765, for example, Governor Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island declared, 
‘By all these charters, it is in the most express and solemn manner granted 
that these adventurers [the English colonists in America], and their children 
after them forever, should have and enjoy all the freedom and liberty that 
the subjects in England enjoy’.11 In 1766, Richard Bland appealed to Magna 
Carta as an earlier form of contract between the monarch and his subjects. 
He claimed that the rights and liberties enshrined in Magna Carta had been 
possessed by the English people since Anglo-Saxon times, long before 1215, 
 8 Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede, p. 54; and H. D. Hazeltine, ‘The influence 
of Magna Carta on American constitutional development’, Columbia Law Rev., xvii (1917), 
1–33, at p. 12.
 9 Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede, pp. 37–48.
 10 Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede, pp. 213–14; and Magna Carta and the Rule of 
Law, ed. D. B. Magraw, A. Martinez and R. Brownell II (Chicago, Ill. 2014), p. 160.
 11 Stephen Hopkins, The Rights of the Colonies Examined (Providence, R.I., 1765), p. 5.
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and had been passed on to the American colonists as a fundamental law 
through their royal charters.12 Thomas Jefferson also made the same point.13 
John Tucker maintained that the compact, created by royal charters, and 
reinforced by Magna Carta, limited the powers which George III could 
exercise over the American colonies. He claimed in 1771 that the American 
colonists lived under the British constitution, whose: 
constitutional laws are comprised in Magna-Charta [sic],14 or the great charter 
of the nation. This contains, in general, the liberties and privileges of the 
people, and is, virtually, a compact between the king and them; the reigning 
Prince, explicitly engaging, by solemn oath, to govern according to the laws: – 
Beyond the extent of these then or contrary to them, he can have no rightful 
authority at all.15
Such colonial opinions were strongly contested in Britain, however. In 
seeking to impose its authority on the colonies the British government, 
supported by a clear majority in the Westminster parliament, insisted that 
the supreme sovereign authority in Britain and also in all British North 
America lay with the combined legislature of the king, the house of lords 
and the house of commons. This view of the British constitution had been 
steadily developing since the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9. Whereas the 
American colonists appealed to an early seventeenth-century view of the 
English constitution, which raised the law above both the British executive 
and legislature, many British politicians, since the Glorious Revolution, had 
become convinced that the combined legislature at Westminster possessed 
the right to pass, amend or revoke any law and could even alter or repeal 
the rights and liberties granted by Magna Carta.16 William Blackstone, the 
celebrated and highly influential jurist, had claimed in 1765 that each state 
needed ‘a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority’, and, in 
Britain, he asserted, this was the combined legislature of king, lords and 
commons.17 Even Edmund Burke, a politician very anxious to conciliate 
the American colonies, could never surrender his conviction that the British 
 12 Richard Bland, An Enquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies (Williamsburg, 1766), 
cited in H. T. Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of 
the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1965), p. 147.
 13 S. R. Hauer, ‘Thomas Jefferson and the Anglo-Saxon Language’, Publications of the 
Modern Language Association, xcviii (183), 879–98.
 14 In the 18th century the great charter of liberty was often written as Magna Charta.
 15 John Tucker, A Sermon preached at Cambridge [Massachusetts], before his Excellency 
Thomas Hutchinson, Esq, Governor (Boston, Mass., 1771), p. 17.
 16 H. T. Dickinson, ‘The eighteenth century debate on the sovereignty of parliament’, 
Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 5th ser., xxvi (1976), 189–210.
 17 Willia Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (4 vols., Oxford, 1765–9), i. 49.
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legislature was the supreme authority in America as it was in Britain.18 By the 
1760s, the British defenders of parliamentary sovereignty had abandoned 
the long-standing belief that parliament’s sphere of action was limited by 
the superior authority of the fundamental law.19 Josiah Tucker, a leading 
British critic of the colonists’ claims, maintained that their arguments were 
self-defeating. He acknowledged that Magna Carta was the great foundation 
of English liberties and the basis of the constitution. It denied the king the 
right to raise taxes by his own prerogative and it supported the constitutional 
right of parliament alone to give consent to tax-raising measures. Magna 
Carta therefore supported the superior authority of parliament over that 
of the subordinate colonial legislative assemblies and hence it could not be 
appealed to in order to challenge the constitutional powers of parliament: 
the principal End and Intention of Magna Charta, as far as Taxation is 
concerned, was to assert the Authority and Jurisdiction of the three Estates of 
the kingdom [king, lords and commons], in Opposition to the sole Prerogative 
of the King; so that if you [the colonists] will now plead the Spirit of Magna 
Charta, against the Jurisdiction of Parliament, you will plead Magna Charta 
against itself .20
British defenders of parliamentary sovereignty also pointed out that not 
all the American colonies had been granted a royal charter of liberties. The 
royal charters that had been granted had not conferred on the colonists all 
the rights and liberties of Englishmen (the right to vote in parliamentary 
elections, for example).21 Moreover, in the past, colonial charters had on 
several occasions been reviewed, altered and even revoked and, since they 
had been granted by the crown alone, they would always be subordinate 
to the sovereign authority of the British legislature.22 William Blackstone 
conceded that, ‘if an uninhabited country is discovered, and planted by 
 18 H. T. Dickinson, ‘America’, in The Cambridge Companion to Edmund Burke, ed. D. W. 
Dwan and C. Insole (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 156–67. 
 19 J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford, 1955), 
pp. 174–213.
 20 Josiah Tucker, A Letter from a Merchant in London to his Nephew in North America 
(1766), p.  5. The same sentiment in exactly the same words can be found in William 
Pulteney, Thoughts on the present state of affairs with America, and the means of conciliation 
(1778), p. 86. See also The Rights of Parliament vindicated, on the occasion of the late Stamp-
Act, in which is exposed the conduct of the American Colonists (1766), pp. 6, 14.
 21 H. T. Dickinson, ‘Britain’s imperial sovereignty: the ideological case against the 
American colonists’, in Britain and the American Revolution, ed. H. T. Dickinson (1998), 
pp. 73–80.
 22 D. J. Hulsebosch, ‘The ancient constitution and the extending empire: Sir Edward 
Coke’s British jurisprudence’, Law and History Rev, xxi (2003), 439–82, at pp. 475–82.
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English subjects, all the British laws then in being, which are the birthright 
of every subject, are immediately there in force. For as the law is the 
birthright of every subject, so wherever they go, they carry their laws with 
them’.23 Unfortunately for the colonial cause, however, he promptly went 
on to assert that, in territories which had been conquered or ceded by 
treaty, as was the case with all of Britain’s American colonies, the common 
law of England had no authority there and the colonists inhabiting these 
territories were subject to the sovereign authority of the British legislature.24 
The American colonies might be allowed to possess their own legislatures, 
which could pass local laws, but these subordinate legislatures could not 
pass laws contrary to those passed by the Westminster parliament. On the 
other hand, the imperial Westminster parliament could pass laws for, and 
raise taxes in, the American colonies.25 Ironically, in view of how much the 
colonists relied in the 1760s on many of the arguments advanced against 
arbitrary and oppressive power by Edward Coke in the early seventeenth 
century, Coke had himself maintained that those English subjects who left 
the realm of England to live in the American colonies could not claim the 
same rights and liberties, under the common law or according to Magna 
Carta, as those who remained in England.26 This was one argument of 
Coke’s that the American colonists ignored.
In defending what they regarded as their constitutional rights and 
liberties, and in resisting the British efforts in the 1760s and 1770s to impose 
imperial authority over them, the American colonists often appealed to 
Magna Carta as proof of their claims. On a number of occasions they 
used visual images of Magna Carta as a symbol of their right to claim the 
civil liberties possessed by Englishmen. In January 1766, Paul Revere, an 
engraver and silversmith, produced a graphic print, A View of the Year 1765, 
in which he depicted a Stamp Act dragon, supported by two devils, trying 
to snatch Magna Carta from a man representing Boston.27 In 1768, Revere 
produced a beautiful silver punch bowl in honour of several leading ‘Sons 
of Liberty’ in Massachusetts. He decorated this with references to John 
Wilkes and his notorious publication, the North Briton, number 45, and 
added flags representing Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights of 
1689 on either side of this image. In the same year, the title page to the 
third edition of John Dickinson’s influential political tract, Letters from a 
 23 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, i. 104–105.
 24 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, i. 105.
 25 Dickinson, ‘Britain’s imperial sovereignty’, pp. 86–94.
 26 Hulsebosch, ‘The ancient constitution and the extending empire’, pp. 439–40.
 27 See E. P. Richardson, ‘Stamp act cartoons in the colonies’, Pennsylvania Magazine of 
History and Biography, xcvi (1972), 275–97.
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Farmer in Pennsylvania, shows him standing with Magna Carta under his 
right elbow and a book by Sir Edward Coke on his bookshelf. In 1774, 
Paul Revere was commissioned by the Royal American Magazine to engrave 
the head and shoulders of both Sam Adams and John Hancock above a 
scroll labelled ‘Magna Charta’. When the American patriots decided to 
publish the Journal of the Proceedings of the [Continental] Congress held at 
Philadelphia, on 5 September 1774 the title-page was decorated with an image 
of twelve hands grasping in unison a pillar resting upon a base entitled 
Magna Carta. On 15 December 1774, the New York Journal was illustrated 
with a similar design, but this time intertwined snakes encircled it as further 
proof that the American patriots were establishing their political unity. In 
July 1775, Maryland published a four-dollar paper banknote, whose design 
included ‘Liberty’ handing a petition to ‘Britannia’, who is being restrained 
by King George III, who is shown trampling upon Magna Carta. Finally, 
the Great Seal of Massachusetts, designed in 1775, depicts a colonist holding 
a sword in his right hand and Magna Carta in his left hand.28
Interesting and important as such symbols were, they were not as 
significant or as influential in rallying the American colonists against British 
policies as the arguments produced in law courts, speeches, debates and 
printed publications. Many of these cited Magna Carta in support of colonial 
claims to their rights and liberties and their protests against Britain’s misuse 
 28 S. Hamilton, ‘“The earliest Device of the Colonies” and some other early devices’, 
Princeton University Library Chronicle, x (1949), 117–23.
Figure 7.1. Seal of Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1775. 
Courtesy of Massachusetts Archives, Boston.
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of its judicial, executive and legislative powers. As early as 1761, James Otis 
challenged the right of the king’s offi  cials in Massachusetts to use ‘writs 
of assistance’, a form of general warrant, allowing the examination of the 
premises of Boston merchants on the mere suspicion that smuggled goods 
might be located there. In winning his case, Otis appealed to Magna Carta 
to support the argument that a specifi c charge needed to be made before 
such an examination of private property could be undertaken.29 When the 
 29 Dick Howard, Th e Road from Runnymede, p. 133.
Figure 7.2. Frontispiece, “Th e Patriotic American Farmer”; i.e., 
3rd edn. of John Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania. 
Courtesy of John Carter Brown Library, Brown University.
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British parliament passed the Sugar Act in 1764, it determined that those 
colonists, who attempted to avoid paying customs or excise duties, would 
be prosecuted in a vice-admiralty court established at Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
Th ere, the charges would not be heard by juries made up of local colonists, 
but by judges appointed by the crown. Th e Townshend Acts of 1767 
established additional vice-admiralty courts in Boston, Philadelphia and 
Charleston, which were used even more frequently by customs collectors. 
Th e result was repeated protests that the colonists were being denied legal 
rights that were not being denied to Britons charged with smuggling 
Figure 7.3. Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress held at Philadelphia, 1774. 
Title page of book in British Library. © British Library Board, shelf mark C.38.f.33.
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offences.30 A town meeting in Braintree, Massachusetts, in 1765, protested 
against the British attempt to use vice-admiralty courts to punish those who 
refused to pay taxes levied by the Westminster parliament, because such 
trials would not be heard by a jury, which was a policy ‘directly repugnant 
to the Great Charter itself ’.31 In September 1765, the colonial legislature 
in Pennsylvania resolved: ‘That the vesting an authority in the courts of 
admiralty to decide in suits relating to the stamp duties, and other matters, 
foreign to their jurisdiction, is highly dangerous to the liberties of his 
majesty’s American subjects, contrary to Magna Charta, the great charter 
and fountain of English liberty, and destructive of one of their most darling 
and acknowledged rights, that of TRIALS BY JURIES’.32 A month later, the 
lower house of the Connecticut legislature condemned the Sugar Act of 
1764, on similar grounds. Vice-admiralty courts, used to prosecute those 
who tried to evade paying the sugar duty, were charged with being ‘highly 
dangerous to the liberties of his Majesty’s American subjects, contrary to 
the great charter of English liberty, and destructive of one of their most 
darling rights, that of trial by juries, which is justly esteemed one chief 
excellence of the British Constitution’.33 In February 1766, the Sons of 
Liberty held a mock trial for the Stamp Act, in which the prisoner was 
found ‘guilty of a Breach of the Magna Charta, and a design to subvert the 
British constitution’.34
In order to restrict the use of such prerogative courts, under the influence 
of the British executive, the legislative assemblies in several colonies began 
erecting their own courts and appointing their own judges so that judicial 
decisions in such cases could be resolved outside the king’s vice-admiralty 
courts. These courts advanced petitions against the oppressive use of the 
king’s courts and pressed for legislative action to be taken in the colonial 
assemblies without seeking the consent of the king.35 In June 1768, when John 
Hancock was prosecuted in the vice-admiralty court in Boston for failing 
to get a permit to unload cargo from his sloop, Liberty, John Adams, the 
future second president of the United States, successfully defended him by 
 30 D. S. Lovejoy, ‘“Rights imply equality”: the case against admiralty jurisdiction in 
America, 1764–1776’, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., xvi (1959), 459–84.
 31 J. L. Malcolm, ‘Magna Carta in America: entrenched’, in Magna Carta: the Foundation 
of Freedom 1215–2015, ed. N. Vincent (2nd edn., 2015), p. 125.
 32 The Proceedings of the North American Colonies in consequence of the Stamp Act (1766), 
p. 10; and Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766, 
ed. E. S. Morgan (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), p. 52.
 33 The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, ed. C. J. Headley and J. H. Trumbull (15 
vols., Hartford, Conn, 1881–90), xii. 424; and Morgan, Prologue to Revolution, p. 55.
 34 Boston Gazette, 24 February 1766.
 35 Magraw et al., Magna Carta and the Rule of Law, pp. 66–8.
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maintaining that this prosecution was against the legal principles enshrined 
in chapter 29 of the 1225 version of Magna Carta.36 Adams highlighted and 
condemned the distinction that the Westminster parliament’s legislation 
had made between British subjects and American colonists:
What shall we say to this distinction? Is there not in this clause, a Brand of 
Infamy, of Degradation, and Disgrace, fixed upon every American? Is he not 
degraded below the Rank of an Englishman? Is it not directly a Repeal of 
Magna Charta, as far as America is concerned … This 29 Chap. of Magna 
Charta has for many Centuries been esteemed by Englishmen, as one of the 
noblest Monuments one of the firmest Bullwarks of their Liberties … The 
[Sugar Act] takes from Mr Hancock this precious Tryal Per Legem Terra [by the 
law of the land], and gives it to a single Judge. However respectable the Judge 
may be, it is however an Hardship and severity, which distinguishes my Clyent 
from the rest of Englishmen.37
When, in 1772, Britain attempted to put on trial far outside the colony 
those colonists charged with burning one of his majesty’s revenue ships, which 
was endeavouring to prevent smuggling in the colonies, Chief Justice Stephen 
Hopkins of Rhode Island successfully maintained that such an action would 
be a violation of the right enshrined in Magna Carta that any accused person 
should always be tried by a jury composed of men living in the vicinity of 
where the crime took place.38 After the Boston Tea Party of 16 December 1773, 
when some colonists attacked British merchant ships importing tea into the 
colony, the British parliament passed the Intolerable or Coercive Acts of 1774 
to punish Massachusetts. Of these, the Administration of Justice Act allowed 
the British authorities to prosecute anyone accused of attacking the property 
of British merchants in trials held far outside the American colonies. Leading 
American patriots, including Thomas Jefferson, protested that it was contrary 
to Magna Carta and the common law to hold a trial outside the locality 
where the offence took place.39 When leading American colonists convened 
to discuss how to unite in opposition to Britain’s imperial policies in the First 
Continental Congress held in Philadelphia, in October 1774, they passed 
resolutions insisting that the colonists had inherited all the rights and liberties 
of Englishmen under the common law and the British constitution. Their fifth 
resolution stated: ‘That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law 
of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being 
 36 Malcolm, ‘Magna Carta in America’, p. 126.
 37 John Adams’s ‘Admiralty Notebook’, quoted in D. Lovejoy, ‘“Rights imply equality”’, 
p. 481.
 38 Malcolm, ‘Magna Carta in America’, p. 126.
 39 Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, p. 164.
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tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law’.40 They 
undoubtedly believed that this claim was based on chapter 29 of the 1225 version 
of Magna Carta. When South Carolina threw off its allegiance to George 
III, in early 1776, its chief justice, William Henry Drayton, expressed deep 
satisfaction that British efforts to abolish the right of trial by jury, in contempt 
of Magna Carta, would no longer be tolerated under the independent state’s 
new constitution.41 When, in July 1776, the American colonists finally drafted 
their Declaration of Independence, their long list of grievances, against the 
British king, ministers and parliament, included the charges that Britain had 
used vice-admiralty courts where judicial decisions had been reached without 
juries and that efforts had been made by Britain to put colonists on trial in 
courts located far beyond the borders of their provinces.42
Far more important than the colonial accusations that Britain was 
betraying the legal principles enshrined in Magna Carta were the repeated 
claims made in America that Britain was acting contrary to Magna Carta 
in maintaining that the Westminster parliament had the right to levy 
direct internal taxes on the American colonies without the consent of the 
colonial legislatures. When parliament attempted to levy the Stamp Tax 
on the colonies, in 1765, the colonists quickly pointed out that consent to 
taxes must be given by those required to pay them and hence internal taxes 
levied in America required the consent of local colonial legislatures.43 They 
therefore vehemently protested that the Stamp Tax was contrary to the 
constitutional principle of ‘no taxation without representation’, a claim very 
much based on Sir Edward Coke’s assertion in the early seventeenth century 
that Magna Carta had laid down that the crown could only levy taxes with 
the consent of parliament. On 28 September 1765, the lower house of the 
Maryland legislative assembly resolved unanimously, ‘that it was granted by 
Magna Charta, … that the subject should not be compelled to contribute 
any tax, tallage, aid or other like charge, not set by the common consent 
of parliament’,44 and hence without the consent of the colonial legislatures. 
In his resolutions against the Stamp Act presented to the Massachusetts 
 40 ‘Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress’, The Avalon Project: 
Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/
resolves.asp> [accessed 20 May 2015].
 41 ‘Drayton’s charge to the Grand Jury of South Carolina, 23 April 1776’, in Principles and 
Acts of the Revolution in America, ed. H. Niles (Baltimore, Md., 1822), p. 72.
 42 ‘America’s Founding Documents’, National Archives <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/
charters/declaration_transcript.html> [accessed 24 Aug. 2015].
 43 A Collection of Tracts, on the subjects of taxing the British colonies in America, and 
regulating their trade (4 vols., 1773), iii. 105.
 44 The Proceedings of the North American Colonies in consequence of the Stamp Act (1766), 
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house of representatives, on 29 October 1765, Samuel Adams, a leading 
Patriot, insisted that a major pillar of the British constitution, to which 
the colonists could also lay claim, was the principle of no taxation without 
representation, which ‘together with all other essential rights, privileges, 
and immunities of the people of Great Britain, have been fully confirmed to 
them by Magna Charta’.45 The Massachusetts assembly went on to declare 
that the Stamp Act was invalid because it was ‘against Magna Charta and the 
natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore, according to Lord Coke, null 
and void’.46 The New York assembly also insisted in 1765 that no taxation 
without representation was ‘a fundamental principle … declared by Magna 
Charta’.47 
Thomas Hutchinson, the lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts, was 
alarmed at the way local American patriots were exploiting Edward Coke’s 
interpretation of Magna Carta in order to resist the imposition of the 
Stamp Tax. He declared on 12 September 1765: ‘our friends to liberty take 
the advantage of a maxim they find in Lord Coke that an Act of parliament 
against Magna Carta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void 
… This, taken in the latitude the people are often disposed to take it, must 
be fatal to all government, and it seems to have determined [a] great part 
of the colony to oppose the execution of the act with force’.48 The fierce 
colonial opposition to the Stamp Act was not confined to Massachusetts. 
Several colonies agreed to send representatives to a Congress in New York in 
order to co-ordinate their opposition to the Stamp Act. There they resolved 
that ‘The invaluable rights of taxing ourselves … are not, we most humbly 
conceive Unconstitutional; but confirmed by the great CHARTER of 
English Liberty’.49 When the Stamp Act was repealed by the Westminster 
parliament in 1766, Jonathan Mayhew in Boston celebrated this decision 
on the basis that taxation by consent was a natural right, but it was also a 
right based on Magna Carta: ‘It shall be taken for granted that this natural 
right is declared, affirmed and secured to us, as we are British subjects, 
by Magna Charta; all acts contrary to which are said to be ipso facto null 
 45 Quoted in Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience, p. 175.
 46 Quoted in Magna Carta Uncovered, ed. A. Arlidge and I. Judge (Oxford, 2014), p. 158.
 47 Quoted in J. P. Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, ii: the Authority 
to Tax (Madison, Wis., 1987), p. 108.
 48 Quoted in Law, Liberty, and Parliament: Selected Essays on the Writings of Sir Edward 
Coke, ed. A. D. Boyer (Indianapolis, Ind., 2004), p. 179. See also Hutchinson’s comment of 
25 Sept. 1765, quoted in Boyer, Law, Liberty, and Parliament, p. 180.
 49 Authentic Account of the Proceedings of the Congress held at New York, in MDCCLXV, 
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and void’.50 On 27 January 1772, Samuel Adams, now one of the most 
outspoken of American Patriots, published in the Boston Gazette Edward 
Coke’s claim that Magna Carta was ‘declaratory of the principal grounds 
of the fundamental laws and liberties of England’. He added, however, 
‘whether Lord Coke has expressed it or not … an act of parliament made 
against Magna Charta in violation of its essential parts, is void’.51 In 1775, 
Moses Mather insisted that the charters of the American colonies were, 
like Magna Carta, permanent, perpetual and unalterable. He claimed that 
chapter 29 of Magna Carta established that British subjects, on both sides 
of the Atlantic, were liable to no taxes and bound by no laws except those 
made and imposed by their own consent.52
The claim that the principle of no taxation without representation was 
enshrined in Magna Carta was supported by political commentators in 
America53 and even by a few in Britain. In July 1768, John Wilkes, a leading 
pro-American campaigner in London, proclaimed:
Liberty I consider as the birthright of every subject of the British empire, and I 
hold Magna Charta to be as full in force in America as in Europe. I hope that 
these truths will become generally known and acknowledged through the wide 
extended dominions of our sovereign, and that a real union of the whole will 
prevail to save the whole, and to guard the public liberty, if invaded by despotic 
ministers, in the most remote, equally as in the central parts of this vast empire.54
Shortly before war broke out, James Burgh, a supporter of parliamentary 
reform in Britain, declared: 
Magna Charta, and the Bill of Rights, prohibit the taxing of the mother country 
by prerogative, and without the consent of those who are to be taxed. If the 
people of Britain are not to be taxed but by parliament; because otherwise they 
might be taxed without their own consent; does it not directly follow, that the 
colonists cannot, according to Magna Charta and the bill of rights, be taxed 
by Parliament, so long as they continue unrepresented, because otherwise they 
may be taxed without their consent.55
 50 Jonathan Mayhew, The Snare Broken (Boston, Mass., 1766), p. 4.
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 52 Moses Mather, America’s Appeal to the Impartial World (Hartford, Conn., 1775), pp. 12, 
25, 36–7.
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In an effort to stop the war in its early stages some British supporters of the 
American cause formed the London Association in 1775.56 They attacked 
the British government’s determination to use armed force in the colonies 
and denied that the Americans desired complete independence.57 To justify 
their position, they published a pamphlet, in 1776, setting out the most 
important terms of Magna Carta, complete with Edward Coke’s remarks on 
these.58 About the same time, another British commentator, who regarded 
Magna Carta as ‘still the impregnable fortress of our privileges’, was even 
more explicit:
By Magna Charta … no subject should be compelled to contribute any tax … 
not set by the common consent of Parliament. Our colonists are subjects of the 
British dominions. In the parliament of Great Britain, which is only a part of 
those dominions, they are not represented. The imposition, therefore, of any 
tax, by that Parliament, must be without the consent of the colonists; and it 
follows that they are absolutely exempted from the necessity of submitting to 
it.59
On both sides of the Atlantic, however, American Patriots and British 
radicals began to rely more on the belief that their political rights and 
liberties were better defended by appeals to fundamental law60 and natural 
rights than by Magna Carta. James Otis61 and James Wilson,62 for example, 
maintained that English liberties had existed long before Magna Carta and 
that the great charter had merely declared what had long been regarded as 
natural rights and fundamental law in England. In 1767, Silas Downer of 
Providence, Rhode Island declared of the doctrine of no taxation without 
 56 J. Sainsbury, Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America 1769–1782 
(Kingston and Montreal, and Gloucester, 1987), pp. 106–13, 118.
 57 The ‘Circular Letter from the London Association’ and ‘Resolutions of the London 
Association’, in The Crisis, lxxxviii, pp. 554–6 and the ‘Prefatory Address from the London 
association’ printed in The Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North 
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taking up arms (1775), pp. iii–vi.
 58 The Golden Passage in the Great Charter of England, called Magna Charta … with Lord 
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 59 Taxation, Tyranny. Addressed to Samuel Johnson (1775), pp. 26–7. Samuel Johnson had 
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revolutionary thought’, Stanford Law Rev., xxx (1978), 843–93.
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representation that: ‘It is a natural right which no creature can give, or 
hath a right to take away. The great charter of liberties, commonly called 
Magna Charta, doth not give the privileges therein mentioned, nor doth 
our Charters, but must be considered as only declaratory of our rights, 
and in affirmance of them’.63 Samuel Langdon, president of Harvard 
College, proclaimed in a sermon preached in 1775, ‘Thanks be to God that 
He has given us, as men, natural rights, independent of all human laws 
whatsoever, and that these rights are recognized by the grand charter of 
English liberties’.64 William Gordon went so far as to claim that Magna 
Carta provided no solid security for the rights and liberties of the British or 
the American people when parliament could amend or ignore its terms by 
passing statute laws.65
As the American crisis developed, however, these concerns did not prevent 
appeals being made to Magna Carta in order to justify using force to oppose 
the British government and parliament, both of which were increasingly 
regarded by the American colonists as arbitrary and oppressive. As early 
as November 1772, some Boston Patriots declared that Magna Carta ‘was 
justly obtain’d of King John sword in hand: and peradventure it must one 
day sword in hand again be rescued and preserv’d from total destruction 
and oblivion’.66 In ‘The Forester’s Letters’, Thomas Paine defended the 
natural rights of the colonists and denied Magna Carta had created any new 
rights, but he did concede that 1215 had shown how a king could be forced 
to renounce tyranny.67 Charles Carroll also stressed that Magna Carta had 
been achieved by force,68 while John Adams used the events of 1215 to claim: 
‘Did not the English gain by resistance to John, when Magna Charta was 
obtained’.69 In ‘A Pastoral Letter’, of 1775, four Presbyterian ministers in 
Pennsylvania advised their co-religionists in North Carolina that: ‘To take 
any man’s money, without his consent is unjust and contrary to reason and 
the law of God … it is contrary to Magna Charta, or the Great Charter 
and Constitution of England; and to complain, and even to resist such a 
lawless power, is just and reasonable, and no rebellion’.70 At a provincial 
convention in Philadelphia, in January 1775, James Wilson claimed that the 
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armed resistance now being contemplated by the American colonists was 
the same as the barons had used in securing Magna Carta in 1215. In his 
view, the right of resistance was founded on both the letter and the spirit 
of the British constitution.71 When some colonial representatives at the 
second Continental Congress, held in Philadelphia in 1776, questioned the 
legitimacy of taking up arms against King George III, Wilson pointed out 
that such an objection had not prevented the English barons from resisting 
the tyranny of King John in 1215 and gaining the concessions he agreed to 
in Magna Carta.72
When the American colonists finally took up arms to secure their 
independence from Britain they began creating new state constitutions 
for their provinces. In drafting written constitutions, they hoped to create 
fundamental laws, which could not so easily be amended or revoked by a 
sovereign legislature as had happened in Britain in recent decades. Many 
colonies, including Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina and 
South Carolina in 1776, New York in 1777, Massachusetts in 1780, and New 
Hampshire in 1784, incorporated in their new constitutions the essential 
features of chapter 29 of the 1225 version of Magna Carta.73 The Virginia Bill 
of Rights of 1776 declared that an accused person should receive a speedy 
trial before an impartial jury in the locality where the offence had occurred, 
that ‘no man could be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land 
or the judgment of his peers’, and that no excessive fines should be imposed 
nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.74 Several states explicitly 
guaranteed that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law’, that any accused person must be tried by the 
law of the land and by a jury of his peers in the vicinity where the offence 
took place, and that justice should not be sold, denied or delayed.75 In 
Massachusetts in 1779, John Adams declared that any government seeking 
to serve the public interest must be a government of laws not of men. In 
England, Magna Carta had been an attempt to serve such a purpose, but 
its specific terms and general principles had been frequently broken by king 
or parliament and the people had often been forced to repair the damage 
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done to their rights and liberties. The American colonies now fighting for 
their independence must try to avoid such a fate by clearly stating their 
rights and liberties, and limiting the powers of their legislatures in their 
new written constitutions.76 Adams helped ensure that the Massachusetts 
constitution of 1780 included no less than three articles, which could be 
traced back to the terms of Magna Carta.77
After securing their independence in 1783 the new American states 
recognized the need to establish a more effective national government 
than they had managed to achieve during the War of Independence. In 
the debates on establishing a new Federal Constitution that took place in 
1787 in Philadelphia, there was little discussion among the representatives 
about how it might be influenced by the terms and principles of Magna 
Carta. James Wilson even pointed out that the Americans no longer had 
any need to look back to Magna Carta for inspiration because that charter 
of rights and liberties had been granted to the English people by their 
monarch, whereas the United States was a republic in which the people were 
establishing their own rights by their own efforts. In his view, the American 
people would retain all the rights and liberties not explicitly surrendered 
in their new Federal Constitution.78 The terms of the Federal Constitution 
were drafted in 1787, but it was then sent out in 1788 for ratification by the 
states. This process, which lasted some months, led to disputes between 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists about whether the new constitution had 
done enough to protect the rights and liberties of individuals. Although 
it has been suggested that there was little discussion of Magna Carta by 
those chosen to ratify the constitution,79 there was in fact some discussion 
of its relevance by major commentators on the issues at stake. The leading 
Federalists, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, shared James Wilson’s 
view that there was no need to include specific guarantees for the rights of 
the individual in the terms of the Federal Constitution. They maintained 
that whereas Magna Carta had been needed by the English people to secure 
their rights and liberties against an arbitrary and oppressive monarch, 
in America’s new republic there was no need to guarantee the rights of 
the individual since the powers of the Federal legislature and the elected 
 76 W. F. Swindler, Magna Carta: Legend and Legacy (New York, 1965), p. 228.
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president were clearly limited by the express terms of the new constitution. 
In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton specifically mentioned that 
there was no need to emulate the English people in securing a Magna 
Carta style charter of liberties. Such a charter could ‘have no application 
to constitutions founded [like the Federal Constitution] upon the power of 
the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. 
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; as they retain every thing 
they have no need of particular reservations … here is a better recognition 
of popular rights’.80 Madison claimed that the English people’s ‘Magna 
Charta does not contain one provision for the security of these rights, 
respecting which the people of America are most alarmed. The freedom of 
the press and rights of conscience, those choicest privileges of the people, are 
unguarded in the British constitution’.81 James Iredell and Samuel Johnston 
both opposed the demand for a specific Bill of Rights to be added to the 
Federal Constitution because the evidence of British history showed that 
a sovereign legislature there had possessed the authority to alter or revoke 
various parts of Magna Carta.82 Governor Johnston asked those at the 
North Carolina Convention, ‘What is Magna Charta? It is only an act of 
Parliament. Their Parliament can, at any time, alter the whole, or any part 
of it. It is no more binding on the people than any other law Parliament 
has passed’.83 In the new American republic, by contrast, the powers of the 
American Congress were clearly circumscribed by the terms of the Federal 
Constitution. David Ramsay, one of the first historians of the American 
Revolution, made this distinction crystal clear in an oration celebrating the 
anniversary of the Declaration of Independence in 1794. While willing to 
accept that Magna Carta had been freely granted to the English people by 
their king, he nevertheless concluded, 
What is said to be thus given and granted by the free will of the sovereign, we, 
the people of America, hold in our own right. The sovereignty rests in ourselves, 
and instead of receiving the privileges of free citizens as a boon from the hands 
of our rulers, we defined their powers by a constitution of our own framing, 
which prescribed to them, that this far they might go, but no farther. All power, 
not thus expressly delegated, is retained.84
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Despite such efforts, Anti-Federalists remained seriously concerned 
about the absence of any mention in the Federal Constitution of the 
rights and liberties of the individual. They maintained that Magna Carta 
had indeed provided an important security for the rights and liberties 
of Englishmen and they wished to see something similar included in 
the new constitution before it was fully ratified.85 Representatives from 
Virginia, for example, put forward the view that the Federal Constitution 
needed to be amended to ensure that such rights and liberties as had 
been protected in England by Magna Carta would be secured in the new 
republic. They urged that no accused person should be punished except by 
due process, according to the law of the land; that justice should neither 
be delayed nor denied; and that an accused person should be given a fair 
and speedy trial before a jury drawn from the area where the offence had 
been committed.86 These were all civil rights, which the Americans had 
long believed were enshrined in chapter 29 of the 1225 version of Magna 
Carta. 
In the event, Congress decided to give way to the demands of the Anti-
Federalists. In 1791, a Bill of Rights, proposed by the leading Federalist, 
James Madison, added ten amendments to the Federal Constitution.87 
Several of these amendments were clearly influenced by some of the most 
famous and cherished terms of Magna Carta. The First Amendment 
guaranteed citizens the right to petition for the redress of grievances. 
The Fifth Amendment declared that ‘No person shall be … deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation’. This clearly 
owed much to chapter 29 of the 1225 version of Magna Carta. The Sixth 
Amendment, also clearly influenced by Magna Carta, provided that ‘the 
accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed’. 
The Seventh Amendment established jury trials in civil cases and the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited cruel and unusual punishments; both of 
which were influenced by Magna Carta, through earlier English statutes 
and American state constitutions.88 In the early years of the republic (and 
long afterwards) appeals were made to Magna Carta a great many times 
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by American lawyers pleading their cases before both state and federal 
courts.89 
Before and during the War of Independence a number of American 
Patriots had used the example of the English barons using force to compel 
King John to accept the terms of Magna Carta to justify their own resort 
to arms against what they regarded as Britain’s oppressive and arbitrary 
policies adopted since the early 1760s. Before and during the drafting 
of the Federal Constitution a number of Americans commented on the 
difficulties that the English had had in securing the rights and liberties 
which they believed that they had been granted by means of Magna Carta. 
The Americans were aware that an effort had been made in chapter 61 of 
the original Magna Carta of 1215 to ensure that King John would observe 
the terms in the Charter to which he had given his consent. In this chapter 
the rebellious barons had proposed electing representatives from within 
their ranks, who could determine whether an appeal to arms needed to 
be made in order to ensure that King John fulfilled his obligations under 
the terms set out in Magna Carta. The Americans knew, however, that this 
chapter had been omitted from all subsequent versions and confirmations 
of Magna Carta. No mechanism therefore had ever been established to 
ensure that the terms of Magna Carta could be enforced. The Americans 
soon found a means by which the authority of the executive and legislature 
created by the Federal Constitution could be effectively prevented from 
exceeding the powers granted to them by the terms of this constitution. A 
supreme court was established quite independent of the executive and the 
legislature. The justices of the supreme court soon established their power 
of judicial review. They took it upon themselves to adjudicate whether 
any action by the executive or the legislature in the United States could be 
judged as exceeding the powers granted to these institutions by the Federal 
Constitution. In 1803, in the case of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John 
Marshall used the arguments previously used by Edward Coke in England in 
the early seventeenth century to assert that the supreme court had the right 
to declare some executive or legislative actions to be unconstitutional.90 The 
principle and practice of judicial review became an extremely important, if 
often contested, aspect of the American Constitution.91 When the supreme 
court was housed in its fine building in Washington D.C. it was therefore 
appropriate that its magnificent bronze doors included among their eight 
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panels, an image of King John agreeing to Magna Carta at Runnymede in 
1215, another of King Edward I confirming Magna Carta in 1297, and a 
third showing Sir Edward Coke disputing with King James I.
101
A. Lock, ‘Reform, radicalism and revolution: Magna Carta in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
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8. Reform, radicalism and revolution: Magna Carta 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain*
Alexander Lock
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Magna Carta was 
invoked extensively across Great Britain and its empire. Building on the 
foundations laid in the seventeenth century it had become a document 
of international scope and influence as vigorously debated by radicals in 
Westminster as by lawyers in Bengal or rebels in Massachusetts.1 Throughout 
the period Magna Carta was used to champion press freedom and 
parliamentary reform, to challenge transportation and naval impressment, 
and in debates to regulate overseas trade and taxation.2 The range of media on 
which its image was reproduced was as broad and unusual as the principles 
and people it was engaged to defend. In the age of the industrial revolution 
its image was reproduced and sold on statuary, playing cards, fabrics, prints, 
porcelain and paintings; bought by an increasing pool of consumers eager 
 *  Note to the reader: unless otherwise stated, all clauses cited in this essay relate to the 
Great Charter sealed by King John in 1215. Small parts of this essay have previously appeared 
in print as ‘Radicalism and reform’, in Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, ed. C. Breay and 
J. Harrison (2015), pp. 161–6. The use of Magna Carta by parliamentary reformers is the 
subject of this essay, but, for further discussion of the subject, see also A. Pallister, Magna 
Carta: the Heritage of Liberty (Oxford, 1971), pp. 59–75. 
 1 For its invocation by British subjects in Bengal, see British Library, India Office 
Records, IOR/H/144, ‘The Humble Petition of the British Subjects Residing in the Province 
of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa and their Several Dependencies’, 26 Feb. 1779; Observations on 
the Foregoing Petition of the British Subjects Residing in Bengal (1779), p. 37. For its invocation 
by revolutionaries in North America see A. E. Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede: 
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America (Charlottesville, Va., 1968), pp. 133–240. 
 2 On press freedom, see below in this essay and R. V. Turner, Magna Carta through the Ages 
(2003), pp. 176–7. For an example of the uses of Magna Carta to challenge transportation 
and naval impressment, see J. Bentham, A Plea for the Constitution (1803), pp. 16–19, 55–
7; J. E. Oglethorpe, The Sailor’s Advocate (1728); The Case of The King Against Alexander 
Broadfoot, at the Session of Oyer and Terminer and Goal Delivery Held for the City of Bristol 
and County of the Same City, on 30 of August, 1743 (Oxford, 1758), pp. 3, 25–26; Nauticus, The 
Rights of the Sailors Vindicated (1772), pp. vi-vii, xiii, 20. For its use in contemporary debates 
on overseas trade, see An Essay towards a Scheme or Model for Erecting a National East-India 
Joynt-Stock or Company (1691), p. 6.
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to own something of Britain’s glorious heritage.3 Just as their seventeenth-
century predecessors had done, radicals and revolutionaries continued to 
employ the Great Charter in order to embarrass the monarch, promote 
political reform and, if necessary, foment insurrection. However, where once 
Magna Carta was enlisted by parliament in their struggle for supremacy 
over the crown, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries’ reformers used 
it to challenge the very authority and power that (the unrepresentative) 
parliament had won.4 
Yet for all these invocations Magna Carta was rarely read by those who 
used it and barely understood in its historical context. It had become 
little more than a heroic symbol of ‘English liberty’, the embodiment of 
an unwritten and reputedly ancient constitution. Citations of the Great 
Charter tended to be crude and anachronistic and beyond the general 
defence of due process famously given in chapters 39 and 40 (that ‘No 
freeman will be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in 
anyway ruined … save by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law 
of the land. To no one shall we sell, to no one shall we deny or delay right 
or justice’) its advocates were less concerned with its specific clauses than 
with its iconographical significance. Magna Carta had become a slogan 
calculated to stir patriotic emotions and mobilize public support. 
When discussing the history of Magna Carta and the ‘rights’ contained 
within it, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century commentators frequently 
used the terms ‘Englishmen’ and ‘Britons’ interchangeably. Many who did 
so were simply indulging in ‘the nasty English habit’ of using the words 
synonymously, while others tacitly suggested that the ‘rights’ contained 
within England’s Magna Carta appealed to and were legitimately claimed 
by most British subjects.5 As Colin Kidd has noted, ‘English liberties 
 3 For examples of this material, see Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, 
Legacy, pp. 168–89.
 4 Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, pp. 43–75.
 5 K. Kumar, The Making of English National Identity (Cambridge, 2003), p. 275, n. 6. 
Though beyond the scope of this essay, the suggestion that such rights could be legitimately 
claimed by all British subjects engendered contentious discussions within the British 
empire. Whilst the jurisdiction of ‘English liberties’ remained a contested issue well into the 
20th century, one recurring feature of the debates was the suggestion that such rights were 
‘inherited’ in the colonies along racial lines (see M. Taylor, ‘Magna Carta in the nineteenth 
century’, in Magna Carta: the Foundation of Freedom, 1215–2015, ed. N. Vincent (2014), 
pp. 136–53, at pp. 150–3; Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900, ed. J. P. 
Greene (Cambridge, 2010), pp.  55, 66, 193, 228; Australia’s Empire, ed. D. M. Schreuder 
and S. Ward (Oxford, 2009), p. 21; D. O’Brien, ‘Magna Carta, the “sugar colonies” and 
“fantasies of empire”’, in Magna Carta and its Modern Legacy , ed. R. Hazell and J. Melton 
(Cambridge, 2015), pp. 99–122).  
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embodied universal aspirations to freedom and self-government’ that were 
attractive to the wider British world where there was ‘a strong identification 
with the values and institutions of the English motherland’.6 Protestant 
Irish and colonial Americans claimed themselves to be of ‘English stock’ 
and ‘heirs to the precious English liberties of their Anglo-Saxon ancestors’, 
while their Welsh and Scottish compatriots perceived union with England 
entitled them to such rights.7 In this context, to describe Magna Carta as 
the ‘birthright’ and ‘inheritance’ of both ‘Englishmen’ and ‘Britons’ was 
perfectly acceptable.8 Indeed, as we shall see, even where protest against 
English domination took place, given the commanding role of England 
within Britain and its colonial possessions, it is unsurprising that such 
opposition was often couched in the language of English legal traditions 
such as Magna Carta and habeas corpus.9
The powerful public authority that Magna Carta had achieved as a 
symbolic document in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is evident 
in its almost ubiquitous visual representation in political cartoons and 
caricatures of the period. And it was not only those who opposed the 
government that invoked it. As in the seventeenth century, the Great 
Charter remained a protean document in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, its malleability exploited to advocate a range of political 
perspectives. Loyalist propagandists claimed that only a strong monarch 
and elite parliament could defend the ‘constitution’ and ‘principles’ of 
1215, while at the same time their radical opponents seeking parliamentary 
reform insisted that the government’s grip on power contravened the legal 
‘birthright’ and ‘inheritance’ of the people’s ‘ancient’ liberties.10 
 6 C. Kidd, ‘Integration: patriotism and nationalism’, in A Companion to Eighteenth 
Century Britain , ed. H. Dickinson (Oxford, 2002), pp. 369–80, at p. 376. See also C. Kidd, 
‘North Britishness and the nature of eighteenth-century British patriotisms’, Hist. Jour., 
xxxix (1996), 361–82; Kumar, The Making of English National Identity, pp. 154–6. 
 7 Kidd, ‘Integration’, p. 376.
 8 One of the most striking contemporary pamphlets to claim Magna Carta was ‘the 
Glory of Britain and Ireland’ (see H. Hone and G. Cruikshank, The Queen and Magna 
Charta; Or, the Thing that John Signed (1820)). Throughout, it consciously depicted Scots, 
Irish and English altogether celebrating ‘the thing that John signed’.  
 9 Kumar, The Making of English National Identity, p. 156. In Ireland the Irish nationalist 
and political writer Wolfe Tone (1763–98) invoked Magna Carta regarding Catholic rights 
in Ireland, while American colonists in the decade leading up to, and during, the America 
War of Independence readily looked to the Great Charter to support their claims against the 
actions of the British government (see The Writings of Theobald Wolfe Tone 1763–98, ed. T. W. 
Moody, R. B. McDowell and C. J. Woods (3 vols., Oxford, 2007), i. 177; Turner, Magna 
Carta through the Ages, pp. 212–17).
 10 W. Cobbett, ‘A letter to the freemen of the city of Coventry, 4 April 1818’, Cobbett’s 
Weekly Political Register, xxx (1818), cols. 379–410, esp. cols. 381–2. 
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Yet, for all their political contestation, the constitutional iconography of 
these popular prints, both loyalist and radical alike, was straightforward: 
the legitimate political actors defended the Charter from destruction or 
desecration, while the tyrannical and illegitimate trampled it underfoot, 
lost, tore, or stabbed it.11 By the eighteenth century, these representations of 
the Charter were combined with a canon of other symbolic achievements – 
habeas corpus, the Phrygian (or Liberty) Cap of antiquity, the Constitution, 
the Bill of Rights (1688) – which were little engaged with as things in 
themselves but in combination represented the liberties of freeborn Britons 
whose public reverence lent the semblance of political legitimacy. William 
Hone’s (1780–1842) pro-reform poem The Political House that Jack Built (1819) 
and M. Adams’ loyalist response A Parody on the Political House that Jack 
Built (1820) vividly demonstrate how these rich political symbols could be 
used by contested groups. Both authors agreed that Magna Carta, the Bill of 
Rights and habeas corpus constituted ‘the WEALTH that lays In the House 
that Jack Built’, but fundamentally disagreed as to how this inheritance was 
to be best preserved. For the radical Hone, the unrepresentative, plutocratic 
parliamentarians and sycophantic soldiery, placemen, and privy councillors 
represented the greatest threat, while for the loyalist Adams it was ‘THE 
VERMIN’ reformer ‘who despises all Laws’ that would irrevocably ‘injure’ 
this ‘Wealth, That Lays in the House, That Jack Built’.12 Notably, neither 
Hone nor Adams explored the details of Magna Carta’s history or how it 
would be undermined by their opponents. Its image was only used as it 
presented an easily recognizable ideogram for ‘constitutional rights’. 
While Magna Carta would become an important symbol for parliamentary 
reformers in the later eighteenth century, it was in the decades immediately 
following the Glorious Revolution (1688) that the framework was established 
in which Magna Carta would emerge as an integral part of reformist 
propaganda.13 Following the jurisprudence of the late Elizabethan and early 
Stuart lawyer Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), the predominant seventeenth-
century interpretation of Magna Carta was that it reaffirmed the ancient 
immemorial rights and liberties of the English and formed the basis of a 
fundamental, unalterable, law.14 However, the Revolution Settlement that 
 11 For a description of the numerous prints, see M. D. George, English Political Caricature 
1793–1832: a Study of Opinion and Propaganda (2 vols., Oxford, 1959), i. 44, 54, 60, 69, 83, 
95, 125, 126, 132, 137, 144, 146, 157, 182, 195, 199; i. 13, 23, 81, 125, 126, 175, 181. 
 12 W. Hone, The Political House that Jack Built (1819), passim; M. Adams, A Parody on the 
Political House that Jack Built: or the Real House that Jack Built (1820), pp. 2–3.
 13 Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, p. 42.
 14 F. Thompson, Magna Carta: its Role in the Making of the English Constitution, 1300–1629 
(1948), pp. 354–75; S. D. White, Sir Edward Coke and the Grievances of the Commonwealth 
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restricted the power of the monarchy and vested sovereignty with parliament 
following the Glorious Revolution eventually, and unwittingly, challenged 
this long-held narrative by undermining the supposed independence vested 
in these ‘ancient’ immemorial laws. Parliament had become the state’s 
supreme law-making body whose capacity to enact, amend and repeal 
law (including clauses from Magna Carta) weakened the authority of the 
Great Charter as an ancient, immutable, law. The Bill of Rights (1689), a 
document that was ironically claimed as ‘our second Magna Charta’ by 
Viscount Bolingbroke (1678–1751), placed Magna Carta’s former guardian, 
parliament, in the ascendancy and so supplanted the Great Charter as the 
immemorial bulwark of English liberties.15 
Yet, Magna Carta endured and became an important instrument in 
political debates about the capacity of parliament to alter fundamental 
laws. As Anne Pallister has argued, once ‘the implications of the Revolution 
Settlement to individual liberty became obvious, the Charter once more 
re-emerged as … a weapon to be used against the new tyranny of a class-
dominated sovereign parliament’.16 Magna Carta was raised in this regard in 
1701, following the imprisonment by parliament of five Kentish petitioners 
who had presented a series of policy demands to the house of commons 
and asked that the Members ‘have regard to the voice of the people’.17 Their 
imprisonment made clear the capacity for parliament to act as arbitrarily 
as any monarch, prompting the publication of a range of anti-government 
pamphlets. The lawyer and whig politician John Somers (1651–1716) argued 
in his Jura Populi Anglicani (1701) that imprisoning the Kentish petitioners 
‘was repugnant to Magna Charta … and all the other Acts which designed 
to secure our Liberties from the Invasion of our Kings’ leaving the public 
‘expos’d to the Arbitrary Will of our Fellow Commoners’.18 The novelist Daniel 
Defoe (1660?–1731) similarly responded, presenting his ‘Legions Memorial’ 
to the speaker of the house of commons, Robert Harley (1661–1724), in 
which he urged the petitioners’ to be released exhorting that ‘Englishmen 
are no more to be Slaves to Parliaments than to Kings’19 
(Manchester, 1979), pp. 245–70.
 15 H. St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, A Collection of Political Tracts (1748), p. 246; Turner, 
Magna Carta through the Ages, p. 171.
 16 Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, p. 42.
 17 M. Goldie, ‘The English system of liberty’, in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought, ed. M. Goldie and R. Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 40–78, at 
p. 61.
 18 J. Somers, Baron Somers, Jura Populi Anglicani: Or, the Subjects Right of Petitioning Set 
Forth (1701), p. 17.
 19 W. Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 
1803 (36 vols., 1811), v. 1256.
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The Great Charter and the rights of the subject were similarly invoked in 
1716 by opponents to the Septennial Act (1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 38) which increased 
the maximum length a parliament could sit from three to seven years. 
Stressing what he believed to be the contractual nature of parliamentary 
authority Archibald Hutcheson (1659?–1740), M.P. for Hastings, described 
the Bill as ‘a very dangerous step towards the undermining of that 
constitution which our ancestors have been so careful to preserve’.20 Passing 
it, Hutcheson argued, would equate to giving ‘up the Habeas Corpus act, 
and all the other privileges and immunities, which have been obtained to 
the people … from the date of Magna Charta to this very day’.21 For these 
men, clearly, parliament was to be limited by the ancient laws and liberties 
of the people; yet in practice, many also recognized that despite Coke’s 
contentions to the contrary, no government, however undesirable, could 
govern effectively if it was bound by the actions of their predecessors and no 
law, however ‘ancient’, was immutable. As the poet Jonathan Swift (1667–
1745) noted in 1710 in the tory newspaper The Examiner: 
… in every Government … there is placed a supream, absolute, unlimited 
Power … [and] wherever is entrusted the Power of making Laws, that Power is 
without all Bounds; can repeal or enact at Pleasure whatever Laws it thinks fit 
… agreeable to our old Constitution; yet at the same Time they allow it to be 
defeasible by Act of Parliament; and so is Magna Charta too, if the Legislature 
think fit; which is a Truth so manifest, that no Man who understands the 
Nature of Government, can be in doubt concerning it.22   
Such recognition of parliament’s growing sovereignty and the dichotomy 
this presented about the needs of an effective government at the expense 
of the ‘ancient rights’ of the subject led to wide-ranging discussions in the 
early eighteenth century regarding the mutability of the Great Charter and 
the ancient constitution it had come to represent.23 It was these debates 
that first led the noted jurist and judge Sir William Blackstone (1723–80) to 
Magna Carta in his The Great Charter and the Charter of the Forest (1759).24 
A pioneering piece of historical scholarship, based on an examination of the 
original documents, Blackstone’s The Great Charter for the first time drew 
a proper distinction between the Magna Carta of 1215 and its subsequent 
reissues. It contained transcriptions of the various issues of Magna Carta 
 20 Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England, vii. 339.
 21 Cobbett, The Parliamentary History of England, vii. 347.
 22 The Examiner, no. 33, 22 March 1710, in Jonathan Swift, The works of the Reverend Dr. 
Jonathan Swift (20 vols., Dublin, 1772), v. 320–2.
 23 See Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, pp. 43–58. 
 24 N. Vincent, Magna Carta: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2012), pp. 97–8.
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alongside other key medieval documents that traced the history of Magna 
Carta from the Articles of the Barons of 1215 to the confirmation of the 
Charter by Edward I in 1300.25 In so doing Blackstone demonstrated 
categorically that Magna Carta had evolved as a legal document between 
1215 and 1300 and as such was far from representing a fixed, fundamental, 
unalterable law. Magna Carta, it would seem, had been eclipsed and 
parliament’s sovereignty fully established.26
Yet, Magna Carta was not overshadowed for long and by the mid 
eighteenth century it once again re-emerged as an important symbol 
integral to propaganda challenging the arbitrary actions of parliament.27 
Unsurprisingly, the actual, and rather problematic, history of Magna Carta 
was entirely ignored in this propaganda in which the Great Charter emerged 
as a simple symbol representing the liberties of freeborn Englishmen over 
which the government carelessly rode rough shod. Though it was widely 
used throughout the early eighteenth century to challenge the government 
during the Excise Crisis (1733) and to oppose naval impressment (which 
was represented as a violation of clause 39), it was the radical politician and 
newspaper editor John Wilkes (1725–97) who capitalized most successfully 
upon the Charter to mobilize public opinion in his favour following his 
arrest under a General Warrant in 1763.28 
Wilkes was arrested for libelling King George III (r. 1760–1820) in 
the infamous number 45 issue of his newspaper the North Briton and his 
subsequent struggles against the government for his own liberty, press 
freedom (against General Warrants) and ultimate election to parliament 
and the mayoralty of London all shamelessly exploited the symbol of Magna 
Carta to great effect achieving widespread – and at times violent – public 
support.29 Wilkes was a master propagandist who utilized the symbolism 
of the Great Charter to represent his causes as ones of national importance 
regarding the rights of freeborn Britons whose liberties – as he argued his 
arrest had proven – were under threat. Under Wilkes, Magna Carta became 
an ideograph that represented a form of ancient liberty, the ‘birthright 
of every subject’, which the government under Lord Bute (1713–92) and 
 25 R. Sweet, Antiquaries: the Discovery of the Past in Eighteenth-Century Britain (2004), 
pp. 234–5, 280; Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, p. 169.
 26 William Blackstone, The Great Charter and Charter of the Forest (Oxford, 1759), passim.
 27 Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, pp. 59–75.
 28 British Museum, Department of Prints and Drawings, 1868,0808.3563, Excise in 
Triumph (1733); Oglethorpe, The Sailor’s Advocate, pp. 4–5; The Case of The King Against 
Alexander Broadfoot, pp. 3, 25–6; Turner, Magna Carta through the Ages, pp. 176–7, 179. 
 29 For the events surrounding Wilkes’s arrest see, P. D. G. Thomas, John Wilkes: a Friend 
to Liberty (Oxford, 1996), pp. 27–56.
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George III were undermining with their General Warrants and backstairs 
conniving.30 
Wilkes, who by 1764 had been forced into exile in Paris, never lost an 
opportunity to appear with Magna Carta in popular propaganda, most 
notably on cheap political handbills and broadsides, in popular prints and 
on grand private portraits.31 In this he was consciously copying a tradition 
well established by the seventeenth-century polemicist John Lilburne 
(1614–57), whose name was inextricably connected with Magna Carta and 
freedom of the press.32 The two were frequently compared by eighteenth-
century commentators and their resemblance was so keenly felt that Wilkes 
was presented with a Lilburne medal and copy of Theodorus Verax’s The 
Triall of Lieut. Colonell John Lilburne (1649) by supporters following his 
arrest in 1763.33 
Enterprising businessmen seeking to profit from Wilkes’s popularity 
equally enhanced the Wilkite association with the Great Charter producing 
porcelain figurines, plates, jugs and teapots for the popular market depicting 
Wilkes, charter in hand.34 Even the illustrious manufactory Wedgwood at 
Etruria in Staffordshire produced highly desirable wares depicting Wilkes 
with Magna Carta for their wealthy customers, the designs for which were 
again copied and sold by less prestigious potteries to lower middling clients 
keen to celebrate their hero Wilkes.35 The fact that manufacturers went 
to such lengths demonstrates the popularity of both the document, and 
Wilkes, and the success he achieved in combining his causes with the idea 
of English liberty represented in the form of the Great Charter.  
A similar example of the potency of Magna Carta as a visual invocation 
of national political legitimacy and liberty in the eighteenth century can be 
seen in the episode prompted by the arrest, in November 1762, of Arthur 
 30 Thomas, John Wilkes: a Friend to Liberty, p. 161.
 31 For some of the many examples of this material, see Brit. Museum, 1887,0307,II.46, 
‘Porcelain Figurine of John Wilkes’, Derby, c.1768; Brit. Museum, Dept. of Prints and 
Drawings, 1868,0808.4320, John Wilkes Esqr. & Liberty. Wilkes, and Liberty. A New Song 
(1763); 1873,0809.1475, English Liberty Established, Or a Mirrour for Posterity: John Wilkes 
(1768).
 32 E. Vallance, ‘Reborn John? The eighteenth-century afterlife of John Lilburne’, Hist. 
Workshop Jour., lxxiv (2012), 1–26, at p. 16.
 33 Vallance, ‘Reborn John?’, p. 16. 
 34 Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, pp. 170–3.
 35 G. A. Godden, Illustrated Encyclopaedia of British Pottery and Porcelain (1966), 
p. 146; Victoria & Albert Museum, 414:1109/&A-1885, ‘John Wilkes Teapot’, Wedgwood, 
c.1770; Brighton Museum, DA328528, Thomas Radford, ‘John Wilkes Teapot’, Derby, 
c.1770. 
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Beardmore (d. 1771) an attorney and editor of a whig journal The Monitor.36 
Closely associated with Wilkes, Beardmore had led a sustained campaign 
against the earl of Bute’s ministry – in particular over the issues of General 
Warrants and illegal detention, the closeness of Bute to the king, and the 
tyranny of the Stamp Act (1712) which raised the price of newspapers 
beyond the pocket of the average reader. 
Reasonably cheap, uncensored and scurrilous, newspapers proved an 
effective way of cultivating public hostility towards the tyranny of the 
government and it is no surprise that both Wilkes and Beardmore used them 
as their main medium of criticism.37 The king’s ministers responded using all 
legal means they could to dampen and terminate any critical publications. 
Arresting the printers and authors wholesale was the most effective method 
and this was often undertaken by the use of General Warrants, which – 
contrary to Magna Carta – were issued to arrest any person suspected of 
involvement in a publication and authorized the searching of their property 
until evidence of criminal activity was found.38 Liberty of expression and 
argument was regarded as fundamental to a legitimate political polity and 
the ‘birth-right of a Briton’ as the ‘firmest bulwark of the liberties of this 
country’; yet, General Warrants, Beardmore and Wilkes argued, threatened 
these rights by undermining the freedom of the individual and the freedom 
of the press to criticize illegitimate government.39 For publicizing such views 
Beardmore was arrested under a General Warrant in 1762 (followed closely 
by Wilkes in 1763).40
Upon his arrest Beardmore ensured that he was apprehended in his study 
while in the act of teaching his son Magna Carta.41 This tableau became the 
subject of a much reproduced painting by the radical portraitist Robert 
Edge Pine (1730–88) who would go on to paint Wilkes and whose own 
father, John Pine (1690–1756), had earlier reproduced the first detailed 
engraving of the Great Charter in 1733.42 Veneration of Magna Carta 
clearly ran in the family. Duplicated as a print by James Watson (1740–90) 
this popular image depicts Beardmore in fine cloak and wig pointing out 
 36 A. H. Cash, John Wilkes: the Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty (2006), pp. 88–9.
 37 See B. Harris, Politics and the Rise of the Press: Britain and France, 1620–1800 (1996), 
pp. 29–52.
 38 H. Barker, Newspapers, Politics and English Society, 1695–1855 (Harlow, 2000), p. 71.
 39 The North Briton, no. 1, 5 Jun. 1762, in J. Wilkes, The North Briton from No. 1 to No. 
XLVI. Inclusive. With Several Useful and Explanatory Notes not Printed in any Former Edition 
(1769), p. 1.
 40 Thomas, John Wilkes: a Friend to Liberty, pp. 23, 27–30. Interestingly, upon Wilkes’s 
arrest Beardmore acted as his solicitor.
 41 Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, p. 60, n. 3.
 42 Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, pp. 216–217.
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chapter 29 of the 1225 charter stating in Latin, ‘Nullus liber homo cap[iatur] 
vel imprisionetur aut’ (‘No freeman shall be arrested or imprisoned …’); 
listening intently his young son absorbs the principles of liberty.43 To 
emphasize the constitutional iconography of the print the inscription below 
notes Beardmore is a ‘Common Council-man of the City of London’ and 
quoting Deuteronomy explicitly connects Magna Carta’s sacred (almost 
religious) political principles of freedom with Beardmore’s act of resistance. 
The print was immensely popular, inspiring parodies such as that depicting 
the infamous eighteenth-century criminal ‘Dick Swift’ teaching his son 
an altered version of the ten commandments with the print of Beardmore 
pinned to the back wall.44 
From such Wilkite prints contemporaries in Britain and the North 
American colonies – who by the late 1760s were beginning to agitate 
against what they considered to be a tyrannical British government – learnt 
how powerful the Great Charter was as a symbol of liberty for their own 
propaganda and at times conflated issues based around their invocation of 
Magna Carta.45 In 1768 in the lead up to the American War of Independence 
the Massachusetts house of representatives commissioned the famous 
Liberty Bowl which, with Magna Carta emblazoned on it, celebrated both 
John Wilkes as an opponent of the king and the ‘Glorious Ninety-Two’ 
American politicians who challenged British laws imposing heavy taxation 
on the American colonies.46 Helped by Beardmore and Wilkes the 1760s 
saw a strong revival of the tradition of Magna Carta as a powerful public 
resource, a symbol readily mobilized and contested by political factions. Its 
regular adornment on popular prints, porcelain and in the press ensured that 
the prominence of the Great Charter in the legal textbooks was translated 
into a shared cultural appreciation. Certainly, this was part of a process 
that was begun in the seventeenth century but with industrialization in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the rate and range of its appearance 
and dissemination was rapidly accelerated. 
Unsurprisingly, during a period dominated by agitation for parliamentary 
reform and challenges to the repressive measures implemented by the 
British government following the American and French revolutions, the 
 43 Brit. Museum, Dept. of Prints and Drawings, 1902,1011.6373, J. Watson, Arthur 
Beardmore, Common Council-man of the City of London, Teaching his Son Magna Charta 
(1765). See also Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, p. 174.
 44 Brit. Museum, Dept. of Prints and Drawings, 1851,0308.607, Dick Swift Thieftaker of 
the City of London Teaching his Son the Commandments (1765). See also Breay and Harrison, 
Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, p. 175.
 45 A. Lock, ‘Magna Carta: the Atlantic crossing’, History Today, lxv (2015), 31–7, at pp. 36–7.
 46 Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, Acc. no. 49.45, P. Revere, Jr., Sons of Liberty Bowl, 1768.
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instances in which the liberties of Magna Carta were depicted proliferated. 
Its appearance in the print media and in major political trials of radicals was 
pervasive. It was exploited by both supporters and opponents of Charles 
James Fox (1749–1806) during the Regency Crisis of 1788; invoked on tokens 
disseminated by members of the London Corresponding Society celebrating 
their acquittal at their trials in 1794; used to challenge the suspension of 
habeas corpus in 1817; and raised during the Queen Caroline affair of 
1820.47 Of all these early nineteenth-century invocations, however, it was 
perhaps most audaciously used in court by the Cato Street conspirators at 
their trials for high treason in 1820. These Spencean radicals had conspired 
to assassinate the entire British cabinet at a banquet but were arrested in 
their hideout having been betrayed by an agent provocateur.48 For one of 
the conspirators, William Davidson (1786–1820), the plot to murder the 
cabinet was perfectly justified by Magna Carta.49 He likened himself and his 
co-conspirators to the twenty-five barons nominated in clause 61 to uphold 
the Great Charter should the government tyrannically ignore its provisions. 
Describing clause 61, Davidson argued that the Great Charter, 
ordained that twenty-five barons should be nominated to see that the terms of 
the charter were not infringed; and, if it was found that his Majesty’s Ministers 
were guilty of such infringement, then four barons were to call upon them 
for redress. If this were not granted, then the four barons were to return to 
their brethren … to take up arms, and assert their rights. Such an act was not 
considered in times of old as an act of treason towards the king, however hostile 
it might be towards his ministers.50
Needless to say this highly inaccurate interpretation of clause 61 did not 
persuade the judge and Davidson was sentenced with six of his other co-
conspirators to be hanged, drawn and quartered: the last time this sentence 
was passed at the Old Bailey.51 
 47 Brit. Museum, Dept. of Prints and Drawings, 1952,0403.3, ‘Design for a column with a 
statue of William III, intended to be erected at Runnymede, 1788; 1868,0808.5828, Revolution 
Pillar (1788); 1868,0808.8364, G. Cruikshank, Liberty Suspended (1817); Manchester, People’s 
History Museum, 1993.371–94, ‘Erskine and Gibbs and Trial by Jury’, token, 1794; Hone 
and Cruikshank, The Queen and Magna Charta. See also Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: 
Law, Liberty, Legacy, pp. 176–7, 181.
 48 M. Chase, ‘Cato Street conspirators’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford, 2004–15) <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/58584> [accessed 26 March 2018].
 49 For more on William Davidson, see H. Mackey, ‘The complexion of the accused: 
William Davidson, the black revolutionary in the Cato Street conspiracy’, Negro Educational 
Rev., xxiii (1972), 132–47.
 50 G. T. Wilkinson, An Authentic History of the Cato Street Conspiracy (1820), p. 341. 
 51 C. Emsley, T. Hitchcock and R. Shoemaker, ‘Punishments at the Old Bailey: drawn 
Magna Carta: history, context and influence
112
While it was invoked predominantly by those challenging the government 
and seeking parliamentary reform, many loyalist prints also engaged Magna 
Carta throughout the period to contest what they perceived to be the 
dangerous Jacobin propaganda of the reformers. Presenting Magna Carta as 
the basis of an authentic ancient liberty, these loyalists argued that the Great 
Charter was being undermined by British radicals eager to replicate the 
excesses of French republicanism, which – when ‘contrasted’ with England’s 
unwritten ‘ancient constitution’ – offered nothing but misery, poverty and 
slavery. This argument was made in The Palace of John Bull, Contrasted with 
the Poor “House that Jack Built” (1820) whose title page displayed ‘the fair 
SCALES of JUSTICE’ weighing up the radicals’ Phrygian cap and quill 
against the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights and Magna Carta. While 
the scales were weighed down with the substance of these weighty ‘Laws 
of renown’, the radicals’ republican ideals were unsurprisingly found to 
be hollow and wanting.52 An earlier print of 1792 by Thomas Rowlandson 
(1757–1827) entitled The Contrast, similarly asserted this popular loyalist 
point. First printed in the aftermath of the September Massacres and the 
arrest of Louis XVI, the print employed the familiar iconography of ‘British 
Liberty’ – represented in this case by Britannia holding the scales of justice 
and Magna Carta – to undermine radical arguments about the benefits of 
republicanism and ‘French Liberty’ which were represented in the print by 
an ugly, blood-stained, Medusa-like Marianne.53 
Although invoked by both loyalist and radical alike, engagement with 
Magna Carta remained unsubtle and unsophisticated in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries and largely copied the iconographical tropes 
already established by the likes of Wilkes and Beardmore in the 1760s. The 
most obvious example of this can be seen in the exploitation of Magna Carta 
by the radical M.P. Sir Francis Burdett (1770–1844) who was committed to 
the Tower of London in 1810 on the orders of the house of commons for 
breach of parliamentary privilege having publicly criticized, in a deliberately 
provocative open letter to his constituents, another prosecution by the 
commons of the London-based radical John Gale Jones (1769–1838).54 
and quartered’, in Old Bailey Proceedings Online <http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/
Punishment.jsp#death> [accessed 27 Sept. 2017].
 52 The Palace of John Bull, Contrasted with the Poor “House that Jack Built” (1820).
 53 Brit. Museum, Dept. of Prints and Drawings, 1861,1012.47, T. Rowlandson, The 
Contrast: British Liberty, French Liberty, Which is Best? (1792); Breay and Harrison, Magna 
Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, p. 158.
 54 Pallister, Magna Carta: the Heritage of Liberty, pp. 67–9. Gale Jones had been imprisoned 
for publicly questioning the legitimacy of parliament to exclude strangers from the house of 
commons during its debates of the failed Walcheren expedition. 
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Throughout his career Burdett was a staunch advocate of radical 
parliamentary reform with a deep and long held attachment to the Cokean 
interpretation of the existence of an ‘ancient constitution’ underpinned by 
Magna Carta.55 For Burdett, Magna Carta represented a powerful emblem 
of the ‘ancient’ freedoms and ‘birthright of Britons’ that had been long 
lost through the misrule of a corrupt political establishment in need of 
reform.56 Upon his imprisonment in 1810 Burdett drew extensively on 
these ideas appealing to the Great Charter with enormous popular success. 
Indeed, the published open letter to his constituents for which he was 
imprisoned eulogized the Charter throughout and opened with Magna 
Carta’s clauses 39 and 40 as its epigraph.57 Published in William Cobbett’s 
Political Register Burdett’s letter continued the debate of a century earlier 
regarding the sovereignty of an unrepresentative parliament. He informed 
his constituents that the Commons’ vote imprisoning Gale Jones amounted 
‘to a declaration, that an Order of theirs is to be of more weight than Magna 
Charta and the Laws of the Land’; as such, Burdett questioned ‘Whether 
our liberty be still … secured by the laws of our forefathers, or … at the 
absolute mercy of a part of our fellow-subjects, collected together by means 
which it is not necessary for me to describe’.58 The corollary of the argument 
was that a reformed parliament, elected on a wide franchise, would not dare 
to so infringe the rights of their subjects and, as they represented the people, 
could not but abide by the ‘ancient constitution’ as its guardians.
This interpretation of the arbitrary and unconstitutional actions of 
the house of commons against Gale Jones and Burdett gained traction. 
Throughout his imprisonment colourful prints and porcelain – reminiscent 
of Wilkes – proliferated depicting Burdett as the champion of Magna 
Carta and British liberty and, following Beardmore before him, Burdett 
even arranged to be arrested at home teaching his son Magna Carta while 
a growing mob outside caused a disturbance.59 According to M. Dorothy 
George, hardly ever before had a public character been so hero-worshipped 
 55 M. Baer, ‘Burdett, Sir Francis, fifth baronet (1770–1844)’, in O.D.N.B. <https://doi.
org/10.1093/ref:odnb/3962> [accessed 26 March 2018]..
 56 Turner, Magna Carta through the Ages, p. 185; The London Magazine and Review, January 
to April 1825, new ser., i (1825), 518.
 57 F. Burdett, Sir Francis Burdett to his Constituents; Denying the Power of the House of 
Commons to Imprison the People of England (1810), pp. 3–12. The letter was first published in 
William Cobbett’s Political Register, xvii (1810), Sir Francis Burdett to his Constituents, cols. 
417–22. 
 58 Burdett, Sir Francis Burdett to his Constituents, p. 5.
 59 Brit. Museum., Dept. of Prints and Drawings, 1868,1212.1, I. Cruikshank, The Arrest of 
Sir Fs Burdett. MP (1810); R. K. Huch, The Radical Lord Radnor: the Public Life of Viscount 
Folkestone, Third Earl of Radnor (1779–1869) (Minneapolis, Minn., 1977), p. 65. 
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or glamorized in satirical prints.60 Burdett represented an attack on 
‘corruption’ in all its facets and recalling Wilkes and Beardmore, the Charter 
was the centrepiece in a symbolic performance calculated to mobilize public 
opinion against the government and the sovereignty of an unrepresentative 
parliament.61 
Such powerful radical propaganda created a strong connection between 
Magna Carta and parliamentary reform in the popular imagination. Indeed, 
so strong was it that when the Reform Act of 1832 was passed, granting 
new political rights in the form of a limited extension of the franchise, it 
was explicitly presented as a new Magna Carta. Early published editions 
of the Act were issued under the title of The Great Charter of 1832 while 
a popular ceramic cordial bottle representing the lord chancellor, Henry 
Brougham (1778–1868) – who played a crucial role in the passage of the 
Bill through the house of lords – identified the Act as ‘The Second Magna 
Charta’.62 Other M.P.s involved in passing the legislation similarly relished 
the comparison. The M.P. Thomas Coke (1754–1842), a descendent of 
the seventeenth-century lawyer Sir Edward Coke, commissioned a relief 
celebrating the Reform Act depicting him with his whig parliamentary 
colleagues forcing King John to seal the Charter at Runnymede.63
This was not the last time that Magna Carta would be raised in connection 
with parliamentary reform in the nineteenth century. The Great Reform Act 
of 1832 was but the first in a series of legislative developments that paved the 
way to universal suffrage in Great Britain in 1928 and in the agitation for 
these later reforms Magna Carta continued to be lionized. Most prominent 
in this respect, however, was its use by the Chartists between 1838 and the 
early 1850s. The first mass working-class movement for democratic rights, 
Chartism took its name from the People’s Charter that contained the six 
points of parliamentary reform for which they agitated.64 The choice of the 
word ‘charter’ in this context was significant. It consciously drew upon the 
powerful symbolism of Magna Carta as the foundation stone of English 
liberties. The allusion to Magna Carta was one which all politically engaged 
 60 George, English Political Caricature 1793–1832, ii. 125.
 61 George, English Political Caricature 1793–1832, ii. 125–7. See also Breay and Harrison, 
Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, pp. 178–80.
 62 The Great Charter of 1832; Comprised in the Three Reform Bills (1832); People’s History 
Museum, NMLH.1992.1073, ‘Ceramic cordial bottle with Lord Brougham and a Second 
Magna Charta’, Doulton & Watts, 1832.
 63 N. B. Penny, ‘The whig cult of Fox in early nineteenth-century sculpture’, Past & 
Present, lxx (1976), 94–105, at p. 104. The relief can still be seen at the Coke family seat at 
Holkham Hall, Norfolk.
 64 D. Thompson, ‘Chartism, success or failure?’, in People for the People: Radical Ideas and 
Personalities in British History, ed. D. Rubinstein (1973), pp. 90–7, at p. 92. 
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contemporaries would have been aware. It continued the long tradition 
of radical appropriation of the Great Charter and in so doing represented 
the People’s Charter as a new Magna Carta that would ultimately secure the 
political rights of all classes, completing the process begun in 1215.65 Yet, again, 
as with Wilkes or Burdett, the Chartist’s invocation of Magna Carta was made 
without any serious reference to its actual historical contexts. It was largely 
used in an anachronistic way to claim rights that were never guaranteed in the 
Charter and that were quite unknown to the medieval mind. 
For all these inaccuracies, however, Magna Carta remained a powerful 
totem celebrated by the crowd. At a great Chartist meeting on Hartshead 
Moor, near Leeds, in 1838 the demagogue Joseph Rayner Stephens (1805–79) 
addressed those gathered, inaccurately invoking Magna Carta as ensuring 
free speech, freedom of association and even freedom from the workhouse; 
he told them,
We are seeking nothing new … We stand upon our old rights – we seek no 
change – we say give us the good old laws of England unchanged (Cheers.) … 
and what are those laws? What is that constitution by which we seek to abide? 
– (Magna Charta) – Aye, Magna Charta! The good old laws of English freedom 
– free meetings – freedom of speech – freedom of workshops – freedom of 
homesteads – free and happy firesides, and no workhouses. (Cheers)66
A year later when Stephens was imprisoned for disturbing the public peace 
the Manchester Chartist R. J. Richardson (1808?–1861) threatened to march 
into the city with 100,000 men holding copies of Magna Carta in their 
hands.67
The Chartists were by no means the last political movement to invoke 
Magna Carta in the long nineteenth century which saw the Charter persist 
as a useful symbol of legitimate political rights. Led by the eccentric lawyer 
Dr. Edward Kenealy (1819–80), the Magna Charta Association established 
in 1874 promoted a broad reformist agenda that built upon the earlier 
demands of the Chartists. Receiving widespread national support, it became, 
according to Rohan McWilliam, ‘the most significant movement of popular 
agitation between the decline of Chartism in the 1840s and rise of organised 
socialism in the 1880s’.68 The suffragettes of the late nineteenth and early 
 65 M. Chase, Chartism: a New History (Manchester, 2007), p. 8. This argument was most 
powerfully put in the Chartist pamphlet J. Watkins, The Five Cardinal Points of the People’s 
Charter (Whitby, 1839), pp. 4–6. 
 66 Northern Star, 16 Oct. 1838, p. 2.
 67 Taylor, ‘Magna Carta in the nineteenth century’, p. 147.
 68 J. A. Hamilton and R. McWilliam, ‘Kenealy, Edward Vaughan Hyde (1819–1880)’, 
in O.D.N.B. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/15356> [accessed 26 March 2018]; 
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twentieth centuries also used Magna Carta in their own propaganda to 
legitimize direct political action. In 1911 the suffragette newspaper Votes for 
Women drew on the example of the Magna Carta barons and ‘How Militant 
Methods Won the Great Charter’ to encourage their readers to continue 
in their shock tactics.69 Others such as the first practising female barrister 
Helena Normanton (1882–1957) engaged with Magna Carta as a historical 
precedent that supported the right of women to vote. For Normanton, 
it is expressly contrary to Magna Carta to refuse, deny, or delay, right or justice. 
The right of franchise is still unconstitutionally withheld from women, but 
the spirit of Magna Carta sounds a trumpet-call to them to struggle ever more 
valiantly to realise its noble ideal.70    
Ironically, these later appeals to Magna Carta were made at almost 
precisely the same time that the clauses of the Great Charter were being 
repealed by parliament. Beginning in 1828 and concluding in 1969 the 
biggest excision of Magna Carta’s clauses from the Statute took place in 1863 
as part of the Statute Law Revision Act (26 & 27 Vic. c.125).71 Today only 
three clauses remain in English law.72 However, the fact that Magna Carta 
was losing its basis in law seemed to matter very little to those who invoked 
it. From the early eighteenth century the Charter had been engaged with 
less as a legal instrument than as a versatile and powerful totem of an ancient 
English liberty. It lent the semblance of political legitimacy to anyone who 
wished to capitalize upon it and its ability to stir emotional public support 
has ensured its legacy as a powerful international symbol of freedom up to 
the present day.
R. McWilliam, ‘Radicalism and popular culture: the Tichborne case and the politics of “fair 
play” 1867–1886’, in Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party 
Politics in Britain 1850–1914, ed. E. F. Biagini and A. J. Reid (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 44–64, 
at p. 44. 
 69 Votes for Women, 27 Jan. 1911. See also Taylor, ‘Magna Carta in the nineteenth century’, 
pp. 149–50. 
 70 H. Normanton, ‘Magna Carta and Women’, The Englishwomen, lxxvii (1915), 129–42, at 
p. 135.
 71 Breay and Harrison, Magna Carta: Law, Liberty, Legacy, p. 221.
 72 Vincent, Magna Carta: a Very Short Introduction, pp. 101–2. The clauses still on Statute 
all date from the reissue of Magna Carta confirmed by Edward I and enrolled on the 
Statute in 1297. They are: clause 1 confirming the liberties of the English Church; clause 
9 confirming the liberties and customs of the city of London and other cities, towns and 
ports; and, the most famous, clause 29 stating that ‘No freeman will be taken or imprisoned 
or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in anyway ruined … save by the lawful judgement of 
his peers or by the law of the land. To no one shall we sell, to no one shall we deny or delay 
right or justice’.
117
Adams, John, 88–9, 94, 95–6
Adams, M., 104
Adams, Sam, 85, 91–2
Agincourt, commemoration of battle 
of, 1, 5
‘Agreement of the People’, see Levellers
Albigensian Crusade, 31
Alexander II of Scotland, 21
American Civil War, centenary of, 12
ancient constitution, idea of, 54, 62, 
66–7, 69, 72, 79–80, 102–7, 112–
13, 115–6
Anne, Princess, 25
anti-Catholicism, 8–9, 12–13
Anti-Federalists (U.S.) and Magna 
Carta, 96, 98
Apprentice Boys, commemoration of in 
Londonderry/Derry, 12–13
archbishops of Canterbury, 
 Stephen Langton, 25, 28–9, 30–1, 
42–9
 Edmund of Abingdon, 46–8
 Justin Welby, 2, 25
Armistice Day 1918, 8
 debates over, 11
 commemoration in 2008, 14
Arthur (King Arthur), 59
Arthur of Brittany, nephew of King 
John, 18, 27–8
Arts and Humanities Research Council, 
see Magna Carta Project
Baker, John, 52
Baldwin, John, 41–4
Bastille, fall of, 1789, 13
B.B.C. (British Broadcasting 
Corporation), 1–2
 ‘In Our Time’ on Magna Carta, 6
Beardmore, Arthur, 108–10, 113
Becket, Thomas, 28, 49
Beijing, 15
 Peking University (PKU), ix–x
 Renmin University, 9
Bicchieri, Guala, 34
Bill of Rights (Great Britain, 1689), 26, 
104–5
Bill of Rights (United States, 1791), 32, 
98–9
bishops, role in the making of Magna 
Carta, 41–50
Blackstone, William, 82–4, 106
Bland, Richard, 81
Bocking, Essex, 24
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, first 
viscount, 105
Boston, Mass., 86, 87
Boston Tea Party, 1773, 89
Bouvines, battle of, 1214, 29
Braintree, Mass., 88
Breay, Claire, 6
Brexit and Magna Carta, 39–40
Briouze, Matilda de, 18
Briouze, William de, 28
British Bill of Rights, 9
British Library
 Magna Carta exhibition 2015, 6, 23
 Magna Carta conference 2015, 6
Brougham, Henry, first Lord Brougham 
and Vaux, 114
Burdett, Sir Francis, 112–5
Burgh, James, 92
Burke, Edmund, 82
Cameron, David, 2, 9, 14, 25
Caroline, Queen, trial of, 1820, 111
Carroll, Charles, 94
Index 
Magna Carta: history, context and influence
118
Carpenter, David, 44–5
Cato Street conspiracy, 111
Charles I, 36, 51, 59, 60, 61, 64, 66n, 
68–71, 76
Charleston, S.C., 87
Charter of the Forest, 7, 45
Charter of Runnymede, 22
Chartist movement and Magna Carta, 
114–5
Christianson, P., 67
Churchill, Winston S., 10, 26
Coercive Acts, see Intolerable Acts
Coke, Sir Edward, 51–60, 62, 65–75, 
79–80, 83–5, 90–3, 99, 100, 104, 
106, 113, 114
 Institutes (1628 et seq.), 53, 57, 59, 
67–8
 Reports (1600–14), 53, 59
 habeas corpus and Magna Carta, 
55–6
 common law and Magna Carta, 
66–7, 69
Coke, Thomas, 114
Connecticut, 88
Continental Congress (U.S.), 89, 95
Coronation Charter, see Henry I
coronation rituals, 48
Cotton, Sir Robert, 59
Cromartie, Alan, 66
D-Day, 1, 11
Davidson, William, 111
D’Avray, David, 45
Dickinson, John, 84, 86
Declaration of Independence (U.S., 
1776), 26, 90, 97
Declaration of the Rights of Man 
(France, 1789), 32
Defoe, Daniel, 105
Delaware, 81, 95
Downer, Silas, 93–4
Drayton, William Henry, 90
Dresden, bombing of, 11
duke of Edinburgh, Philip, 25
Dzelzainis, Martin, 75
Edward I, 34–5, 46, 58, 65, 69, 100
Edward II, 35
Edward III, 51
Edward the Confessor, 54, 59
Elizabeth I, 62
Elizabeth II, 2, 25
Examiner, The, 106
Excise Crisis, 1733, 107
Falaise, 27
Federal Convention (U.S., 1787), 96–7
Federalist Papers, 97
F.I.F.A. (Fédération International de 
Football Association), 2–3
First World War, 1, 8, 10–12
Five Knights Case, 1627, 55–6, 64–5
Fox, Charles James, 111
French Revolution, 13–14, 112
Gallipoli, commemorations of battle of, 
6, 26; mentioned, 10
General Warrants, 109
George III, 82, 85, 95, 107
George, M. Dorothy, 113–4
Georgia (U.S.A.), 80
Glorious Revolution, 1688, 82, 104–5
Gordon, William, 94
Great Reform Act, 1832, 114
Guy Fawkes Day, 8
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 87
Hamilton, Alexander, 96–7
Hancock, John, 85, 88–9
Harley, Robert, 105
Henry I, 30, 54
 Coronation Charter of, 1100, 30
Henry II, 27, 28, 49, 54
Henry III, 22, 23, 33–4, 45–8, 54, 58, 
65
Henry IV, 35
Magna Carta in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain
119
Henry V, 51
Hill, Felicity, 47
Hiroshima Day, 6 August, 12
historic anniversaries, 1–15
Historical Association, 6
Hobbes, Thomas, Behemoth, 60
Holocaust Memorial Day, 14
Holt, J. C., 43
Hone, William, 104
Hopkins, Stephen, 81, 89
Human Rights Act, 1998, 9
Hutchinson, Thomas, 91
Iberian peninsula, 49
Intolerable Acts, 1774, 89
Iredell, James, 97
James I, 53, 57, 59, 62–3, 100
James II, 36
Jefferson, Thomas, 82, 89
John (King), see King John
Johnston, James, 97
Jones, John Gale, 112
Jurors, The, sculpture at Runnymede, 
3–4
Justinian I, Institutes, 57–8
Kenealy, Edward, 115
Kennedy, John F., assassination of, 15
Kidd, Colin, 103
King’s College London, 6
kingship, ideas of in the thirteenth 
century, 41–3
King John, 17–22, 25–31, 33, 35, 39–
40, 44–5, 47, 54, 58, 61, 69, 80n, 
94–5, 99–100, 101n, 114
 failings of kingship, 18, 26–7
 arbitrary government of, 18–19
 character, 28
 death, 33
King Stephen, 54
Langdon, Samuel, 94
Langton, Stephen, see archbishops of 
Canterbury
Levellers, 62, 67–77
 and ‘free-born Englishmen’, 75–6
 political thought of, 70–2
 views on Magna Carta, 72–7
 ‘Agreement of the People’ and Magna 
Carta, 76–7
Lilburne, John, 70–6, 108
Littleton, Thomas, 53
Locke, Huw, sculptor, 3–4
London Association, 93
London Corresponding Society, 111
Louis, King of France, 22, 33
Lynch, Loretta (U.S. Attorney 
General), 2, 25
McWilliam, Rohan, 115
Madison, James, 96
Magna Carta: 
versions of, 106
1215, 23, 26, 58, 80
1216, 22, 33
1217, 22–3, 34
1225, 22–3, 34, 41, 46, 52, 54, 
58, 65, 67–8, 74, 80, 98
1300, 7, 23
clauses of 1215 version mentioned 
in the text: 
1: 22, 32, 116n
9: 116n
10: 31
11: 31
12: 17, 22
13: 22, 32, 37
18: 22
20: 21 
33: ix–x, 17, 37–8
35: 30, 37
39: (ch. 29 in 1225 version), 3, 
20, 21, 32, 36, 44, 54–5, 
Magna Carta: history, context and influence
120
65, 69, 74, 81, 90, 98, 102, 
107, 110, 116n
40: (ch. 29 in 1225 version), 17, 
20, 32, 39, 54–5, 65, 69, 
74, 81, 90, 98, 102, 110, 
116n
41: 37–8
42: 37–8
48: 22
50: 30, 31, 40
51: 30, 31, 40
54: 21
60: 31
61: 31, 68, 99, 111
800th anniversary celebration of, 
2–7, 9, 25
800th exhibitions of, 6
and the British empire, 38
and the Civil War (1640–60), 
61–77
copies found in Faversham and 
Sandwich, Kent, 7
in colonial America, 80–2
composition of 1215 version, 44–5
contemporary disagreement over, 9
contemporary relevance of, 17–18, 
32
distribution of in 1215, 23
earlier celebrations of, 5, 26
elitism of, 20–1, 40, 79, 103
iconography of, 102–4
Jews and, 31
legacy of, 32, 34, 46
legal training, use in early modern 
Inns of Court, 52
liberty of the subject, 60
longevity of, 22–3, 34, 52
and loyalism, 112
and monarchical power, 30, 33, 35, 
47, 64–5
origins of, 30
and the papacy, 29, 33
and political pluralism, 37
precedents for, 19, 31, 39, 58, 69, 
77, 81, 104, see also ancient 
constitution
rule of law and due process, 7, 24, 
26, 32, 35, 38, 40, 47, 55, 74, 
80–1, 95
and spiritual authority, 50
taxation and, 20, 24
United States, influence in, 36, 
79–100
and U.S. Constitution, 96–7
universality of, 15, 17, 24, 31–2, 
36–7, 47, 101, 116
and women, 21, 32, 47
Magna Carta Project 2012–15 (Arts 
and Humanities Research Council), 
6, 45
Magna Carta Trust, 5
800 Committee of, x, 5
Magna Charta Association (f. 1874), 
115
Mandela, Nelson, 5
Marbury v. Madison, 99
Marshal, William, earl of Pembroke, 34
Marshall, John, 99
Maryland, 81, 85, 95
 legislature, 90
Massachusetts, 80–1, 85, 86, 95
 colonial assembly, 91
 Constitution, 1780, 96
 House of Representatives, 110
 Liberty Bowl, 1768, 84, 110. See 
also Revere, Paul
Mather, Moses, 92
memory, history of, 7, 10, 14–15
Montfort, Simon de, French baron, 31
Montfort, Simon de, eighth earl of 
Leicester, 41
National Archives, The, 6
National Portrait Gallery, 8
Magna Carta in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain
121
national commemorations, 7–8
New York, 95
 colonial assembly, 91
New Hampshire, 95
Normaton, Helena, 116
North Carolina, 94, 95
North Russia Club, 11
Observance of 5th November Act, 
1606 (the ‘Thanksgiving Act’), 8
Old Testament, influence on thirteenth-
century bishops, 48–9
Orange Order, parades of in Northern 
Ireland, 13
Orr, Alan, 77
Osborne, George, 5
Otis, James, 86, 93
Otto IV, Holy Roman Emperor, 29
Overton, Richard, 70, 73–4
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
14
Paine, Thomas, 94
Pallister, Anne, 105
Pamiers, Statute of, 1212, 31
Paris, medieval schools at, 41–2
Paris, Matthew, 46
Parliament, development of, 34–5, 41
Peace Pledge Union, 11
Peking University (PKU), Beijing, 
Magna Carta conference 2015 at, 
ix–x
Penn, William, 81
Pennsylvania, 81, 94
 colonial legislature in, 88
People’s Charter, 1836, 114–5
Petition of Right, 1628, and Magna 
Carta, 56–7, 66–7, 75
Philadelphia, 87, 89, 94
Philip II (Philip Augustus), king of 
France, 28, 33
Pine, John, 109
Pine, Robert Edge, 109
Pocock, J. G. A., 66
Portadown, N.I., 13
Public Processions (Northern Ireland) 
Act, 1998, 13
Putney Debates, 1647, 76
Quinault, Roland, 8
Ralph of Coggeshall, 44
Ramsay, David, 97
Regency Crisis, 1788, 111
Revere, Paul, 84–5, 110n
Rhode Island, 81
Richard I, 27, 58
Richard II, 35
Richard III, 35
Richardson, R. J., 115
Rouen, 27
Rowlandson, Thomas, 112
Rudyerd, Sir Benjamin, 51–2, 56, 60
Runnymede, Surrey, 2–4, 9, 15, 17, 
21–3, 25, 30, 33, 39, 41, 43, 44, 
80, 100, 111, 114.  
Russell, Conrad, 64
Russian Revolution, centenary of, 12
Salisbury Cathedral, 6
Second World War, 1, 10–11
 Soviet commemoration of, 11
Septennial Act, 1716, 106
Shakespeare
 Henry V, 1
Sharpe, Kevin, 64
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley, 5
slavery, 5, 38
Smith, David Chan, 65–6
Somers, John, 105
Sons of Liberty, 88
South Carolina, 90, 95
Stamp Act, 1712, 109
Stamp Act Congress, 1765, 91
Stamp tax, 1765, 90–2
Statute Law Revision Act, 1863, 116
Magna Carta: history, context and influence
122
Stephen (King), see King Stephen
Stephens, J. R., 115
Strafford, Thomas Wentworth, first earl 
of, execution, 59
suffragettes, and Magna Carta, 115–6
Sugar Act, 1764, 87–8
Sumption, Jonathan, 9
Supreme Court (U.S.), doors of, and 
Magna Carta, 100
Swift, Jonathan, 106
Townshend Acts, 1767, 87
traditions, invention of, 7–8
Trafalgar Day, 8
Tucker, John, 82
Tucker, Josiah, 83
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(United Nations, 1948), 32
Verax, Theodorus, 108
Vincent, Nicholas, 6, 45
Virginia, 95, 98
charter of 1606, 80
Bill of Rights, 1776, 95
Walwyn, William, 72–3, 75, 77
Waterloo, battle of, 1, 5, 26
Watson, James, 109
Webber, Teresa, 45
Wedgwood, depictions of Magna Carta, 
108
Weiler, Björn, 48–9
Westminster Abbey (St. Katherine’s 
Chapel), 46
Westminster Hall, 60
 Magna Carta exhibition in, 6
Wilkes, John, 84, 92, 107–15
William I (the Conqueror), 54
William, Prince (duke of Cambridge), 
2, 25
Wilson, James, 93, 94, 97
Winchester Cathedral, 47
Worcester, Sir Robert (Bob), x
Ypres, battle of (1915), 26
The Institute of Historical Research (I.H.R.) is the U.K.’s national centre for 
history. Founded in 1921, the Institute facilitates and promotes innovative 
research via its primary collections library, and its programme of training, 
publishing, conferences, seminars and fellowships. The I.H.R. is one of the 
nine humanities research institutes of the School of Advanced Study at the 
University of London.
‘I.H.R. Shorts’ is a new Open Access publishing series from the Institute 
of Historical Research at the University of London. Insightful and concise, 
I.H.R. Shorts offer incisive commentaries on contemporary historical 
debates. Titles range from 15,000 to 50,000 words with a focus on 
interdisciplinary approaches to the past. 
1. Dethroning historical reputations: universities, museums and the 
commemoration of benefactors
edited by Jill Pellew and Lawrence Goldman (2018)
2.  Magna Carta: history, context and influence
edited by Lawrence Goldman (2018)
Magna Carta: history, context 
and infl uence
Papers delivered at Peking University on the 
800th anniversary of Magna Carta
This book examines the history and infl uence of Magna Carta in British 
and American history. In a series of essays written by notable British 
specialists, it considers the origins of the document in the political 
and religious contexts of the thirteenth century, the relevance of its 
principles to the seventeenth century disputes that led to the Civil War, 
the uses made of Magna Carta to justify the American Revolution, and 
its inspiration of the radical-democratic movement in Britain in the early 
nineteenth century. The introductory essay considers the celebration of 
Magna Carta’s 800th anniversary in 2015 in relation to ceremonials and 
remembrance in Britain in general. Given as papers to a joint conference 
of British and Chinese historians in Beĳ ing in 2015, these essays provide 
a clear and insightful overview of the origins and impact of a medieval 
document that has shaped the history of the world.  
IHR SHORTS
Concise, incisive history 
from the Institute of 
Historical Research 
